The Civilian and the War on Terror: Do Norms Shape Strategy? by Replogle, Sherri
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
2013
The Civilian and the War on Terror: Do Norms
Shape Strategy?
Sherri Replogle
Loyola University Chicago, sherri.replogle@gmail.com
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2013 Sherri Replogle
Recommended Citation
Replogle, Sherri, "The Civilian and the War on Terror: Do Norms Shape Strategy?" (2013). Dissertations. Paper 682.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/682
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO 
 
 
 
THE CIVILIAN AND THE WAR ON TERROR:  
 
 DO NORMS SHAPE STRATEGY?  
 
 
 
  
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
 
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
SHERRI STONE REPLOGLE 
 
CHICAGO, IL 
 
AUGUST 2013 
 
Copyright by Sherri Stone Replogle, 2013 
All rights reserved. 
iii 
  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I would like to thank the many people who supported me in the process of writing 
this dissertation. First of all, Dr. Alexandru Grigorescu, the chair of my dissertation 
committee, provided invaluable feedback, much patience, and extraordinary commitment 
to help me turn my ideas into a researchable project. Without him this finished product 
would not have been possible. Dr. John Allen Williams provided this layperson with 
much needed guidance in military affairs, and his stellar reputation among those with 
both military and academic backgrounds made securing interviews a much easier process. 
Drs. Vince Mahler and Peter Schraeder provided feedback on several drafts and pushed 
me to clarify my arguments. I thank the many other professors and students who provided 
intellectual support throughout this process.    
Dr. Manfred Steger, my first academic mentor and friend, had faith in me 
throughout this process. His unwaivering commitment to the relevance of ethics in 
political life has shaped my own aspirations in both teaching and scholarship.  Khalil 
Marrar has listened endlessly to my ideas and encouraged and supported me throughout 
the process.  Finally, I thank my children, parents, and the rest of my family for their 
inspiration and sacrifices along the way.  
Even a purely moral act that has no hope of any immediate and visible political effect can 
gradually and indirectly, over time, gain in political significance. 
 
— Václav Havel 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii  
LIST OF TABLES vi  
LIST OF FIGURES  vii  
ABSTRACT viii  
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  1  
    
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF THE CIVILIAN IMMUNITY NORM  62  
    
CHAPTER THREE: DOCTRINAL INNOVATION AND CIVILIANS  95  
    
CHAPTER FOUR: IRAQ  136  
    
CHAPTER FIVE: AFGHANISTAN  184  
    
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION  246  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  265  
 
VITA  283  
 vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Civilian Immunity Norm: Principles and Underlying Meta-Norms 58 
 
Table 2. Summary of Findings 250         
Table 3. Conditions of Strategic Effects 254         
  
 
 vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Physical War Versus  the War of Ideas 48 
 
Figure 2. Double Loop Learning 100         
  
 
 viii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The sentiment that civilians should be protected in war is reflected in the set of legal, 
moral, and political strictures known as the civilian immunity norm (CIN). This norm is 
paradoxical in the sense that although it is widely considered settled, meaning it generates 
a strong consensus in the international community among states and even among publics, 
it is also quite fragile in actual battlefield conditions, when the protection of civilians 
often gives way to military necessity. The norm came under considerable stress during 
the height of the Global War on Terror, when many argued that the norm must be relaxed 
in order to effectively fight non-state actors. Viewed through this lens, a rather 
remarkable development occurred in the U.S. military under the War on Terror, when, 
faced with strategic failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, rather than escalate force against 
civilians for the sake of “winning,” the military changed its definition of “military 
necessity” to more closely reflect the constraining normative environment. Despite a 
growing research agenda centered on issues of civilian immunity, it remains unclear what 
effect the CIN has, if any, on such developments. When does the CIN matter? More 
specifically, when does it alter short term strategic choices and even long term doctrines? 
This study employs a constructivist approach, arguing that democracies will 
choose strategic outcomes that strengthen compliance with the CIN when they see the 
constraining normative environment as a key part of the strategic environment.  
Legitimacy is argued to be the causal mechanism driving interests and identities to align 
 ix 
 
more closely with the human rights-based aspects of the international order.   My 
argument, based on a social conception of power, hinges on the observation that state 
interests change over time and that this is evident as sovereignty-based attitudes toward 
civilian casualties move toward a more constraining, human rights-based outlook. I 
identify three conditions under which this occurs: when the normative/discursive 
framework of protecting civilians is seen as essential to delegitimizing the enemy; when 
the legitimacy of the initial invasion is in question, and civilian casualties are seen as 
damaging to the international image by increasing that gap; finally, when regaining a 
monopoly on force is seen as impossible to achieve through material force alone because 
civilian casualties increase support for the insurgency. Together, these provide the 
conditions under which aligning with human rights-centered norms eventually come to be 
seen as the only viable strategy in fighting insurgencies.  
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The civilian immunity norm (CIN) is the formal term assigned to the set of legal, 
moral, and political strictures meant to regulate state behavior toward civilians in war.
1
 
As with all international norms, the CIN represents “collective expectations for the 
proper behavior of actors with a given identity.”2 In an increasingly constraining 
normative environment wherein publics at all levels (domestic, regional, even global) 
expect moral behavior in war, many believe that it is no longer possible for democracies 
to inflict large-scale damage on civilians.
3
 This is often attributed to material factors such 
as developments in precision weaponry and global communications; however, such 
observations assume rather than demonstrate that technology alone can account for the 
causal power of social pressure. Despite a growing literature on state behavior toward 
civilians, little attention has been paid to the effects of the CIN itself on military strategy,  
                                                          
1
 By formal, I refer to its legal form as codified in the Laws of War (also known as the Laws of Armed 
Conflict, and more recently as the body of International Humanitarian Law or IHL). The norm is comprised 
of  four principles with corresponding rules and expectations for behavior: distinction, proportionality, 
precaution, and military necessity. It is also referred to as the non-combatant immunity norm, though non-
combatant has a more technical meaning that includes those soldiers not participating in combat. I use the 
term “civilian immunity norm” since I am less concerned with the legal technicalities than I am with the 
commonsense, generalized expectations of various international publics.   
2
 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5. 
3
 See Judith Gail Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality, and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 137; Richard D. Rosen, "Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on 
Terror: Preserving Civilian Immunity," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42, no. 3 (2009): 730. 
Rosen argues that even the appearance of civilian casualties can undermine support for military operations.  
2 
 
 
the aspect of state behavior most directly responsible for the treatment of civilians on the 
battlefield.  
Though it is sometimes assumed that democracies treat civilians better because of 
pressure issuing from their own domestic publics, the historical record is mixed on both 
state behavior and public expectations. Democratic publics are often divided when it 
comes to civilian casualties of foreigners, and democracies sometimes, with or without 
the support of their publics, escalate force against civilians, especially when faced with 
strategic failure.
4
 This occurred on a large scale in World War Two and to a lesser degree 
in Vietnam. Since Vietnam, however, the norm has made significant legal progress,
5
 and 
we have seen at least two conflicts—Iraq and Afghanistan—in which democracies, when 
faced with strategic failure, have strengthened efforts to comply with the CIN instead of 
overriding it. Moreover, in these cases, decision-makers transformed military doctrine to 
reflect a broader institutional commitment to civilian immunity. When does the CIN 
                                                          
4
 See Alexander B. Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization 
in War," International Security 30, no. 5 (2006). Democratic publics have been shown to support such 
actions against foreign civilians in exchange for security, while at the same time maintaining a belief in 
their nation’s humane identity. This has been the case in the twentieth century in the United States. See for 
example, Sahr Conway-Lanz, Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity, and Atrocity After 
World War II  (New York: Routledge, 2006). Michael Walzer supports this tendency in normative theory 
for exceptional cases only, for what he terms “supreme emergencies,” in Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral 
Argument With Historical Illustrations  (New York: Basic Books, 1977).  
5
 This refers to the Additional Protocols of 1977, wherein the rules and principles protecting civilians that 
existed within the just war tradition were spelled out in great detail in international law, for the first time 
ever. See, for example, Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch, and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of 
Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949  
(The Hague; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982); Claude Pilloud et al., Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949  (Geneva; Norwell, 
MA, USA: International Committee of the Red Cross: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987). 
3 
 
 
matter? More specifically, when does it alter short-term strategic choices and even long 
term doctrine? 
The debate about civilian immunity matters in practice for obvious moral 
reasons—the suffering of innocent human beings in war is a perennial humanitarian 
concern. The issue of how norms matter also reflects the broader theoretical debate about 
the extent to which power-seeking states can act morally in the international arena. Few 
issues capture the tension between principle and power better than how states engaged in 
war respond to moral pressure by multiple publics—not just domestic publics. On the one 
hand, constructivists and liberals claim the CIN as one of the strongest, most settled, of 
all international norms and see it as a great achievement of international law.
6
 On the 
other hand, realists and sometimes rationalists emphasize war as the closest 
approximation of an anarchical environment whereby states can be expected to disregard 
norms in the pursuit of power. Most agree that the international commitment to protecting 
civilians is constantly endangered by a lack of compliance on the battlefield, when 
civilians are particularly vulnerable to the exigencies of states’ (and increasingly non-
state actors’) strategic calculations.7 Even when states do comply with the laws meant to 
protect civilians, the legal limits of the CIN allows for significant unintentional but 
                                                          
6
 See Helen Kinsella, The Image Before the Weapon: A History of the Distinction between Combatant and 
Civilian (Cornell University Press, 2011), 3.  
7
 This is true with other norms as well, particularly with more foundational norms such as sovereignty and 
human rights. I will argue in this chapter that what makes this norm unique is that it is suspended between 
these foundational norms and as such provides a lens through which to examine the relationship between 
morality and power.  For an explanation of the commitment versus compliance problem more generally, 
see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
4 
 
 
foreseeable harm.
8
  This particular norm thus occupies the extremes of the morality 
versus power debate, in practice as well as in theory. 
This study employs a constructivist approach, arguing that democracies will 
choose strategic outcomes that strengthen compliance with the CIN when they see the 
constraining normative environment as a key part of the strategic environment.  
Legitimacy is argued to be the causal mechanism driving interests and identities to align 
more closely with the human rights-based aspects of the international order. My 
argument, based on a social conception of power, hinges on the observation that state 
interests change over time and that this is evident as sovereignty-based attitudes toward 
civilian casualties move toward a more constraining, human rights-based outlook. I 
identify three conditions under which this occurs: when the normative/discursive 
framework of protecting civilians is seen as essential to delegitimizing the opponent; 
when the legitimacy of the initial invasion is in question, and civilian casualties risk 
damaging the state’s international image by increasing that gap; finally, when regaining a 
monopoly on force is seen as impossible to achieve through material force alone because 
civilian casualties increase support for the opponent. Together, these provide the 
conditions under which aligning with human rights-centered norms eventually come to be 
seen as the only viable strategy for democracies fighting insurgencies. 
                                                          
8
 This refers to the doctrine of double-effect, commonly known as collateral damage. See M. A. Michael 
Carlino, "The Moral Limits of Strategic Attack," Parameters 32, no. 1 (2002); T. A. Cavanaugh, Double-
Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Colm 
McKeogh, "Civilian Immunity in War: From Augustine to Vattel," in Civilian Immunity in War, ed. Igor 
Primoratz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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The Puzzle: Morality in War 
 Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is 
also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the 
requirements of successful political action.
9
 
Few political acts carry greater moral significance than killing civilians in war.   
To kill innocents in the pursuit of state interests violates the essence of respect for 
humanity, a key value in the international normative order.
10
 Yet international society 
also recognizes the sovereign state as a war-making body and aims to limit—but not 
outright prohibit—the killing of civilians. Reflecting the tensions within the international 
order between sovereignty and human rights, the CIN is suspended in the ambiguous 
space between military necessity and respect for humanity.  Even a cursory glance at 
history reveals, however, that civilians tend to lose when moral principle confronts 
military strategy.
11
 The popular view that holds it is no longer possible for democracies to 
inflict large-scale damage on civilians
12
 runs counter to most theories of realism, the 
                                                          
9
 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, brief ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993). “Six Principles” excerpt available online, accessed 
February 14, 2013, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm. 
10
 Respect for humanity refers to the moral imperative that human beings ought not be treated as a mere 
means to an end. This foundational limiting principle is best known as Kant’s “Formula of Humanity”: “So 
act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same 
time as an end, never merely as a means,” in “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” in Immanuel 
Kant: Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
429. 
11
 Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures”; Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-
Lindsay, "Draining the Sea: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare," International Organization 58, no. 2 
(2004). 
12
 See Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality, 137; Rosen, "Preserving Civilian Immunity," 730. Rosen 
argues that even the appearance of civilian casualties can undermine support for military operations.  
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paradigm most closely associated with military affairs. This is because war is the realm 
of force, in which the possibilities for moral action are thought to be severely 
diminished.
13
 Proscriptions against killing civilians are therefore often assumed to run 
against the logic of force; that is, international norms appear as external, even artificial 
constraints on pure strategic action.
14
  My argument is that this understanding derives 
from a conventional reading of realism that places morality in opposition to power, with 
the result that too little attention is paid to the possibility that successful political action 
sometimes requires moral constraint.
15
   
Amoral versus Ethical Realism 
Conventional interpretations of realist IR draw on broader disciplinary 
assumptions about the state’s relationship to violence. The very definition of the state 
used in political science is drawn from Max Weber, who describes the state as that body 
which maintains a “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.”16 Realist IR expands 
this focus on violence to define the dynamic between states. Classical political thinkers 
such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes have been interpreted as sharing an 
ontological perspective centered on the idea of an amoral realm of international politics, 
                                                          
13
 See Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, On War  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
14
 For a realist position on norms, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International 
Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994). 
15
 An international norm is commonly defined as the “collective expectations for the proper behavior of 
actors with a given identity,” Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, 5. 
16
 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Fortress Press, 1965).  
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whereby force or the threat of force is the defining characteristic of relations between 
states.
17
 Machiavelli is often credited with ushering in the rational utility of violence 
approach, which elevates the national interest and frees violent political action from the 
strictures of conventional ideas of morality. The insights of Hobbes have also informed 
realist IR in that while the state’s use of force settles questions of ultimate authority and 
provides internal stability and security for the population, no such possibility exists for 
relations between states. Neoclassical realists such as Morgenthau emphasize that the 
state’s use of force is directly related to its security obligations toward its own population 
as well as the survival needs of the state itself:  
the individual may say for himself: ‘Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let 
justice be done, even if the world perish),’ but the state has no right to say 
so in the name of those who are in its care … Realism, then, considers 
prudence-the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions-
to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by 
its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its 
political consequences.
18
 
This assumption of amorality is even more striking in neorealist, or structural 
realism,
19
 since classical and even neoclassical thinkers at least thought it necessary to 
discuss the relationship between morality and power. The tide may be turning, however, 
and the idea that morality is a problematic but enduring dimension of international 
                                                          
17
 For a discussion on amoral versus ethical realism, see Jack Donnelly, "The Ethics of Realism," in The 
Oxford Handbook Of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
18
 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised, 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 4-15, accessed February 2, 2011, 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm. 
19
 Typified by Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).  
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politics is once again gaining a foothold in the international relations literature, especially 
in the English School and in some forms of constructivism.
20
  Contra Kenneth Waltz’ 
assertion that only material capabilities produce change in structure,
21
 an increasingly 
sophisticated literature is beginning to treat ethics not as an artificial, external 
intervention into the logic of power politics but rather as part and parcel of the structure 
of the international political order itself.
22
  As Hall attests, the conceptual line between 
power and morality is hard to sustain when one moves from abstract theory to history, 
since we know, for example, that “moral authority was employed as a power resource to 
construct and define the rules of a hieratic, feudal-theocratic social order.”23  Moreover, 
recent works of political theory on classical realist thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, 
and Hobbes have emphasized the profound moral concerns that animated their work, 
which becomes evident once their writings are adequately historicized.  About Hobbes, 
for example, Marius Hentea detects that “the need for a clear standard, which has the 
power of a genuine morality, is what Hobbes wants.” He adds that “it is the demands of 
                                                          
20
 This is less true in some other post-positivist approaches such as critical theory, feminist IR, and post-
structuralism (post-modernism). All of these approaches tend to distrust claims about morality in IR, 
viewing such claims as indistinguishable from the exercise of power. My approach and assumptions are 
closer to both constructivism and the English School in that I believe that the employment of ethics both 
constrains and enables power, but that ethics entails foundations separate from and thus distinguishable 
from power.  
21
 Waltz, Theory of International Politics.  
22
 For an explanation of the constitutive function of ethics, see especially Mervyn Frost, Global Ethics: 
Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 
2008). 
23
 Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," International Organization 51, no. 4 
(1997): 592.  
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self-preservation in the state of nature and the desire for religious salvation [that] lead[s] 
men to behavior that is at war with those ends—it is the moral need for peace which 
informs Hobbes’ discussion.”24  Hentea’s study throws into question the use of these 
early thinkers to support later IR theories that assume a binary opposition between power 
and morality (and as a result the irrelevance of morality to power politics).
25
  
While conventional interpretations of realism as “amoral” render moral norms 
invisible, ethical readings of realism offer a useful starting point for investigating the 
effects of moral norms. Hans Morgenthau, though distrustful of moralistic foreign policy 
to the extent that he actively sought to disentangle considerations of morality from 
political interests, nevertheless conceded that morality functions to set the outer limits of 
what is politically possible.
26
  From this conception of power—as social as well as 
material—it becomes possible to think of these ethical boundaries as internal to the 
relations between states to the extent that they are embodied in international norms. 
 
                                                          
24
 Marius Mihai Hentea, "Realism's Classical Tradition: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes" (Harvard 
University, 2007), 260.  
25
 Jack Donnelly also persuasively argues that realism entails its own ethics: “A defensible realist ethic is 
perhaps best seen as a warning against the inappropriate application of moral standards to international 
political action,” in Donnelly, "The Ethics of Realism," 157. 
26
 The actual quote is “moral rules do not permit certain policies to be considered at all from the point of 
view of expediency,” Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations,  225. Examples of this 
revisionist interpretation of Morgenthau includes A.J.H. Murray’s observation that “Morgenthau adopts an 
Augustinian, rather than Hobbesian-Machiavellian, moral framework,” in "The Moral Politics of Hans 
Morgenthau," The Review of Politics 58, no. 1 (1996): 81; also “Morgenthau’s realism attempts to 
recognize the centrality of power in politics without reducing politics to violence,” on Michael C. Williams, 
"Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral 
Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 58, no. 4 (2004): 633. 
10 
 
 
 
Norms: Commitment Versus Compliance  
Norms, provide some degree of stability in the international order by creating 
predictability, even in times of war. Like any social resource, however, they can also be 
used for change and are subject to change themselves.
27
 As will be shown in chapter two, 
the CIN has a long history and is closely tied to the foundational international norms of 
both sovereignty and human rights. Like both of those norms, it is somewhat paradoxical 
in the sense that it enjoys a wide consensus on moral, political, and legal grounds, yet this 
alone does not predict compliance in particular cases. That is, though the CIN is 
entrenched in the international normative order, both in international law and in global 
public sentiment,
28
 it remains contingent and fragile in that it is often violated by states 
and non-state actors alike.
29
 Indiscriminate targeting and other forms of civilian 
victimization still occur, especially in cases of ethnic and intrastate warfare, and as will 
be shown later, this has been the case in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
30
 The International 
Committee for the Red Cross, the organization charged with providing humanitarian 
                                                          
27
 See Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall W. Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of Change (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
28
 The legal norm was strengthened through the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, 
whereby civilian protections were specified and codified for the first time. See Judith Gail Gardam, Non-
Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian Law  (Dordrecht; Boston; Norwell, MA: M. 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993). 
29
 See Alex J.  Bellamy, "Massacres and Morality: Mass Killing in an Age of Civilian Immunity," Human 
Rights Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2012): 2. 
30
 Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures”; Valentino, "Draining the Sea.” 
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assistance and promoting the laws that protect victims of war, states that “in 
contemporary armed conflicts, the challenge of upholding humanitarian values is not the 
result of a lack of rules but a lack of respect for them.”31  
Significance of CIN in GWOT 
This commitment versus compliance paradox became especially salient during the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT), a far-reaching military response to what was seen by 
some as an act of war waged against the international order itself.  While many 
understood the far-reaching response of the GWOT as a threat to the longstanding anti-
torture norm, it was also a precarious time for the CIN. The post 9/11 years produced 
much public debate about the changing nature of war and whether current norms 
regulating when and how force is used would give way to the new security environment 
that seemed to make it impossible to maintain a distinction between civilian and 
combatant.
32
 This anxiety becomes clearer when we consider that there are a variety of 
strategic outcomes that affect civilians in war.   
Counterinsurgency and Civilians 
Civilians have been largely absent from the study of strategy, with two notable 
exceptions: the total war era of World War Two when the strategic bombing of civilians 
was rationalized as necessary to break the morale of the enemy, and more recently, in 
counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency refers to the range of strategies states employ 
                                                          
31
 ICRC Webpage, accessed October 30, 2012, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/contemporary-
challenges-for-ihl/index.jsp. 
32
 On the debate, see Rosen, "Preserving Civilian Immunity."  
12 
 
 
when fighting non-state actors who reject the authority of the ruling regime and seek to 
take over the reins of government. The population figures into counterinsurgency since, 
as Mao famously pointed out, it is the sea in which the insurgents swim.
33
 Separating 
insurgents from the population is key because the people are potential supporters, 
providing cover, sustenance, and recruits. However, the mere presence of an insurgency 
does not determine a specific strategic response. Despite the recent conflation of 
counterinsurgency with population protection, state behavior toward civilians in 
counterinsurgency has varied dramatically; population protection is only one of a variety 
of choices states use to defeat insurgencies. Counterinsurgency strategies can use more or 
less force, and civilians can be seen as objects to be coerced and manipulated,
34
 or they 
can be seen as actors, even as the center of gravity. The French in Algeria, for example, 
employed multiple strategies, from punishing civilians to protecting them.
35
 While 
strategic failure often precedes any wartime innovation,
36
 including counterinsurgency, 
whether or not change occurs and what form it takes is not determined by the mere 
                                                          
33
 John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden  (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009); Sam C. Sarkesian, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: Theories, Doctrines, and Contexts (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2010). 
34
Daniel Rothbart and K. V. Korostelina, Why They Die: Civilian Devastation in Violent Conflict  (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011); Daniel Rothbart, K. V. Korostelina, and Mohammed D. 
Cherkaoui, Civilians and Modern War: Armed Conflict and the Ideology of Violence (New York: 
Routledge, 2012).  
35
 For the logic of this type of counterinsurgency in the case of Algeria, see David Galula, 
Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); David Galula, Pacification 
in Algeria, 1956-1958  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006). 
36
 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). 
13 
 
 
recognition of an insurgency nor of battlefield conditions alone. The example of the U.S. 
military’s failed attempt to shift its doctrine to a more systematic strategy of civilian 
protection in Vietnam is one such example.
37
 
Variance: Strategic Interaction Matters 
The variance described above allows for the identification of conditions under 
which compliance with civilian-centered norms comes to be seen as strategically 
important. Since in most forms of contemporary warfare the fight takes place “among the 
people,”38 civilians ever present; to what extent each side considers civilian casualties as 
permissible is a key strategic consideration. This is especially true in insurgencies 
involving guerrilla warfare wherein a weak party is pitted against one or more strong 
parties. As Arreguin-Toft wrote in 2001, multiple strategies are possible when engaging 
in asymmetric warfare. How force is used is key, but only in relation to the strategy of the 
opposition. He states, for example, that “barbarism,” or violating established norms 
against killing civilians, is a strategic choice that can win or lose a war. The French in 
Algeria, for example, suffered reputational damage even after defeating the insurgency.
39
 
Martin Van Creveld, Israeli military historian, suggests this stark choice as well when he 
presents two methods of counterinsurgency that allow for strong actors to prevail: the 
                                                          
37
 Joseph Roger Clark, "Innovation Under Fire: Politics, Learning, and US Army Doctrine" (The George 
Washington University, 2011). 
38
 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World  (New York: Knopf, 2007). 
39
 The film, Battle of Algiers, depicts this lesson, and is often shown in military classrooms; Galula, 
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strong party must either be prepared to use indiscriminate force wholeheartedly and 
unapologetically, as did Hafez al Assad in Syria, or it must show great restraint, even at 
the expense of significant casualties, as did Great Britain when dealing with Northern 
Ireland. Van Creveld points out that most counterinsurgencies that have failed have 
employed a middle-ground approach.
40
  
That strategic or even doctrinal change could follow a variety of paths is 
confirmed by historical patterns of war more generally. With increasing interest in state 
behavior toward civilians in war, a body of knowledge is beginning to accrue about how 
states behave toward civilians in war. Despite claims of democratic peace, the first major 
quantitative studies on state behavior toward civilians in war have offered little support 
for a consistent pattern of moral conduct by democracies in war. History shows that 
democracies will victimize civilians when leaders believe it brings them strategic 
advantage, and this is especially the case when the other side breaks the rules.
41
 Placed 
into historical context, then, it is quite remarkable that, when faced with a foe in Iraq who 
refused to be bound by the laws of war, “the US military shifted from a strategy that was 
accepting of even large numbers of civilian casualties to, as Ricks put it, ‘a strategy 
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founded in the concept that the civilian population isn’t the playing field but rather the 
prize, to be protected at almost all costs.’”42 
C.O.I.N.: A Radical Departure  
The strategic change adopted by the U.S. military is embedded in a broader 
doctrinal shift known as C.O.I.N. (counterinsurgency), which first arose in response to 
developments in Iraq and was later adapted, albeit to a lesser extent, to the conflict in 
Afghanistan. Doctrine differs from strategy in that, while strategy shifts with conditions, 
doctrine is meant to establish a more stable, permanent orientation toward fighting wars. 
This doctrinal shift is fairly remarkable because, as military scholars have explained, 
C.O.I.N. marks a radical break with the past Weinberger-Powell doctrine of 
overwhelming, decisive force.
43
 Whereas the Weinberger-Powell doctrine held that long, 
open-ended commitments were to be avoided,
44
 it also reflected confidence in the idea 
that more force, albeit in the beginning, was key to winning in a combat situation:  “if our 
vital interests are involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are resolved that if we must 
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fight, we must win.”45  Viewing the failure in Vietnam as partially a result of not using 
enough force in the beginning to produce a decisive outcome, Weinberger aimed to 
“avoid the danger of this gradualist incremental approach which almost always means the 
use of insufficient force.”46 The Powell Doctrine affirmed the previous doctrine and 
added that the U.S. should “use overwhelming force in order to achieve a decisive 
outcome, always have an exit strategy, and emphasize low casualties.”47  
C.O.I.N., on the other hand, emphasizes the “paradoxes” of counterinsurgency: 
“Sometimes, the more force used, the less effective it is,” and “sometimes, the more you 
protect your force, the less secure you may be.”48 The adoption of this approach is the 
result of a process of institutional learning about the relationship of force to political 
goals in a changing strategic environment.
49
 C.O.I.N. clearly emphasizes the strategic 
preference for population protection over killing the enemy; in this sense civilians 
become the new “center of gravity,” and killing them comes to be seen as a strategic 
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deficit.
50
 While this process of transformation within the military has been well 
documented through the lenses of personalities, leadership, and bureaucratic politics, no 
studies thus far have explicitly linked the impact of civilian-centered ethical norms to the 
civilian-centered doctrinal outcome. What is specifically lacking is an explanation of 
whether and how the civilian immunity norm has shaped the perceptions of interests and 
identities. 
Effects of Norms: Identity and Interests Matter 
That norms matter in international politics broadly has been established since the 
mid 1990s; how they emerge, spread, and gain acceptance has been well documented.
51
 
Though norms are often treated as dependent variables or outcomes, they have been 
shown to causally matter in at least three ways: they serve as evaluative points of 
reference; they exert regulative effects on behavior; and they exert constitutive effects on 
identity and interests. Whether and how norms matter in the relationship between 
morality and power in the realm of force is unsettled.  Military strategy, in particular, has 
been assumed to most closely approximate pure strategic interaction in the service of pre-
given state interests, in the sense that the logic of force serves its own end of “victory.” 
Winning is defined in coercive terms as when one group overcomes the ability of another 
to resist its will. If even military strategy, under certain conditions, can be explained as 
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international norms-driven social action, the assumption of amorality in anarchy becomes 
more difficult to sustain. And understanding what those conditions are has foreign policy 
relevance that transcends military strategy.  
Norms: Constraining and Enabling Effects 
Much of the literature on the civilian immunity norm since the war on terror 
began has been evaluative and legal, asking whether the content of the norm sufficiently 
protects civilians, whether it is attuned to the changing realities of war, or whether the 
norm can be expected to survive intact if it disadvantages states to the benefit of non-state 
actors (insurgents, guerrillas, or terrorists).
52
 In the course of this growing interest in the 
norm, a just-war revival has resulted in a fresh look at the normative assumptions, moral 
reasoning, and political context that grounds the civilian immunity norm. While my focus 
is neither evaluative nor legal, normative political theory in this area, though distinctly 
ethical in its approach, nonetheless informs my study since I am interested in the 
empirical effects of moral or ethical norms. Just war theorists assume a connection 
between theory and political practice; they critique the civilian immunity norm as 
containing tensions between military necessity, an enabling principle, and proportionality 
and discrimination, its two constraining principles.
53
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Understanding this sheds light on how states might maneuver within the norm—
by using its concepts to both enable and constrain the killing of civilians. Proportionality, 
for example, is based on double-effect reasoning, which limits the unintentional but 
foreseeable harm done to civilians to that which provides military advantage. The 
concept of military necessity might then lend itself to rhetorical expansion in order to 
accommodate more casualties.  
Regulative Effects of CIN: Internalization and Institutionalization 
Norms are most often thought to exert regulative effects on behavior. These 
effects, as applied to the CIN and the Laws of War in general, are more associated with 
the stability of the social order than with change. Norms are thought to function 
endogenously through a logic of appropriateness (what is the “right thing to do” in this 
case); or in cases of norm compliance problems, a logic of consequences is applied, 
usually involving exogenous factors. Both of these explanations have been employed to 
explain the civilian immunity norm. Ward Thomas demonstrates that through the gradual 
internalization of the civilian immunity norm inside the military, along with its 
institutionalization at the international level, the US was able to make considerable 
progress toward norm compliance in the area of strategic bombing. According to this 
study, the mindset and the lack of reciprocity that allowed for the atrocities of World War 
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2, such as the firebombing and atomic bombing of Japan, would be much less likely to 
occur today.
54
   
The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan throw this into question, however, since both 
conflicts demonstrate variance in behavior toward civilians, indicating independence 
from a generalized internalization of the norm. However, regulative effects would be 
expected to constrain the range of strategic choices to exclude especially punitive 
strategies that would escalate force against civilians in order to defeat the insurgencies.   
When Norms Break Down: Lack of Reciprocity 
Other cross-national studies that take into consideration strategic interaction have 
shown that CIN compliance is more problematic, however, and that behavior toward 
civilians hinges on reciprocity now just as it did in World War 2, in the absence of strong 
norms.
55
 Reciprocity remains fragile between states, and a particular state’s behavior 
toward civilians in war is not necessarily contingent on whether it was a signatory to the 
Geneva Conventions.
56
 These studies, focusing on states, obviously do not apply in the 
same way, if at all, to case involving non-state actors. Downes, however, includes non-
state parties to the conflict and argues that whether or not norms break down is 
contingent on how desperate the state is to win, reduce its costs, and whether or not the 
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war is a war of attrition (which includes guerrilla wars).
57
 This partially answers my 
question, but it looks only at intentional civilian targeting as an effect of strategy (such as 
in wars of attrition that eventually target civilians). My question is concerned both with 
constraints on strategic choice and with explaining why even unintentional civilian 
casualties are being avoided. That is, the CIN in my case is being tested as an input or 
independent variable shaping the decision to adopt a strategy and doctrinal outlook. 
Downes’ use of strategy as an input is thus not well suited to my question because it does 
not explain how certain strategies are chosen over others when more than one choice 
exists.
58
  
Compliance Through Reputation 
Finally, the compliance literature also employs the concept of reputation. 
Reputation is a broad concept in IR and is generally used in the state-centric, mostly 
rationalist sense of signaling strength or resolve to other state actors in conflict 
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situations.
59
 As applied to international law, it is considered one of the strongest 
explanations of both compliance with and violation of legal norms,
60
 but it has been 
found to be a relatively weak indicator of compliance with the laws of war.
61
 Studies that 
examine how violations of the civilian immunity norm impact reputation are lacking, 
despite a growing sense that the US reputation suffers when it is thought to kill too many 
civilians. This is perhaps, as Sharman suggests, because social costs do not enter into 
consideration due to the prevailing rationalist definitions of reputation that dominate this 
literature. Furthermore, this concept of reputation is inherently state-centric because it 
assumes only states or domestic publics can impose costs on other states. Reputation on 
this account is a property concept
62
 based on a “collection of individual beliefs” about the 
“degree to which an actor reliably upholds its commitments, based on a record of past 
behaviour.”63 
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This concept has been used in the conflict versus cooperation debate to explain 
why a state goes to war (when its reputation as a superpower is threatened, for example)
64
 
and why it upholds international agreements.
65
 Its focus on state-to-state relations offers 
little in the way of understanding how a state fights wars against non-state actors and 
what connection such struggles may have to its changing perceptions of its own interests. 
Rachel Brewster, in responding to the idea that American reputation suffered when 
George Bush was suspected of breaking the laws of war regarding torture, considers this 
and rejects it, suggesting that image is not the same as reputation: “For better or worse, 
bad actions that are not predictive of future behavior, because the regime has changed or 
because the strategic situation is different, do not lead to reputational costs.
66
  
Image: A Social Definition of Reputation 
A constructivist understanding of reputation, on the other hand, is defined by 
general beliefs about the “referent’s character or nature, based on a range of information, 
associations and social cues.” This understanding, suggested by Sharman, is the one I 
adopt because it is more appropriate to my question.
67
 The social conception of reputation 
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is inherently relational and thus lends itself to strategic interaction of a social nature. As 
in all social situations, reputations are subject not just to ownership (wherein good 
behavior piles up like a bank account) but to strategic management.
68
  
Constitutive Effects of Norms 
The notion of image or social reputation fits well with what are known as 
constitutive effects of norms. This effect is least likely to be tested, or even understood as 
relevant, by those studying the strategic importance of civilians in war.
69
 Constitutive 
effects are marked by the interdependence or even co-determination of identity and 
interests. This notion has been applied to security most famously in Katzenstein’s 1996 
edited volume on the social constructedness of national security interests: “Identity is a 
short-hand label for varying constructions of nation and statehood” and “culture is a label 
that connotes collective models of nation state authority or authority carried by 
convention or law.” 70 Security interests, on this account, must be understood in terms of 
norms as well as material factors because norms are embedded in culture and provide 
collective expectations. This concept is familiar when it is applied to the role of military 
organizational culture in shaping policy, to strategic culture more generally, to the 
construction of new norms such as intervention, and to the formation of international 
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organizations such as NATO.
71
  That the CIN exerts constitutive effects is central to my 
argument since identifying with “protecting civilians” is often central to the legitimacy 
claim employed for the use of force in the first place.   The language of CIN is 
constitutive in that it provides the social power to shape perceptions of identity and 
interests.  
Alexander Wendt provides an explanation of how identities and interests are 
shaped through social interactions.  To think of political interactions as social means that 
identities and interests are co-constituted within a particular social order. The social 
dimension of power is inherently communicative in that it allows an actor to control 
interactions by defining the terms within which those interactions occur. One aspect of 
this is role-taking, which “involves choosing from among the available representations of 
the Self who one will be, and thus what interests one intends to pursue.”72 Another is 
altercasting, “a technique of interactor control in which ego uses tactics of self-
presentation and stage management in an attempt to frame alter’s definition of the 
situation in ways that create the role which ego desires alter to play.”73 Social power is 
indicated by the successful achievement of defining the identity of the self and of the 
other’s identity as well. According to Wendt, “ego tries to induce alter to take on a new 
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identity (and thereby enlist alter in ego’s effort to change itself by treating alter as if it 
already had that identity.”74  
Since the goal is to delegitimize the non-state actor altogether, the aim in this case 
is not so much to get the actor to accept the identity preferred by the ego but rather to 
push the alter off the stage altogether. However, engaging in war against said actor 
(through the GWOT) has already elevated the status of the actor to that of a serious 
challenger.  This forces the identity of the ego toward that of defender, particularly if the 
power interests of the ego push against the limits of the prevailing normative order.  
Constitutive effects are present when ego (or alter for that matter) behaves a certain way 
because its identity must fall in line with its interests. If behavior does not match the 
preferred identity, either the identity must change, the interests must change, or the 
relationship between the two must be rearticulated to allow for the contradiction. 
Furthermore, that there is a “stage” implies the presence of an audience. Who the 
important audience is thought to be at any given moment provides cues to which norms 
are persuasive in achieving the desired identity and interests.  
The Strategic Importance of Ethics in the War of Ideas 
If we think of ethics as always present though not determinative, anarchy begins 
to approximate a more “realistic” social setting. Jack Donnelly describes this as the view 
that many people actually hold about IR, which is the recognition that “statesmen are 
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subject to demands of competing systems of values.”75 As with any group-based social 
setting, the primary tension is always marked by the tension between particularist versus 
universal values. If a state at war most often follows a particularist value system, 
indicating a primary ethical obligation to its own group, then shifting toward a more 
universal ethical system indicates that it has come to recognize the social value of 
demonstrating a commitment to ethical treatment of the members of other groups.  
Translated to war, this means that the state as social actor is attempting to communicate 
to an audience its moral identity. Granted, its wish to communicate the vital interests of 
the war effort to its own domestic public is a constant. This public is generally 
understood as the most important public since it must support the war effort, and in a 
democratic society, it also holds the power of electoral punishment as well.
76
 In the case 
of counterinsurgency, a state may wish to signal resolve and strength to its allies and to 
its enemies, or in an attempt to intimidate the local population. The lesser understood 
choice has to do with why ethics would enter into a state’s relationship to occupied 
publics and the international or global publics that identify with that population.  This is 
explained through the “War of Ideas.” 
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The Global “War of Ideas”  
One of the key observations sparking this study is that the military literature 
began to express a concern for communicating a more ethical U.S. image to potentially 
hostile publics around the same time as the strategy in Iraq changed. That the U.S. began 
to emphasize the importance of winning its global “war of ideas” against al Qaeda and 
extremist Jihadism as a matter of security in the war on terror suggests that ideational 
factors play a likely role in the overall strategy change. Military scholar Echevarria 
explains that 
Officials and analysts alike continue to underscore the importance of the 
“war of ideas” as an integral part of the larger war on terror. The U.S. 
National Security Strategy (March 2006) declares that “From the 
beginning,” the war on terror “has been both a battle of arms and a battle 
of ideas—a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology.” 
Likewise, the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 
2006) states that “In the long run, winning the War on Terror means 
winning the battle of ideas.”  Similarly, the … U.S. National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (October 2007) affirms that “the War on Terror is a 
different kind of war—not only a battle of arms but also a battle of 
ideas.”77 
The War of Ideas is the ideological aspect of the war on terror, as Echevarria 
states above. It is essentially a public relations war meant to counter the global Jihadist 
ideology competing with the U.S. global ideological vision.
78
  Battling anti-Americanism 
post 9/11 was the vague goal of the War of ideas, but the shift in focus from a war of 
ideas as a civilian matter,  that is as a public diplomacy matter, to a military “war of 
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ideas” suggests that decision-makers began to see the ground wars as directly connected 
to the larger ideological war. The link between the two is the desire to control the 
perceptions of the audiences each side was trying to affect, mostly the Muslim and Arab 
communities within a larger, diffuse global public. Writing about the ability of Jihadists 
to master strategic communications and win the support of Arab/Muslim audiences, 
Bockstette writes that  
their communication goals are aimed at legitimizing, propagating and 
intimidating. They craft their strategies based on careful audience analysis 
and adapt their messages and delivery methods accordingly, adhering to 
the fundamental rules underlying any communication or public relations 
campaign. Their skillful use of the mass media and the Internet to 
compensate for asymmetrical disadvantages has enabled them to keep 
generating new generations of jihadist terrorists. This information 
asymmetry must be undermined in order to counter the threat of a growing 
radicalization of the Muslim community. Ensuring one’s own credibility 
while undermining the jihadists’ credibility is one of the key elements to 
winning this battle. 
79
 
 
One of the key ways Jihadist use strategic communication is for the 
“legitimization of their movement and the coercion and intimidation of their enemies.”80 
Therefore, the war of ideas is about countering the ability of the opposition to control the 
strategic narrative. This is reminiscent of the Cold War public diplomacy project and thus 
may not seem new or relevant, but its focus on gaining the support of foreign publics for 
a global war on terror is peculiar to the times. It has not been made theoretically evident 
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why the US requires the support of foreign publics for its military actions, and how 
support for US military operations is connected to winning the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. My argument is fairly intuitive but overlooked—that a key strategic 
communication resource is the appeal of the CIN and its association with the U.S. 
identity and ideology. Embracing and co-opting the strong global sentiment in favor of 
protecting civilians from harm in war is the key idea linking the strategy in both the 
operational and the ideational wars. Whereas Jihadists have a cultural “in” to targeted 
audiences through the discourse of Islam, the U.S., in order to compete, must appeal to its 
universal, human rights-based values and language in a way that has global appeal. The 
civilian is one of the few universal concepts that can bridge competing cultural and 
religious systems. Put simply, the U.S. later had to put its money where its mouth is by 
attempting to live up to its professed values. 
 Interestingly, this link has not yet been made explicit, let alone theoretically 
explained, by anyone to date. Nowhere in the above article does the word “civilian” 
appear as part of the war of ideas, though Echevarria does cite world public opinion polls 
that measure changes in Muslim and Arab public attitudes toward the U.S. in terms of 
how “threatening” they view it. It requires only a short jump in logic to realize that 
publics are comprised of civilians; they are the biggest part of civil society and thus are 
likely to perceive the projection of U.S. power as threatening to themselves in terms of 
threats toward civilians more generally. This is less the case for domestic audiences, but 
truer for the publics of U.S. allies, and perhaps greatest for Arab and Muslim publics. 
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Perhaps more importantly, the fact that the two sides of the global war on terror--the 
material and the ideational side--come to be seen over time as strategically intertwined 
suggests the possibility that the civilian immunity norm may form an assumed but 
important part of the normative backdrop for both forms of the war and thus may inform 
actual military strategy in ways not made explicit in a way intelligible to the study of 
international relations.
81
  
A more explicit concern for how foreign publics view civilian casualties is 
evident in the type of research feeding into the military. For example, RAND 
Corporation, whose research serves the policy needs of the U.S. Department of Defense, 
completed an in-depth empirical analysis of public and press reactions to civilian 
casualties in multiple conflicts involving the US.
82
  This concern for civilian casualties 
has been linked more explicitly to strategy in recent times, but it was present to a degree 
in the early years of the war on terror. The observations of military analyst Marcus 
Corbin, of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, predate the RAND study 
by three years:  "Nowadays civilian casualties, and even specific incidents, can have a 
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strategic effect on a conflict out of all proportion to their size, especially in an age of 
instant video transmission around the world.”83 Retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner 
explains, "In our war games, the bad guys gave up fighting us directly ….They moved 
into cities. They attacked our supply lines with explosives. They wore civilian clothes. 
They took hostages. They responded to our new weapons by forcing on us the dilemma 
of killing civilians and of their killing of civilians."
84
 Rosen, a professor of international 
law and a colonel in the military, argues that this is a distinct disadvantage for Western 
states, especially since the “international community, including the media, focuses 
inordinately on the perceived missteps of Western states as opposed to their adversaries’ 
violations of the law of war.”85  
Reconciling the War on the Ground with the War of Ideas 
The idea that democratic states must exhibit restraint assumes that civilian 
casualties entail political costs for them because they are “particularly sensitive to 
popular opinion” and stand to lose both domestic and international support for military 
operations.
86
 This suggests that states face a trade-off in interests between winning in war 
through the superior application of force and winning in the court of public opinion, both 
at home and abroad. While states have many resources to counter domestic public 
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opinion (mainly nationalistic sentiment), this is not the case for foreign publics, neither 
for occupied populations, nor for sympathetic regional or international publics. However, 
if states see their best option as reconciling the two definitions of winning into a 
consistent goal based on strategic constraint, then it can be argued that morality has a 
social dimension that at times provides strategic advantage. My argument is that this is 
exactly what occurred, and that the CIN is a social resource that bridges the two goals in 
order to gain support of the local public as well as international publics that are 
sympathetic to the local population.  
Therefore, despite the conviction that exercising constraint in asymmetric warfare 
presents powerful states with a disadvantage, states, when faced with strategic failure, 
sometimes choose this path. While one is hard-pressed to make the argument that states 
might knowingly act in ways inconsistent with their strategic advantage, if we assume a 
rational actor, then it appears that what is normatively good has to some extent come to 
coincide in such cases with what is strategically advantageous. Therefore, it is difficult 
and possibly even counterproductive to insist on disentangling the “rational” and 
normative” casual logics driving the move toward a more ethical strategy and doctrine. 
This study aims to contribute to the small but growing body of scholarship that seeks to 
understand how the two come together. Constructivism is particularly useful for this 
purpose because it allows for the fact that states sometimes change their behavior because 
their perceptions of their interests change. I argue that this is precisely the case, and that 
the impact of the civilian immunity norm on state behavior and interests accounts for this 
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shift.  Since the mere presence of the norm is not determinative, the key task is showing 
how this occurs and also identifying the conditions under which this norm matters, that is, 
when the normative environment is seen as a key part of the strategic environment. 
In the next section, I will explain how attempting to study the strategic aspects of 
the normative environment bucks up against a larger theoretical debate in IR known as 
the constructivist/rationalist divide. Arguing that this divide is counterproductive to the 
topic under examination, I will then explain my adaptation of a model that includes 
legitimacy as the concept that links norms with state behavior.
87
   
Constructivism versus Rationalism Debate 
The introduction of constructivism has divided international relations theory into 
roughly two camps: Checkel states that “rationalists emphasize coercion, cost/benefit 
calculations, and material incentives, whereas constructivists emphasize social learning, 
socialization, and social norms.”88 March and Olsen provide a framework that captures 
the basic distinction between the approaches and divides the behavioral domain by 
assigning different logics to different modes of political action. These are known as the 
logic of appropriateness versus the logic of consequences.
89
 While this opposition is 
theoretically neater than an either/or proposition, it is also increasingly seen as 
                                                          
87
 This is based on Ian Hurd’s work on the instrumental use of norms. See Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and 
Strategic Behavior: The Instrumental Use of Norms in World Politics," Paper Presented at the 48th Annual 
Convention of the International Studies Association (Chicago, IL, 2007). 
88
 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," International 
Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 553. 
89
 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," 
International Organization 52, no. 04 (1998). 
35 
 
 
counterproductive for the simple reason that states do not necessarily behave in an 
either/or fashion.  The military literature cited previously about the war of ideas and the 
war on the ground provide evidence that the military, as the representative of state 
interests in war, take for granted that conflict involves a struggle over perceptions as well 
as physical force.  
In explaining behavior, from a material rationalist perspective—realism being the 
most prominent in security studies—the U.S. is least susceptible to pressure from the 
international community because of its dominant power position, and thus need only 
respond to its pre-given material interests. When power interests change, cooperation 
with institutions change, thus rendering institutions epiphenomenal.
90
 From this 
perspective, power considerations alone will account for the shift in strategy. Compliance 
literature contains a set of explanations that are rational but liberal in focusing on costs 
and benefits associated with opportunities to cooperate/transact with other states. This 
will be discussed in more detail below, but this perspective offers little to account for 
non-material costs which would help to explain the shift in strategy, or importantly, in the 
relationship between the ideational and material aspects of war.   
Constructivism butts up against some of the assumptions often taken for granted 
in matters of war, which is the primacy of material factors. Rationalist explanations, 
while important, are often inadequate to answering the question that interests me, which 
is ultimately whether and how a more constraining normative context figures into 
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strategy.  From a constructivist perspective, the puzzle is inherently a social one that may 
reach beyond behavior to an explanation of how identity and interests are shaped by 
changing expectations (and how policy thus results in its particular form). Constructivist 
theory varies in its emphasis on identity,
91
 speech acts,
92
 or rules,
93
 but regardless of its 
deep theoretical underpinnings, it is closely associated with norms because, on a scale 
from anarchy to community, it tends toward community, viewing international politics as 
taking place in a social setting.
94
 While power and material incentives are present for 
constructivists, this approach allows that “moral” considerations like humanitarianism are 
as much a part of the social and political game as are the more tangibles.
95
 For domestic 
audiences and allied publics, reflecting a “humanitarian” or moral identity works to 
maintain support for the war effort. This is also true for persuading fence-sitting publics, 
especially those seen as potential supporters of the opposition (whether local or 
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transnational). Hardened or “irreconcilable” publics would be less persuadable and 
therefore may not figure into the social game as crucial variables.    
Constructivism, in attempting to explain social action as being based on shared 
intersubjectivity, too often falls back on the assumption that the causal power of norms is 
to be found internally, and as Hurd notes, “the internalization approach requires a strict 
separation between strategic behavior and legitimacy which is not only empirically 
unsustainable but also produces an unproductive ‘either/or’ framing of the relationship 
between constructivism and rationalism.”96 According to Hurd,  
the assumption of internalization is counterproductive in IR research for 
three reasons: it predicts perfect compliance with norms, eliminates 
strategic thinking by states, and erases any behavioral difference between 
constructivism and rationalism. These problems attend both rationalism 
and constructivism as the two have come to agree on a common division 
of labor between explaining the making of interests and explaining 
strategic action.
97
  
The attempt to find commonalities between normative behavior and strategic 
behavior is a slowly growing trend because, while the two approaches differ in their 
ontological assumptions, they are not mutually exclusive.
98
 This occurs not only to 
constructivists, who bear the onus as the newcomer, but also to rationalists who attempt 
to make sense of the encroachment of constructivism on the discipline. Such 
engagements have produced alternative analyses of the relationship between norms and 
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strategic action, such as that articulated by Robert Keohane. Keohane, who identifies 
himself as a rationalist, argues that while norms have both regulative and constitutive 
effects, constitutive effects have little bearing on behavior: 
Katzenstein, Krasner and I have argued that even for rationalist 
neoutilitarian research programs, constitutive norms can be seen as 
important – not because they generate a coherent world culture but 
because they create common knowledge, which is essential for 
coordination (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 682).   Even if strong international 
and transnational constitutive norms are lacking, knowledge of the norms 
that various agents and groups hold is important in affecting the strategies 
that players employ.  According to a rationalist neoutilitarian perspective 
such as my own, however, constitutive norms serve essentially as a source 
of background knowledge, significant for strategy but not determinative of 
actions by state or non-state actors.
99
 
In the debate about strategic action versus normative behavior, Keohane’s 
position supports the former.  The real question is not whether strategy or norms prevails, 
however, but whether norms have an effect not reducible to that which can be explained 
by rational choice, strategic or not.  
Legitimacy and Norms 
As Ian Hurd usefully argues, states sometimes use norms instrumentally, and in 
doing so, “straddle the academic divide between the [two] logics.”  The reason for this 
centers on legitimacy—invoking norms to justify one’s behavior is strategic action for the 
sake of locating the self within a particular normative order.
100
  According to Clark, 
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“legitimacy makes any kind of sense only within a social context.”101 He adds that 
“socially, legitimacy functions to prescribe recognition of the relevant actors, and also to 
prescribe appropriate forms of conduct.”102 Clarke adds that “at the point where 
legitimacy and legitimation overlap is a political terrain—the meeting ground of 
norms…[and] distributions of power. Legitimacy entails not just standards but practices 
in the form of “actors’ strategies of legitimation.”103 An act of legitimation is both social 
and strategic since it upholds the norm of seeking approval even as the actor seeks to 
manipulate perceptions and even distort the agreed upon meanings of the norm.
104
 Hurd 
gives the example of non-aggression by states:  “so prevalent is the reflex to justify war 
as defensive or as invited that it is difficult to find a case of admitted aggression in the 
post-1945 world.”105 Legitimacy is the key concept linking states and norms since it 
accounts for the social context in which states seek power and cooperation,
106
 even as I 
argue, in war.  
Legitimacy is thus the goal of a process rather than a norm in its own right.  
Norms are used to achieve legitimacy. Further, in a globalizing world, legitimacy is 
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located in the intersection between international society and what Clark calls the “world 
society,” characterized by shifting social bases and multiple audiences. On this account, 
human rights is a “world society claim” by which “state actors were able to pursue their 
interests via human rights, only because there was a world society constituency extending 
beyond international society and to which appeal could be made.”107 To the extent that 
the legitimacy of human rights is weighted against sovereignty in the international order, 
we would expect to see the human rights interpretation of the CIN carry greater strategic 
appeal.  
Thus, contra Keohane, who sees strategically motivated action as negating the 
explanatory power of norms, I employ a social notion of legitimacy that derives from the 
observation that social life is inherently strategic in the sense that it entails 
communicating, arguing about moral claims, and justifying one’s identity and actions to 
one’s community, even a global civil society. A legitimacy gap on this account would 
then be indicated by an inability to project identity or image as consistent with one’s 
position vis a vis the prevailing normative order. Ultimately this means that the actor’s 
strategies of legitimation have failed. Further, it indicates that reputation or image is 
being controlled according to alter’s definition instead of ego’s. The causal mechanism 
for changed behavior lies in the legitimacy gap—the failure to achieve identity on one’s 
own terms. This means that when an actor is unable to control that image through words, 
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it must close the legitimacy gap through deeds, which necessarily entails a redefinition of 
interests—in this case, what it means to “win” a war.   
The recognition that norms matter in ways not amenable to the rationalist-
constructivist divide is important to my efforts to carve out a space in the growing body 
of literature on state behavior toward civilians in war. It explains why what is in reality a 
fairly straightforward question has not been posed to this point. I believe this is because 
the literature on civilians in war is divided between branches of rationalism and 
constructivism, with the security studies literature emphasizing the strategic dimensions 
of civilians in war on the one hand and a norms-based approach emphasizing culture and 
identity on the other.  These alternative explanations for state behavior toward civilians 
will be reviewed in chapter three. 
First, chapter two of this study will undertake an in-depth historical overview of 
the civilian immunity norm to show the specific constitutive effects that issue from this 
norm, specifically how the nexus of law, morality, and power have coalesced around and 
even within the norm for centuries. This chapter will highlight recent literature discussing 
the constitutive effects of the norm on the international order itself, specifically in terms 
of its embodiment of the tension between sovereignty and human rights. This concept of 
international order draws on Reus-Smit’s notion of the “moral purpose of the state,” 
meaning that every international order has a purposive function defined by the moral 
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reason for being of the state.
108
 This concept serves to link the GWOT to moral norms by 
way of communicating a moral purpose in the GWOT conceived as a defense of the 
international order. This will lay the groundwork for interpreting the instrumental use of 
the norm both in terms of making sovereign power claims about military necessity and in 
terms of making identity claims by aligning with the human rights aspects of the norm. 
The attitudes of states toward civilian casualties say a great deal about the extent to which 
they perceive a legitimacy gap caused by civilian mistreatment. Likewise, the degree to 
which states attempt to justify more expansive definitions of military necessity points to 
the diminished strategic importance of the civilian immunity norm.  This chapter will also 
provide the background to understand the historical centrality the civilian immunity norm 
to Western military culture.  
In Chapter 3, I will narrow the literature to two strands that compete more directly 
with my own hypothesis: First, I will review the literature on doctrinal innovation in the 
military, primarily because this is the strand of literature that seeks to explain the change 
in strategy in social scientific terms. Reviewing this theoretical literature will demonstrate 
that a gap exists in the explanations for why it is that the innovation was successful; and I 
will suggest that a norms explanation helps to fill that gap. Second, I will review the 
literature that specifically seeks to show why and under what conditions states do or do 
not victimize civilians.  This will again demonstrate that the rationalist/constructivist 
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divide is apparent in the explanatory categories (rationalist/strategic; regime type; 
identity; and military culture) and that each, taken alone, does not adequately allow me to 
pursue that account of norms that interests me. My own model hits on but transforms the 
meanings and relationships between the concepts above; that is, I treat them not as 
independent factors but rather integral dimensions of the same phenomenon: democratic 
states strategically alter military culture to render their actions more consistent with the 
identity claims of the state when they believe a legitimacy gap hinders their ability to act 
effectively. The strategic use of the civilian immunity norm fills the legitimacy gap by 
rendering consistent the message between the war of ideas and the war on the ground.  
The extent to which there is variance between the cases is examined as a function of the 
legitimacy gap, which I do in chapters 4 and 5. 
The Material as Background 
 In order to test for the effects of the civilian immunity norm, the normative 
environment or what some consider the normative “background” of C.O.I.N. must be 
brought to the foreground. This means that the material will not be absent but will rather 
be shifted to the background. One of the primary missing links within the norms literature 
as applied to the civilian immunity norm is how international norms are intertwined with 
material factors. No studies thus far have linked changing perceptions of interests of the 
U.S. as being tied to its identity, or concerns about “who we are” as a nation, yet the “war 
of ideas” suggests that winning the physical war is being increasingly tied to positive 
assessments of U.S. identity. A constructivist understanding of reputation recognizes the 
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socially negotiated nature of identity—that a state can assert its identity endlessly but that 
unless it is recognized as what it claims to be, it has strategically failed at controlling 
perceptions. Legitimacy is the central concept that ties together reputation costs with 
norm compliance because the civilian immunity norm is essential to the reputation of the 
U.S. in the eyes of foreign publics—they identify more closely with civilians than they do 
states.  
The central material factor at work in my model is derived directly from the 
military literature: the strategic necessity to deprive insurgents, terrorists, and guerrillas 
of ideological and material support, especially in terms of increased recruitment of 
insurgents.
109
 This is key because this loss of a monopoly on violence within the 
international realm leads strategic decision-makers to see the changing nature of warfare 
as a global insurgency rather than a localized one. This understanding led to an effort to 
shift from a “case-by-case” strategy to a broad doctrine. Whereas localized insurgencies 
have always relied on delegitimizing the incumbent government, David Kilcullen, one of 
the architects of the counterinsurgency strategy, points out that the transnational character 
of contemporary insurgency is such that several battles are being fought simultaneously 
(global terrorists, local, and regional battles are all taking place at once, all with different 
goals) and that multiple audiences, some far away from the battlefield, provide support. 
Indonesia, for example, was known to have been the source of many foreign fighters at 
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one point in Iraq.
110
  Multiple populations thus characterize and vastly complicate the 
global insurgency, or what has also recently been termed the post-Maoist “insurgency 
archipelago.”111 The implications are that while the local population directly experiences 
the effects of the struggle for legitimacy between insurgents and the host nation, which 
may include civilian casualties as well as ideological, security, and economic 
developments, extended audiences will most likely judge the insurgents or terrorists 
versus the government on their treatment of civilians. 
The changing nature of war is a highly contested topic,
112
 the full examination of 
which falls outside the scope of this study. My point is rather that if leaders perceive it as 
such, it helps to explain a shift in interests, even a revised idea of what it means to “win” 
a war. While it is true that guerrilla warfare is nothing new and neither is 
counterinsurgency, the political and informational context changes,
113
 as do what are 
considered effective and “appropriate” strategies regarding civilians. Mary Kaldor points 
out that the emerging global civil society that makes possible the participation of 
progressive actors such as human rights–oriented NGOs and advocacy groups also makes 
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possible the rise of violent actors who wish to challenge humanitarian, liberal norms.
114
  
Although states sometimes press against such norms when it constrains what they see as 
their sovereign prerogatives, the fact that the liberal human rights regime helps to 
delegitimize violent non-state actors means that democratic states, at the least, have an 
abiding rational interest in maintaining the primacy of their own position as guarantors 
within such an order.   
Summary of the Argument 
This study employs a constructivist approach, arguing that states will choose to 
strengthen compliance with the CIN when they see the constraining normative 
environment as a key part of the strategic environment.  Legitimacy is argued to be the 
causal mechanism driving interests and identities to align more closely with the human 
rights-based aspects of the international order.   My argument, based on a social 
conception of power, hinges on the observation that state interests change over time and 
that this is evident as sovereignty-based attitudes toward civilian casualties move toward 
a more constraining, human rights-based outlook. I identify three conditions under which 
this occurs: when the normative/discursive framework of protecting civilians is seen as 
essential to delegitimizing the enemy; when the legitimacy of the initial invasion is in 
question, and civilian casualties are seen as damaging to the international image by 
increasing that gap; and when regaining a monopoly on force is seen as impossible to 
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achieve through material force alone because civilian casualties increase support for the 
insurgency. Together, these provide the conditions under which aligning with human 
rights-centered norms eventually come to be seen as the only viable strategy in fighting 
insurgencies.  
Overall, this study adds to the literature on the strategic importance of civilians in 
conflict by testing for the influence of norms in shaping strategy. This particular norm 
has not yet been considered as a possible cause of strategic change. In this sense, I aim to 
further the ideational turn in security by showing that norms can be used instrumentally 
even within war without being reduced to “cheap talk.” I also aim to contribute to the 
ongoing attempt to bridge constructivism with rationalism through employing a logic that 
makes use of both approaches.  
The schematic below visually demonstrates the causal logic of the model, which 
is that the war of ideas appeals to human rights-associated principles and values while the 
physical war appeals to sovereignty-based values. Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) creates 
a legitimacy crisis due to the inability to prevail in a way that reconciles the desired 
identity (defender) with the desired interests (conventional winning through superior 
force). Civilian protection is a strategy of legitimation that renders words and deeds 
consistent, and in the process necessitates redefining interests as “winning” by 
delegitimizing the enemy. 
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Figure 1. Physical War Versus the War of Ideas 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Design 
Case Selection 
George and Bennett suggest that one can reasonably select a single case for in-
depth study when it is a deviant, least likely, most likely, or crucial case.
115
 Afghanistan 
and Iraq in some ways straddle the line between two cases and a single case, but I will 
treat them as two cases. Even when treated as two cases, each conflict is still a crucial 
case because it involves the most powerful state in the system. The two cases are two 
separate conflicts that overlap in terms of the organization, state, time frames, and 
personnel involved. Further, the C.O.I.N. doctrine that represents change within the 
military is the outcome under study in the Iraq war, but it is applied later and to a lesser 
extent in the Afghanistan war. C.O.I.N. claims to be conceived as a guide for both 
conflicts, but in reality, it was not adopted in Afghanistan during the same process. As 
two cases, they also demonstrate variance in terms of the perceived legitimacy of the 
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invasion of each, and Afghanistan is a joint effort between the U.S. and the international 
community. This allows me to compare the relative urgency with which civilian 
casualties were treated, and in addition, material differences between the two conflicts 
become evident.  
Both theaters were considered at the time to be two fronts in the larger war on 
terror. In this sense, both cases involving the U.S. are both least likely and crucial.
116
 
They are the least likely or hard cases because, from a rationalist perspective, the power 
position of the US makes it least likely to be punished for norms violations by 
international institutions such as the International Criminal Court. It is least likely to 
suffer intervention by other states, or economic or other sanctions from the international 
community for killing civilians, and its domestic support for war is not historically 
dependent on civilian casualties, but rather is more sensitive to troop casualties.
117
 Thus 
by choosing a constraining strategy it is behaving in ways not expected from a purely 
rationalist perspective. 
From a constructivist perspective, they are crucial cases because the United States 
has the soft power to set cultural norms, including international norms. Thus, what the 
U.S. interprets in terms of norms has effects for the entire normative international 
context. Early debates about the civilian immunity norm suggested that it could be 
weakened by seeming U.S. indifference to civilian casualties. Moreover, given the 
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immense resources devoted to the war on terror, the U.S. sees the ability to establish the 
terms of the post 9-11 international order as in its own interests. Constructing the 
normative environment so as to delegitimize terrorism and the use of violence by non-
state actors through strengthening the norm in the public discourse is consistent with its 
demonstrated interests. No other case has the ability to impact the normative environment 
in this way.   
Data 
This study employs multiple data sources. I began with interviews, asking broad 
exploratory questions about C.O.I.N. and the U.S. shift in strategy, as well as about U.S. 
attitudes toward civilian casualties. I conducted approximately twenty-two interviews 
with active and retired military members, some enlisted who served in either or both 
conflicts, some junior officers, and some high level officers, as well as other civilians 
with an informed analytical perspective and professional insight. Because of the 
extremely sensitive nature of the information shared with me, it was mutually agreed that 
all identifying information would be excluded, with only general rank (lower level, junior 
officers, et cetera) to be used when necessary to clarify differences in perspective among 
groups of interviewees. For example, lower level enlisted personnel have a different 
vantage point on war than those involved in the making of doctrine. This is noted when 
applicable, though ranks of individuals are not.  
Other military perspectives were gleaned from the voluminous literature, which is 
both secondary and primary. I searched out and viewed or read articles, interviews, 
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lectures, memoirs, and transcripts of congressional testimony, as well as leaked memos 
authored by key decision-makers.  In order to triangulate the data, I examined and 
interpreted official security documents of the U.S. Government, speeches, and secondary 
analytical and historical sources. Wiki-leaks provided access and cues to leaked classified 
intelligence reports that helped to directly gauge U.S. concerns about civilian casualties 
during key battles such as Fallujah in Iraq. Another important data source were the 
primary conference reports detailing a series of meetings held with military officials from 
2000 until after the adoption of C.O.I.N. in 2008. These reports demonstrate the change 
in attitudes that took place among high level military officials over time and included 
military and human rights academics who would eventually partake in the writing of the 
actual doctrine. The increased role of these human rights workers in the process of 
C.O.I.N. revision over time is taken as evidence of the diffusion of civilian-centered 
human rights norms into the military throughout the innovation process. 
Finally, I examined the debate internal to the military during the year preceding 
the writing of the new doctrine, as well as the field manual itself and the early version of 
the field manual that was later discarded.  A structured comparison allows me to 
demonstrate variance in how civilians were viewed strategically in older models of 
counterinsurgency versus the innovated model.  I specifically looked for indicators as to 
whether civilians were seen as objects or as subjects in the war. For example, were they 
grouped linguistically with material objects such as property, or were they seen as 
participants in the social/political order? Was moral identity deemed important for 
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military actors? Were civilian casualties mentioned, and if so, how consistent was the 
treatment of civilians in the old versus new models? Reading historical and journalistic 
accounts of both wars allows me to place the developments in C.O.I.N. into context, 
particularly when it comes to events that garnered bad press for the U.S., such as 
atrocities and controversies about torture, detainment, and civilian casualties. 
Method 
The method used is process tracing and historical explanation. The process tracing 
method is suitable for constructivism since, as Wendt suggests, “the core of descriptions 
of causal mechanisms is “process-tracing, which in social science ultimately requires case 
studies and historical scholarship.”118 The aim is to “identify the intervening causal 
process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”119 Lupovici agrees that 
constructivist research designs should use process tracing in order to show a relationship 
between variables.  Because constructivism is also concerned with how the normative 
context matters, constructivists “need to study both the behavioural and the discursive 
dimensions.” “Crucial junctures” must be identified “in order to ‘tell the two stories’, and 
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to actually establish the regulative as well as the constitutive eﬀects norms have on 
behaviour.”120  
As recommended by George and Bennett, this study will employ a structured, 
focused comparison, which means that both cases are narrowed to the same questions in 
order to guide and standardize the data. The aim of each case study is to tell the story of 
civilian casualties, whether and how such casualties came to be seen as problematic, and 
whether and how this problem contributed to the civilian-centered institutional outcome. 
The questions used to structure each case were as follows: 
1. What was the baseline legitimacy level of each invasion based on 
international sentiment?  
2. Did the attitudes toward civilian casualties change over time? At what point 
did civilian casualties come to be seen as problematic and why?  
3. What were the crucial junctures in each conflict that led to the development of 
new approaches, whether strategic or doctrinal? Were civilian casualties seen 
as driving these changes? To what extent and how?  
4. What kind of contact did military insiders have with the human rights 
community? Did attitudes toward the human rights community change over 
time? How is this expressed in the institutional outcome? (i.e. changes to 
minimize civilian casualties?   
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5. What explains the variance in the two cases in terms of when each adopted a 
new approach and to what extent? For example, why was Iraq the first to 
inspire new doctrinal thinking and why was population protection in 
Afghanistan only considered later?   
6. What institutional changes brought about as a result of civilian casualties cut 
across both conflicts?  
Because the institution (U.S. military) and the umbrella conflict (GWOT) are the 
same for both wars, I divided the time periods for each conflict in such a way that overlap 
was minimal. This allowed me to speak about human rights development from 2001-
2012s within the military as a single continuous phenomenon. The Iraq chapter will 
include the early years and Afghanistan the later years. Human rights is primarily 
examined through the military’s interactions with a particular human rights group at 
Harvard university, which is spread across the two cases. Moreover, the sequential steps 
of human rights adoption structures the time periods, with Iraq containing the first three 
phases: instrumental use, argumentation, and persuasion, and Afghanistan containing the 
last two phases of habitualization and institutionalization.
121
   
Since the CIN is not a visible variable, it must be proxied by attitudes toward 
civilian casualties throughout the phases noted above. As Lupovici explains, “another 
method for the study of norms is based on examining the actors’ arguments about 
                                                          
121
 These are the phases of human rights adoption noted in Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of 
Human Rights. This framework does not fit perfectly since it is designed for the impact of international 
norms on domestic regimes, but it does allow for tracking some movement toward a stronger human rights 
orientation. 
55 
 
 
normative behavior.”122 Modified behavior is indicated by the efforts to change doctrine 
(actual doctrinal changes do not always coincide with more visible troop buildups, such 
as the surge in Iraq). The crucial juncture in each conflict is identified as the time when 
the military saw civilian casualties as driving a legitimacy crisis. Coverage of each 
conflict ends upon doctrinal change toward civilian-protection; however, Afghanistan 
continues beyond doctrinal change so that more permanent institutional changes can be 
noted. The expected sequence of events is increased attention to civilian casualties, 
perceptions of a legitimacy crisis, and then attempts to innovate doctrine to remedy the 
situation. 
Because mutual constitution of identity and interests are the primary focus, 
Lupovic argues that discourse analysis is needed to show constitutive effects.  Discourse 
analysis may entail varied approaches, but this study employs critical discourse analysis, 
an interpretive approach that aims at analyzing the construction of meaning through 
language. It is critical insofar as it aims to explicate relationships of power. Since my 
own argument draws on the discourse analysis of others, especially (as will be explained 
in chapter two) on Kinsella's theory that the “civilian” is produced by locating subjects 
within discourses of barbarism, I will apply Kinsella’s ideas to the case under study. 
Doing so allows me to demonstrate the war on terror rhetoric as a norms-driven discourse 
meant to produce identities in relation to international law and morality. Contextualizing 
the discourse of terrorism as a continuation of the “barbarism versus civilization” 
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discourse indicates the perceived need to delegitimize the enemy by invoking aspects of 
the CIN that resonate with the international community.  
Moreover, in this approach, identity becomes a relational concept inseparable 
from power interests, making it compatible with a constructivist lens. This particular 
notion of discourse is thus Foucaultvian in that it sees language as the focal point of 
power and discourse.
123
 This interpretive approach examines the language employed to 
legitimize political action, as well as attempts to construct a preferred identity to 
legitimize interests. What I will look for in terms of discourse is if and how the historical 
language of the CIN is invoked instrumentally,  as part of the GWOT, to what extent the 
same language claims are used to delegitimize the enemy, and then to what extent the 
same language claims are later seen as having created a rhetorical trap.  
The intervening process will comprise the bulk of my analysis, and evidence of 
the presence of the civilian immunity norm will not thus be taken as evidence of the 
influence of the civilian immunity norm, but rather concerns about how image is 
connected to legitimacy in relation to the norm serves as the key indicator that the norm 
is important causally. Legitimacy in this case is not derived from an objective 
measurement imposed externally but rather a subjective concern for how civilian 
casualties are being interpreted by multiple audiences at the same time, with an emphasis 
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on the Arab/Muslim communities within the warzone and outside as well.
124
 How this is 
communicated within the military as a concern is indicated by literal mentions of 
legitimacy as well as expressions that suggest a concern for how behavior reflects on the 
national and institutional image.  
Furthermore, in order to show the movement from sovereignty interpretations of 
CIN to human rights interpretations, I will look for the language of sovereignty in the 
beginning, especially during the invasion and shortly thereafter. Table 1 shows that 
sovereignty indicators of CIN are measured by an emphasis on the military necessity 
principle as an enabling factor in killing civilians. Treating civilian deaths as the cost of 
doing business, or as the inevitable outcome of military operations, or as the fault of the 
enemy, is an indicator of a sovereignty orientation. Table 1 also shows that movement 
toward a human rights interpretation is indicated by humanity principles (distinction, 
precaution). Proportionality lies somewhere in between and can be used for either 
enabling or constraining.  Treating civilian casualties as “allowable’ collateral damage 
indicates a tendency to privilege the proportionality principle of the CIN.  The key here 
would be the extent to which the military thought it necessary to emphasize their 
constraint.   
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The increasing human rights orientation will also be measured by the extent to 
which the military as an organization follows the predictable steps toward norm diffusion 
mentioned above. The expected relationship over time is that the proper lens for viewing 
civilians moves away from sovereignty and toward human rights, which is indicated by 
the constituent concepts within the norm. 
Table 1. Civilian Immunity Norm: Principles and Underlying Meta-Norms 
More Sovereignty Less  Sovereignty Less Human Rights More Human Rights 
Military Necessity Proportionality Precaution Distinction 
 
Expected Findings Combining Process Tracing and Discourse Analysis 
Early Invasion 
Each case study will begin by placing the conflict into context within the larger 
global war on terror and determining a baseline level of legitimacy. This will be based on 
broad sentiments of the international community regarding the legitimacy of the invasion, 
the degree of international support and involvement in the conflict, and where available, 
attitudes of relevant audiences, especially those of Arab and Muslim audiences. When 
perceptions of legitimacy are high, I expect to find a lower concern for civilian casualties 
in terms of damage to social reputation, values, or “who we are,” in connection with the 
treatment of civilians (while at the same time a high level of claiming an identity based 
on human rights, democratic values, and a high regard for innocent life in comparison to 
terrorists). In the face of criticism about casualties, however, I would expect to find 
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attitudes of sovereign power expressed in terms of “military necessity” and legalistic 
referents to the norm in connection with casualties; denial, displacement of blame, and 
other dismissive statements rather than attempts to create identity alliances with human 
rights in the face of criticism. Regarding the war of ideas, I would expect to find little 
recognition that the war of ideas is contingent on actions in the physical war.   
Rising Insurgency 
The causal steps should reflect an early recognition of an insurgency and the need 
to re-establish the monopoly of force. The level of concern for reputation costs incurred 
by civilian casualties would remain low in the beginning and would grow after force is 
escalated and the need for a clear choice about strategy begins to become apparent. 
Sensitivity to the strategic of killing civilians will become more common, and arguments 
will begin to surface about reducing casualties as a matter of winning both the war of 
ideas and the war on the ground. This will be intensified at key points of global criticism 
of the U.S. reputation as being tarnished and will take on urgency as the connection 
between strategic failure and identity becomes evident to key innovators in the military. 
As an indicator of a crucial juncture, I would expect to find an increasingly explicit 
articulation of the need for legitimacy in counterinsurgency, and it would be increasingly 
connected to the idea that killing civilians produces recruits for the enemy.  
Adoption of C.O.I.N. 
Upon adoption, I would expect to see a concern for operationalizing the ethical 
standards involved in population protection. Appeals to the ethical warrior culture will be 
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apparent—words like virtue, honor, ethical, moral high ground will become more 
common in communications both to the public and to the soldiers. Institutionalization of 
ethical treatment of civilians will be a goal, and the military will continue to seek out help 
from human rights workers in order to figure out the details of what is required to 
maintain a policy of civilian protection. I would also expect to find more coherent and 
explicit articulations of why this ethical turn is the only possible one for the U.S. to 
adopt. Connections will be made explicit between the war of ideas and the war on the 
ground. A newfound appreciation for strategic communication and controlling the 
narrative will emerge in the military, and a policy of accountability will emerge in 
military culture.  
Falsification 
Lupovici explains that  
the mere fact that there are actors who violate the norm does not 
necessarily indicate that the norm does not exist….This is exactly why 
Kratochwil and Ruggie argue that norms cannot be falsiﬁed and hence 
cannot be regarded as ‘variables.’125  
My hypothesis will be considered falsified in the absence of supporting evidence 
as documented above. Counter-evidence would not include material incentives since that 
is a background to the norm. However, material factors that overrule or crowd out 
legitimacy concerns would be taken as counter to my hypothesis.  Statements that 
disregard the sequential order of events centered on legitimacy concerns would weaken 
the hypothesis; for example, patterns of statements that suggest that population protection 
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was preferred from the beginning but was only hampered by operational problems  would 
imply a high level of norm internalization that alone explained the shift in doctrine. 
Statements that the U.S. reserves the right to revert to all necessary means would counter 
the theory of the legitimacy gap. Statements that indicate that it mattered little, if at all, 
how the U.S. was perceived by foreign audiences in terms of civilian casualties. If 
coercive strategies were seriously considered but not chosen for purely instrumental 
reasons, without regard for social damage to the U.S. reputation, this would be 
considered evidence of a pure logic of consequences, or rationalism with no need for the 
addition of norms. 
The next chapter provides an historical account that demonstrates both the long 
history of the norm as a social concern as well as the centrality of the CIN to the evolving 
moral purpose of the state order. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORY OF THE CIVILIAN IMMUNITY NORM 
History provides the strongest proof of the importance of moral factors 
and their often incredible effect: this is the noblest and most solid 
nourishment that the mind of a general may draw from a study of the past. 
--Carl Von Clausewitz 
To introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation 
would be an absurdity. 
--Carl Von Clausewitz 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the concepts of war and morality seem, on 
the face of things, oxymoronic: war unleashes political power in its rawest form, which is 
the use of force to coerce, subjugate, or even to destroy an opposing group; morality on 
the other hand implies limits based on the recognition of some sort of duties or 
obligations. The logic of force is potentially limitless, as famously stated by Clausewitz 
in the above quote;
1
 yet as this chapter will demonstrate, Western ways of war have long 
been embedded in a tradition of moral contemplation and rule-making.
2
  A short history 
of those rules as they apply to the protection of civilians fulfills three purposes: first, to 
provide a deeper understanding of the historical context of the CIN; second, to highlight 
the constitutive role of the norm in the international order; finally, to demonstrate from 
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the constitutive role of the norm in the international order; finally, to demonstrate from 
where my qualitative measures derive by showing the norm’s development as the reason 
for its embodiment of the tension between sovereignty and human rights. Let me begin 
with a brief explication of why an historical overview matters in this case. 
Since war, as the realm of politics most resembling anarchy, has been considered 
the province of realism, the significance of morality (or ideational factors writ large) in 
the face of material interests has been largely dismissed. This view of morality is itself 
historical; that is, how morality has been understood to matter (or not) changes over time. 
This fact disappears in structural realism, which takes an ahistorical view reflective of its 
basic assumptions about states and the state system. This sort of structural explanation 
presents insurmountable problems for discerning the effects of moral norms, yet its 
emphasis on power is indispensable for explaining the use of force. Given the ideational 
turn in the past couple of decades, which has inspired reinterpretations of the realist 
canon, it has become increasingly evident that the idea that war occupies a realm separate 
from the rest of the moral and political world is itself an historical development. Even 
Clausewitz, the most influential military strategist and philosopher of war of the 19
th
 
century believed that morality matters, though to be sure morality for him mattered in a 
way that would hardly resonate with contemporary readers—as morale of the soldiers. In 
that vein, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a history of the moral limits that came 
to be known as the civilian immunity norm, as well as its contextual significance in 
shaping the broader normative order. 
Derived from just war principles, informed by state practice and military tradition, 
and ensconced in international treaties and customary law,  the civilian immunity norm is 
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often heralded as the oldest, most entrenched of all international norms, preceding even 
modern sovereignty and the Westphalian state system. The aim of the civilian immunity 
norm is simple in that it attempts to limit the permissible harm done to groups of people 
now known as civilians or noncombatants. It is considered the core moral norm of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the Laws of Armed Combat 
(LOAC).
3
 Simple on the face of things, the norm presents an enigma in that while it 
generates a high level of consensus (which is at least partially implied in its definition), it 
has also proven fragile, contingent, and in near constant danger of collapse in the face of 
a changing international context.
4
 Terrorism, the strategy of warfare whereby non-state 
actors hide among and purposefully target civilians, is only the latest in a long series of 
challenges to the norm.   
The paradoxical character of the civilian immunity norm means that narratives of 
either progress or decline (or even of irrelevance) fail to capture its significance,
5
 not 
only to the practice of war but to international law and international relations more 
generally.  As Helen Kinsella writes, “the laws of war,” and struggles to define the 
principle of distinction between combatant and civilian, “offer substantial insight into the 
conceptualization and institutionalization of relations among states over time.”6  These 
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laws have been “both reflective of and constitutive of” particular sociopolitical orders.7 
As such, many of the key tensions that characterize the contemporary international 
context, such as the competing dictates of state sovereignty versus human rights, are 
embodied in the norms protecting civilians.
8
 Moral strictures have thus functioned to both 
enable and limit war’s violent potential, suggesting a more problematic relationship 
between morality and power than is commonly acknowledged by conventional realism.
9
  
By highlighting the norm’s growing importance in relation to identity and interests in the 
international order, and its enabling and constraining elements, this chapter will also 
support my central premise that doctrinal innovation centered on minimizing civilian 
casualties presents a puzzle. In addition to setting the historical stage for the cases under 
study, the chapter will provide a concrete frame of reference for the ensuing theoretical 
discussion of norms, how they function, and the methodological challenges that issue 
from attempting to bridge empirical analysis with an expressly normative subject matter.    
The sections that follow will be organized into three parts. First, to demonstrate a 
pattern of increasing consensus about the importance of civilians in ethical theory, this 
chapter will discuss the development of the idea of civilian immunity as an important 
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component of the ethical concerns of just war doctrine. Second, it will address some of 
the seeming contradictions within the norm itself. Third, it will provide an overview of 
the development of the legal norm of noncombatant immunity, as codified through 
treaties and conventions, which will link the strengthened consensus to increasing levels 
of specificity and precision in legal terms, with special attention paid to major 
developments in international politics that shaped the outcome of the conventions.  In 
doing so, this work will highlight key problematic aspects of the norm that prevent or 
limit consensus and thus potentially weaken its practice.  
Theoretical Origins and Development in Just War Theory 
As mentioned above, the roots of the civilian immunity norm are located 
primarily in just war theory, the systematic and influential body of thought concerned  
with the justice of war, both in terms of when war may be waged (jus ad bellum) and how 
it is fought (jus in bello). While Saint Augustine is typically credited with the birth of just 
war doctrine, Brian Orend argues that its earliest contributions can be traced to Greco-
Roman origins.
10
 Aristotle and Plato were both concerned with the just cause of war and 
what could be rightly done with conquered populations. While the distinction between 
combatant and civilian was both a theoretical and legal achievement of the 
enlightenment, attempts to specify  when and why soldiers should be subject to harm 
provide the ethical foundation and impetus for eventually considering the additional 
category of those who should be protected from harm altogether. Richard Shelly Hartigan 
explains that the earliest precursors to the concept of the civilian were born of both moral 
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imagination and practical necessities of life in the ancient Greek polis.  The city-state 
allowed the civis, or citizen, the stability and leisure necessary for intellectual reflection 
but this arrangement also created a practical distinction:   
The city, urban living, with shelter secure from the elements and food supplies 
assured, meant civilization. It was the sine qua non of civilization. However, ancient man 
was forced to pay a price for the luxury of that reflection afforded him by urban living. 
He had to organize and institutionalize a portion of the city’s population for its defense. 
Thus was born the soldier, and his alter ego, the civilian.
11
  
To be sure, the emerging moral concept of the civilian had little effect on 
widespread practices of slaughter and enslavement in Ancient Greece.  Greek society was 
extremely parochial, entailing little if any sense of shared humanity with enemy 
populations, particularly with non-Greeks or Barbarians. It would not be until the city-
state began to decline and the Roman Empire began to rise that Stoicism in the pre-
Christian era would produce the seeds of a “feeling” that “some members of an enemy 
population ought to be spared.”12 Other early Roman contributions to the jus in bello 
(justice in war) include among others, Cicero, a proponent of moderation who asserted 
that surrendering soldiers ought not be slaughtered, and Ambrose, mentor to Augustine, 
who called for virtuous fighting.
13
   
Out of this context arrives Saint Augustine of Hippo, a towering figure in just war 
theory.  Augustine is notable for framing the Greco-Roman ethical concerns within a 
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Christian context, and here we can see that the use of force had to be justified against a 
set of moral imperatives grounded in identity: how could Christians follow the pacifistic 
teachings of Christ and at the same time wage war on behalf of their communities? 
Augustine was much more concerned with the question of jus ad bellum, or when is a 
war just and permissible.  His answer was “to repulse an invading enemy, avenge a 
wrong, and punish those guilty of breaching the peace.”14  His contribution to jus in bello 
is less recognized, for while he  advocates limitations on even just violence, this was 
mere repetition of the type already commonly made for practical purposes—sparing 
women and children in the hope that the other side might reciprocate in the future, or for 
even more banal economic reasons: to preserve them for slavery.
15
 What Augustine did 
contribute to jus in bello is that a Christian must have right intention, both in waging war 
and in fighting it. In order to protect the city from encroaching barbarians,  employing 
force must be motivated by “the right intention [which is] love for, and desire to protect, 
the endangered innocents,” and it must be carried out in somber,  dispassionate fighting.16   
So while moral condemnation against unnecessary slaughter was already in place, 
Augustine added, “no slaughter at all with desire for glory or revenge.”17  
 Augustine’s theoretical contributions did not directly impact the precarious 
position of what we now think of as civilians, mostly because his formulation of “just 
cause” overrode any latent concern for  innocents of the enemy population. On 
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Augustine’s account, unjust societies were more than likely to be populated by unjust 
souls. His model of war is therefore distinctively punitive not only toward rulers, but 
toward the population. Though Augustine admitted the possibility that some innocents 
may be killed, his practical inclination suggested that in any case, innocence is an interior 
condition that cannot be readily identified by soldiers. Moreover, death and unjust 
punishment in war were for him not the worst evils, because “in eternity they quite 
escape punishment.”18 Regardless, as Hartigan points out, Augustine’s contribution to jus 
in bello is “a groping and hesitant articulation of a guilt-innocence opposition” that leads 
eventually to the familiar “innocent civilian” which would shape the norm for centuries, 
and which is still used in popular political discourse today.  
Though the following centuries of the Dark Ages were not known for great 
intellectual achievement, they “did manage big progress on the jus in bello front.”19 
Christian charity and mercy mixed with aristocratic chivalric codes of honor and fair play 
provided the normative bases for many of these conventions.
20
 Through consultation with 
Augustine’s writings and the Bible, the church further specified moral obligations toward 
civilians. Influenced by battlefield practices, changing weaponry, and even violent 
sporting practices of the times, such as jousting, papal edicts in the tenth century set forth 
a fairly concrete set of rules which were later developed and consulted by many different 
sources.  The “Peace of God” and the “Truce of God”—as  well as the 1139 Second 
Lateran Council  and Gratian’s 1148 Decretum resulted in, for the first time, women and 
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children being singled out for immunity from attack based loosely on their noncombatant 
status.  Other types of harmful methods of fighting were prohibited as well, including the 
destruction of food sources, using crossbows, and employing weapons dipped in poison.
21
   
As Kinsella points out, the emphasis on military honor, chivalry and fair play, and 
Christian values are important aspects of the Just War tradition since they will be central 
to the development of the idea of “civilization” as a qualifier consulted to determine who 
was deserving of protection and who was not.
22
  In terms of norm development, which is 
generally indicated by increasing specificity, the events of this era indicate increasingly 
specific behavioral obligations toward the protection of certain persons, and they build on 
previous doctrine, indicating a strengthening normative consensus about the protection of 
certain persons over many hundreds of years.  On the other hand, many persons were 
either excluded (particularly Non-Christians) or considered “unfortunate, unintended 
victims.”23 
Another important benchmark for the civilian immunity norm occurs in the 
thirteenth century when St. Thomas Aquinas contributes the principle of proportionality, 
which limits the force that can be morally justified to that which is proportionate to the 
military advantage gained. He also provides the earliest articulation of the doctrine of 
double-effect, which states that the good done by unintentionally killing civilians should 
outweigh the harm, indicating a sense of precaution that must be taken to limit even 
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“necessary” violence.24  At this point, two of the three limiting principles that make up 
the civilian immunity norm have been conceptualized, even if primitively: distinction and 
proportionality—with the third being precaution. Distinction carries the heaviest 
normative weight in that is logically and morally prior to the other two limiting 
principles.  
It is noteworthy that insofar as the earliest preoccupations with the moral limits of 
war focused on when war could be waged and by whom, the frame of reference was 
nearly a complete reversal of what is today. That is, rather than assume the inevitability 
and almost naturalization of war in anarchy, the pacifist position of the early Christian 
church required answers to the question of why it was permissible to kill at all, and only 
then who could justly be harmed.  It was this line of thinking that eventually led to a 
corollary logic: if some may be harmed without assigning moral culpability to their 
killers, then it follows that others should be protected.    
As mentioned above, as just war doctrine developed, it became the foundation for 
the earliest forms of international law, and its concepts and categories eventually fueled 
aspirations of an international society of states. The roots of society (based on social 
interactions, in contrast to the realist idea of a “system”), were anchored in its attempts to 
limit war, even as the Peace of Westphalia approached, and war became increasingly 
recognized as a tool of statecraft. Paradoxically, the emphasis on state sovereignty was 
accompanied by an increased emphasis on the individual and the role of reason. The 
autonomous rational man in natural law accompanied the sovereign nation-state, which 
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led to the next crucial turn in the development of the civilian immunity norm. This dual 
autonomy of individual and state would eventually come to be seen as an opposition and 
would be expressed in the development of international “humanity’s law.”  Humanity’s 
law is a term coined by Teitel, who observes the increasing emphasis in international law 
on the interests of human beings as separate from or even in opposition to the interests of 
states.
 25
 
The Transition from Just War to International Law 
As the ecclesiastical tradition gave way to the Peace of Westphalia and the rise of 
the nation-state, Just War concepts became secularized and increasingly universalized by 
way of natural law. Three men who figured prominently in this historical transition were 
Francisco de Vitoria, an important Catholic theologian and political theorist of the 
sixteenth century,  Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth century “grandfather of international 
law,” and Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss jurist who lived more than a century later.26  It 
was Vitoria who first invoked natural law and claimed that the “deliberate slaughter of 
the innocent is never lawful in itself.”27 This distinction was for him based on the guilt of 
the combatants who bore arms and the presumed innocence of those who did not, unless 
proven otherwise. Categories of protected classes included “women, children, clerics, 
religious, foreign travelers, guests of the country, ‘harmless agricultural folk, and also … 
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the rest of the peaceable civilian population.’”28 Colm McKeogh argues that the practical 
effects for civilians were progressive in a general sense, but that the argument was 
incoherent because Vitoria attempted to fit natural law claims into an Augustinian 
punitive war framework. Recall that Augustine assumed that the responsibility for the 
wickedness perpetrated by the ruler was the basis for jus ad bellum and that the entire 
population shared in this guilt. The problem for Vitoria is that it cannot be said that 
soldiers of both sides are guilty if only one side has just cause, since guilt is what entitles 
one side to punish the other.    
McKeogh argues that the civilian immunity norm as we currently understand it 
was only made possible because Grotius, in employing natural law, challenged the 
millennium old model of punitive wars that was justified within the Augustinian tradition 
as punishment for sin. Grotius paves the way for a state’s moral obligation toward the 
enemy population by insisting on universalizable principles, not just categories, as the 
basis for judgment.  Jus ad bellum, or the cause for war, was universalized first, in the 
sense that self- preservation, rather than the guilt or innocence of the collective enemy, 
became the justification for fighting. This was necessary in part because the rise of the 
nation-state meant that standing armies and frequent warfare stretched Augustine’s 
punitive justification for war incredibly thin, and yet the requirements of sovereignty—as 
an agreement rather than its later realist meaning as an eternal material fact—necessitated 
the reconciliation of war with the moral framework meant to regulate state relations.  
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The effect on jus in bello was that the actions of the person under consideration 
must be invoked as reasons justifying his death.
29
  In shifting the moral locus of concern 
away from the soldier’s internal state, Grotius far surpasses Augustine’s prohibition on 
passionate or vengeful killing. According to Grotius,   “the law of nature does not allow 
inflicting reprisals, except on the actual person who committed the offense. Nor is it 
enough that by a kind of fiction the enemy may be regarded as forming a single body.”30 
Emmerich de Vattel adds to Grotius’ basic imperative nearly a century later: “The 
sovereign is the real author of war, which is made in his name and at his command. The 
troops, both officers and soldiers, and in general all the persons by whom the sovereign 
carries on war, are only instruments in his hands. They execute his will and not their 
own.”31  While instruments who fight may be killed without attributing guilt, civilians, 
who retain personhood and cannot be considered instruments, may therefore not be 
subject to harm: “as they do not resist the enemy by force or violence, they give the 
enemy no right to use it towards them.”32  Consideration of just cause was, importantly, 
effectively separated from justice in fighting, at least on theoretical grounds. The later 
legal norm based on this distinction is considered by most analysts to be crucial to 
protecting civilians since the state is seen as possessing its own will, superceding that of 
combatants but separate from that of civilians. Overall, the Enlightenment revision of just 
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war doctrine produced a version of civilian immunity that served to square the normative 
and material conditions of the time, and as Kinsella points out, to invoke natural law as a 
transition to the emerging Law of Nations.
33
   
Theorizing about the justness of the causes of war ended for the most part with 
Vattel, precisely because of the conditions of modern sovereignty:  
But how shall this law be made to prevail in the quarrel of Nations and 
sovereigns who live together in a state of nature? They recognize no 
superior who shall decide between then and define the rights and 
obligation of each.
34
 
As Just War Theory declined, the secular turn produced the voluntary Law of 
Nations and the “science” of international law wherein the justness of war was not at 
issue so much as the conduct of war.  This period of “law” was social rather than 
positivist, that is, based on custom, which included practice as well as conventional 
concepts and ways of reasoning. This period is hailed by some as the height of the 
civilian immunity norm, wherein agreements between sovereign states were based on a 
shared consensus and reciprocity. These customary understandings would greatly inform 
the later codification of international law. The result was that the positive laws of war, in 
assuming the inevitability of war between sovereigns, were more concerned with what is 
than what should be. The positivist bent produced problems for grounding the norm, 
however, in that natural law theorists attempted to shift its foundations from a moral 
imperative to a material fact. As McKeogh points out, Vitoria and his successor Suarez   
attempted to link the “powerful moral concepts of guilt and innocence to the material 
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facts of combatancy and non-combatancy…yet they can link them only by 
presumption.”35 The difficulties of establishing a solid grounding for distinguishing 
between civilians and combatants, combined with many other customary ways of 
rationalizing who can be harmed and who cannot, leads to a permissiveness that has 
undermined the imperative to protect.  
While the principles of the norm seem straightforward at first glance, the history 
thus far shows that the norm, even as it gained coherence and a level of consensus among 
nation-states, has historically allowed for the killing of large numbers of civilians. This is 
not simply because states have failed to realize the norm’s ideals but also because the 
norm itself is constituted by tensions between its enabling and constraining elements. 
These tensions are an inherited feature of the norm that help to account for its continued 
enigmatic character today.  
The basic tension derives from just war theory itself. As a compromise between 
realism and pacifism, the just war tradition tries to find a middle way between acceptance 
of war and limiting its devastating effects. The constituent concepts of the civilian 
immunity norm (distinction, proportionality, precaution, and military necessity) reflect 
the interplay of power and morality, with the result that military necessity (as interpreted 
in state practice) has historically limited attempts to increase the norm’s precision and 
specificity. This becomes evident in the codification process, and provides insight into 
why large number of civilians can be killed without necessarily violating the norm.    
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One of the tensions that accounts for this weakness in the norm is found in 
double-effect reasoning, the proportionality principle applied to jus in bello that was first 
articulated in medieval times by Aquinas. This compromise between morality and what is 
deemed “military necessity” reflects the tension between sovereignty based on state 
rights and natural law rights (eventually known as human rights) based on universal 
notions of humanity. While developments in the civilian immunity norm depended on the 
extension of rights to individual human beings to counter notions of collective guilt and 
punishment, the reality of war is that it kills civilians. Since Just War, and then 
international law based on its principles, seeks a middle way between realism’s 
acceptance of war and pacifism’s rejection of violence, double-effect is the compromise 
that makes war possible. In other words, were the pacifist stance—the total moral 
prohibition on killing—followed, even if it were modified to allow for the killing of 
soldiers but not for civilians, it is generally assumed that war would be impossible. 
Double-effect is a moral loophole, so to speak, whereby foreseen but unintentional deaths 
of civilians are permissible so long as they are “not productive of the military goal and 
proportionate to the good sought.”36  
Criticism abounds on this point. Just as Augustine saw innocence as an interior 
state that would not be visible to soldiers, political theorists have raised the problematic 
of attributing intention or its absence to states since the will of states is abstract, and can 
often only be judged by acts or by agents.
37
  Moreover, the line between what is 
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intentional versus what is unintentional but foreseen is unclear and often shifts at the 
tactical and operational levels of military action. In a related vein, military necessity is 
also a potentially limitless concept.  Moreover, critics such as McKeogh charge that the 
premises of double-effect violate the very basis for civilian immunity: the separation of 
ad bellum and in bello on the one hand, and the distinction between instrument and 
personhood on the other: 
Civilians ought not be killed as a side effect of an action to save one’s own 
combatants, for combatants may be treated as instruments, but civilians 
remain persons; it is not the case that two combatant lives saved outweigh 
one civilian life lost. Rather, the attack on the military target is only an 
intermediate step, a means to the end of victory in the war. Its worth 
cannot be assessed without reference to the ad bellum end for which the 
war is waged by that party to the conflict.
38
 
Furthermore, because the assessment of proportionality takes place event by 
event, the “cumulative loss of civilian life can become disproportionate to the strategic 
end of the war.”39 Regardless of its moral and theoretical limitations, double-effect and 
proportionality remain crucial concepts in international law, both enabling the killing of 
some civilians for the purposes of state, while limiting that killing, at least in theory. This 
remains one of the most controversial, but arguably practically essential, elements of the 
civilian immunity norm. Moreover, this moral tension represents well how power and 
morality interact to both enable and constrain the killing of civilians in war. It also 
suggests that empirical research focused on the norm’s regulative effects would benefit 
from breaking the norm down into its constituent parts: does military necessity expand to 
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become more permissive of killing civilians, for example? Do the parties to the conflict 
emphasize the sovereign rights of states over the human rights of civilians, or vice versa?  
Another explanation offered for the inherent fragility of the norm is the 
indeterminacy of the principle of distinction itself. In her groundbreaking and highly 
regarded work, Helen Kinsella argues that despite the accomplishments of  Just War 
theory, identifying who exactly counts as a civilian—and thus who should be subject to 
harm and who should not—has shifted considerably throughout history. Rather than 
taking this as evidence of the norm’s irrelevance, however, she insists that the effects of 
the norm cannot be understood by measuring compliance alone, but also by its 
constitutive effects. Tracing the codification process through the major preparatory 
conferences, debates, and drafts of diplomatic treaties that mark the norm’s milestones, 
Kinsella finds that the transition of the norm from a social to a legal (positivist) status can 
only be properly understood in light of the social identities, historical discourses, and 
power relations that shaped it.  
By comparing conflicts that occurred directly before or after major milestones in 
the norm’s development, Kinsella was able to explain variance in the norm’s effects that 
could not be measured by numbers alone. She hypothesizes, and convincingly 
demonstrates, that because the distinction between civilian and combatant was an 
historical process, specifying who is a civilian relies on shifting, often inconsistent 
criteria based on gender, civilization, and innocence.
40
 Gender, for example, is often used 
in a way considered to be synonymous with “civilian” (women and children being the 
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most common definition). Differences in the definition of “innocence,” however, can 
support or negate the use of gender and even age as a marker of “civilian.” For example, 
innocence has been applied according to a continuum of loyalty during the U.S. Civil 
War, and women who were considered disloyal were killed alongside men and even 
children. The concept was applied differently in the same time frame, involving some of 
the same military personnel, in the case of the Indian Sand Massacre. Here, innocence, as 
applied to Indians, was defined as ignorance or harmlessness, but innocence was 
overridden by distinctions of “civilization.” Who counted as a civilian deserving of 
protection was much narrower, and the killing more permissive, because the war was 
seen as being waged “on behalf of civilization.”   
It may be tempting to view the weakness in the civilian immunity norm as an 
unacknowledged byproduct of the age of colonization but irrelevant to the development 
of the norm per se. Kinsella pushes beyond the mere fact of shifting standards, however, 
and ties the development of the principle of distinction to the interests and identities of 
the emerging European empires and the European order of states. On her account, 
“civilization” was the identity attribute understood to be shared by European states. 
Earlier notions of chivalric codes of military honor loosely structured the (voluntary) 
Laws of Nations between these states, but such laws were not seen as applicable to the 
wars of colonization. For Kinsella, the importance of the transition from an ecclesiastical 
to a secular order is that “Vitoria substituted the right of conquest held by Christian states 
for that held by civilized states.”41   Civilization takes its meaning from its binary 
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opposition—barbarism, and wars of colonization were seen as being launched on behalf 
of civilization. However, barbarism has also historically been constructed as a descriptor 
of wars that do not honor the civilian/soldier distinction—that is, they are “barbarous” 
wars.
42
  
Although the barbarian is presumed to demarcate a clear opposite or 
absolute limit of civilization, the barbarian is, in fact, immanent to 
civilization. The barbarian is said to wage war unconstrained and 
undisciplined, this is among the characteristics of barbarism. And yet, 
against the barbarian, civilized entities may wage a war unconstrained and 
undisciplined. Consider the effects of this upon the entire distinction of 
barbarian and civilized believed to arise from the putative self-discipline, 
restraint, and moderation of civilized entities. Does this distinction 
disappear? Or, was it simply never there? Answers to either underscore 
that the barbarian remains the constitutive outside, presupposed and 
prefigured by civilization.
43
  
The concept of civilization served not only to allow for what most would now 
consider violations of the civilian immunity norm, but “the shaping of the laws 
themselves” were a means by which “civilized nations and civilized men defined and 
defended their interests and identities.”44 Consider how Grotius links the civilized 
identity of the emerging society of European states to their conduct in war: 
There is a common law among nations, which is valid alike for war and in 
war . . . . Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in 
relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of: I 
observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and 
that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for 
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law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree, 
frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of all crime.
45
 
In other words, the construction of the laws of war were an important site of the 
construction of the international order built on the recognition of sovereignty between 
states on the one hand and the hierarchy between states and their empires on the other:  
The tensions and ambiguities of discourses of civilization both set the 
limits of law (civilization vs. barbarism) and occasion the exercise of the 
law (from barbarism to civilization). Only individuals and nations that are 
defined as civilized are invested with the power to distinguish between 
combatants and civilians….Barbarians, by definition, lack the capacity to 
discriminate or to judge and, therefore, are unable to exercise this 
sovereign power. Consequently, as the Marten’s clause illustrates so well, 
the empire constructs the laws of war, especially the principle of 
distinction, and the barbarians are held to be (always already) in violation, 
regardless of actual practice.
46
 
This points to the constitutive effects of norms: norms are essential touchpoints in 
the building of social identities and interests and as such form the basis for a particular 
order. Thus norms serve as both cause and effect at various times. This is what 
constructivists term “mutual constitution,” which is better imagined as a process than as a 
linear occurrence. A non-linear causality need not be considered post-positivist, however. 
As Kendall Stiles and Wayne Sandholtz write, international norms change, and that 
change is characterized by broad cyclical patterns, meaning a norm serves as both cause 
and effect at different points in its development. Such shifting is attributable to political 
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and legal disputes that mediate between the tensions inherent in normative theory, 
international law, and political practice.
47
  
What becomes evident through the codification phase of the civilian immunity 
norm is that as the international order transforms to incorporate formerly colonized 
peoples, the debate about the norm also becomes a site for the struggle of interests and 
identities. In this section, I will sketch out the major legal milestones for the norm, 
beginning with the U.S. Civil War and ending with the 1977 Additional Protocols.  
Legal Codification of the Norm 
General Orders 100 (The Lieber Code) 
The parallel discourses of natural law and civilization permeated the European 
and then the American political landscape and were intimately tied to the colonial project.  
John Locke’s Second Treatise, to offer one important example, rationalized the 
dispossession of the Indians from their land based on such reasoning.
48
  The effect of 
such reasoning on the civilian immunity norm was that even as the legal code attempted 
to specify material facts upon which to identify protected civilians, tensions and 
contradictions created double standards and gray areas that fell back on military honor 
and chivalry to discern. This is evident in General Orders 100, written by Francis Lieber 
and issued by the American government in 1863. 
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Meant to address the escalating violence of the Civil War, General Orders 100 
(Lieber Code) marked the transition from war being seen as “between professionals 
without a great deal of involvement of the civilian population” to increasingly affecting 
civilians.
49
  The document was the first comprehensive attempt at codifying previous 
customary laws of war and was implemented as U.S. domestic law for the last two years 
of the Civil War. This development serves as a test case for Kinsella’s hypothesis. In 
comparing two wars conducted at the same time by many of the same military personnel, 
guided by the same legal codes, Kinsella shows that the treatment of civilians in 
Sherman’s March was much more discriminate than the treatment of Indians in the Sand 
Creek Massacre.”50 While the Civil War was brutal against some civilians, it was not 
indiscriminate. Mark Grimsley argues that distinctions were made according to 
socioeconomic status, with the logic being that elites were targeted because they would 
likely support the opposition and resist the Union.
51
 Thus, “innocence” was based on 
degrees of loyalty toward the Union.  Indians, on the other hand, were deemed 
uncivilized in a way that suspended them somewhere between the category of children 
and savage, fueling a tension between policies of “assimilation and extermination,” 
which resulted in every man being named a potential target. Gender norms—the 
protection of women--were applied more equally across the two conflicts.
52
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The Lieber Code demonstrates the extreme confusion in specifying who counts as 
a civilian because although it attempted to institute a definition of civilian according to 
material criteria: those not in uniform that had little to with that distinction. As Kinsella 
argues, the visual marker of combatant does not neatly correspond to realities on the 
ground, especially in a civil conflict, and so the “indeterminacy of the principle of 
distinction affects compliance with the principle.”53 The Lieber Code’s importance for 
the codification of the norm is its systematic reflection on the principle of distinction, and 
its reliance on custom as a source of criteria.
54
   
After the Lieber Code, the civilian immunity norm continued to rely on 
agreements between “civilized” states. This meant in practice that the legal aspects of the 
norm remained vague and that its practical implementation relied on the expectation that 
the moral honor of military personnel would dictate distinctions about civilians. The 
nascent legal norm, however, while even at low levels of specificity and precision, began 
to take on increasing importance as a part of the normative political order between states. 
The rise of a legal class meant that it also served as a test of transformational progress for 
nations seeking recognition as sovereign states—Japan at the turn of the century, for 
example, was watched by legal scholars to determine whether its conduct in war qualified 
it for “passage…from the oriental to the European class,” and marked those who were 
capable of self -rule and recognition of sovereignty.
55
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The Hague Conventions and the Fourth Geneva Convention 
The Lieber Code, though vague and ideological, attempted to “strike a balance 
between the demands of military necessity and the principles of humanity.” The 
document survived and formed the “undisputed basis for the so-called Law of the 
Hague,” the first formal international treaty on the laws of war. 56 The legal sources of the 
civilian immunity norm are thus traceable to a long series of conventions, customs, and 
supporting agreements. The earliest meetings leading up to the First Hague Peace 
Conference reflected concerns about increasingly lethal weaponry and its effects on the 
means and methods of warfare. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 was one of the results 
of such concerns, and it mostly served to protect members of the military from “an 
unlimited power as to the choice of injuring an enemy,” but this was directed primarily at 
protecting members of the military.
57
 There are a few exceptions: its concern with 
artillery bombardment of undefended places refers indirectly to protection of 
noncombatants.
58
 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 revised the unratified rules 
of the Brussels Declaration, but still mostly took for granted that limiting the means and 
methods of warfare would indirectly limit civilian deaths. It was soon after, in World War 
I and the Spanish Civil War that the development and implementation of aerial 
bombardment would exploit the gaps in international law. It was not expressly forbidden 
to indiscriminately attack a defended area, for example.
59
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The next Hague convention produced the Hague Rules of Air Warfare in 1923, 
though it was never ratified. This marks the recognition of the new vulnerability of 
noncombatants to developing weapons technology, and it also exposed the limited 
compatibility of noncombatant immunity with military necessity. Were noncombatant 
immunity observed, aerial warfare would not at this point be permitted and would render 
the technology ineffective. The Rules of Air Warfare shifted the debate to proportionality 
and the identification of proper military objectives and targeting. The purpose of such 
bombardment was taken into consideration, and intention, first introduced by Augustine, 
became a litmus test for the norm: the Rules specified that aerial bombardment not be 
undertaken for the “purpose of terrorizing the civilian population or damaging private 
property not of a military character, or of injuring noncombatants.”60  
This did not hold, however, as World War II is almost universally recognized as 
the lowest point in the lifespan of the civilian immunity norm. Some believed that the 
distinction between combatant and noncombatant had been forever destroyed, as 
technology made distinguishing between targeting objectives more difficult, and 
intentional target area bombing and saturation bombing became more frequent and 
widespread. Finally, the first use of the atomic bomb, a weapon designed to be 
indiscriminate, appeared to mark the end of the principle of distinction. During World 
War 2, military necessity followed the ideology of total war in which the entire nation is 
mobilized for the war effort. The population was thus seen as a more efficient target for 
reducing the military capability of the enemy.  As Ward Thomas notes, the problem was 
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not that the norm did not exist; rather it was that the early days of international law had 
produced a “multiplicity of laws” that had “a relatively modest impact on expectations, 
preparations, and decisions in war.”61   
The enormous gaps between the Laws of the Hague and current state practice cast 
into doubt the ability of international law to uphold the very principle of distinction, let 
alone the regulations needed to sustain it. This is why the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(formally entitled Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Times of War of 1949) was in name the first attempt to specifically codify the treatment 
of civilians, but in reality its scope was limited to the protection of civilians in the 
custody of a foreign military. As Gardam explains, “any provision in the draft of the 
convention designed to protect the civilian population from the dangers of military 
operations was carefully removed.
62
 This was done out of fear that the conventions, in 
reaching far beyond state practice to limit conduct during hostilities, would not be 
ratified. Kinsella adds that sovereignty was the overriding concern between states, and 
that “delegates to 1949 preparatory conferences deemed the sovereignty of states, which 
is inextricably bound to the emergence and the codification of the laws of war, too sacred 
to be subjected to international regulation.”63  Instead, the general statement of principle 
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found in the Martens Clause, formulated in the Hague Conference of 1899, provided the 
guidelines for the legal norm until the Additional Protocols. It states that 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high 
contracting parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in 
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under 
the protection and empire of the principles of international law as they 
result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws 
of humanity, and the requirements of public conscience.
64
 
Interestingly, however, while the Geneva Conventions were hesitant to restrict 
state behavior toward civilians, it did for the first time introduce the protection of 
noncombatants in non-international armed conflict, providing the seeds for the later 
Additional Protocols.
65
 The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 
attempted to remedy the timidity of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 by codifying the 
main precepts of just war principles and secular customs into actual battlefield rules.
66
 
This development was profoundly shaped by post World War 2 challenges to the colonial 
world order, when colonized peoples became represented in the forum of the newly 
formed United Nations. The U.N., formed in response to the atrocities and enormous 
scale of destruction wrought by the World Wars, quickly became the forum for the 
former third world to push a human rights agenda, particularly the right to self- 
determination.
67
 It was not until the preparation for the 1977 Additional Protocols that the 
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movements arising in the former third world insisted that they be recognized as equal 
belligerents. As Kinsella points out, for the first time the “‘barbarians’ dictated the laws 
of war.”68  
The 1977 Additional Protocols 
Gardam concurs that the overarching political context for the 1977 Additional 
Protocols was the ongoing liberation movements (and the resistance to that struggle by 
incumbents). Even as the U.N. effectively outlawed war, “for some of these States an 
integral component of their political agenda was the right of such peoples to use force to 
achieve their goal of self-determination [which] caused considerable disquiet in the 
international community.”69 Some of these movements revived the medieval Just War 
paradigm that claimed that a just cause superceded limits on the means and methods of 
warfare. Gardam and others at the time saw this as a threat to civilian immunity not 
because of the potential for equal belligerent status of internal war combatants but 
because the guerrilla warfare strategies used in such wars threatened to undermine the 
very distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello that made compliance possible. 
That is, it threatened to support the claims to killing of civilians in the pursuit of a just 
cause.
70
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Other developments in international politics at the time reflect this same basic 
struggle. After the 1972 Munich attack on Israeli civilians, international terrorism became 
almost synonymous with attacking civilians. Drawing on the ongoing debates about the 
Additional Protocols, terrorism became not only a descriptor of a strategy or tactic, nor 
even an evaluative judgment, but it became an identity for an entire liberation movement 
(most notably at this time, the Palestine Liberation Movement). Moreover, as state 
terrorism was employed against various resistance movements in Latin America, the near 
conflation of terror with killing civilians became politically charged and complicated the 
codification of the Additional Protocols. The emergence of the anti-terrorism norm 
became closely related to the civilian immunity norm. Parhad explains  
The relatively powerful states, including most of the Western states, saw 
the creation of a strong anti-terrorism norm as an opportunity to reinforce 
some level of order in the anarchical society of international politics, by 
de-legitimizing a certain category of violence that was most often a 
“weapon of the weak.” Meanwhile, many of the weaker states saw norm-
building efforts as an opportunity to bring attention to more insidious and 
pervasive forms of violence and oppression in the international system.
71
 
The right to self- determination movement challenged the very notion of who 
properly represented civilization. The rebels in the French Algerian War, for example, 
challenged the Western identification with civilization by debating and interpreting the 
laws of war.
72
 Western states such as the United States who self-identified as a civilized 
state were faced with a difficult choice. On the one hand, leaders resisted legitimizing 
guerrillas as belligerents with rights in international wars because to do so would 
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challenge the exclusive claims to sovereignty and the monopoly on legitimate force that 
sovereignty entails. Furthermore, those states who anticipated involvement in struggles 
against Guerrillas objected to the military constraints of the additional Protocols, 
including states who found themselves the site of secessionist struggles.
73
 On the other, 
they wanted to delegitimize the methods used by guerrillas and terrorists by ratifying the 
legal norm.  
The result is that the United States rejected Protocol I which mentions guerrilla 
fighters as combatants in international wars and accepted Protocol 2, which addresses 
internal wars. Reagan’s 1987remarks to the Senate make clear his objections:  
‘It is unfortunate that Protocol 1 must be rejected,' the President wrote. 
But, he added, ‘we must not, and need not, give recognition and protection 
to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law.'
74
  
Reagan goes on to say that the United States will continue to abide by the 
principles of noncombatant immunity independently of the dictates of international law. 
As of the current writing, Protocol I has not been ratified by United States, Israel, Iran, 
Pakistan, and Turkey. Most of the contributions of Protocol I have been considered 
customary law since then, however, and the general tenets regarding civilians are widely 
accepted. The contributions of the Additional Protocols are many and include most 
importantly the definition of civilian. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I defines the 
principle of distinction: 
                                                          
73
 Gardam, Non-Combatant Immunity, 159. 
74
 Quoted in New York Times, February 16, 1987, accessed April 10, 2011, online:  
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/16/world/reagan-shelving-treaty-to-revise-law-on-
captives.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm . 
93 
 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.
75
   
The three principles of protection (distinction, precaution, and proportionality) 
became enshrined in the Additional Protocols, with distinction given the most weight 
(article 48 of API ). Furthermore, it states in article 51: 
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general 
protection against danger from military operations. To give effect this 
protection the following rules, which are additional to other applicable 
rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances. 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall 
not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary 
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited.
76
 
The challenge of international law has been to maintain the determinacy of 
distinction based on a person’s noncombatant status. Kinsella rightly points out that 
basing civilian status on the direct participation in hostilities does not solve the issue of 
determining who is and who is not a combatant. Since non-international warfare has 
become the norm since World War 2, the reality that guerrilla fighters do not distinguish 
themselves by openly carrying arms still holds. This makes the burden of distinction 
more difficult in practice, but also more conceptually difficult to maintain since guerillas 
and insurgent rely on the cover and support provided by civilians in order to be effective.  
In terms of military strategy in coping with insurgency, the reality is that 
counterinsurgency has tended to be far less discriminate than in recent interstate wars.   
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 To sum, despite the long history and high level of acceptance of the norm at the 
abstract level, attempts to codify and apply the norm have always been  contentious, 
contingent, and utterly political insofar as the norm shapes and is shaped in turn by the 
prevailing political order.  As such, the norm has been central to the Western war-making 
tradition, but the U.S. experience with counterinsurgency, its importance to U.S. identity 
and interests has not always translated into compliance, particularly in these types of 
wars. Thus, this historical overview supports my basic premise that at a crucial juncture, 
the doctrinal shift invoked by the U.S. military need not have been in the direction of 
constraining violence toward civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. When faced with a failure 
in strategy, the new strategy chosen by the U.S. could have theoretically enabled or 
constrained the scope of violence employed in fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, this chapter provides the basis for identifying constitutive effects in 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan through the employment of a long history of CIN 
language and legitimating discourses, in particular its reliance on the discourses of 
“civilization versus barbarism” as well as the “innocence” of civilians. Read in this light, 
it makes sense that the legitimacy struggle present between the U.S. and non-state actors 
would lean so heavily on the language of the CIN. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DOCTRINAL INNOVATION AND CIVILIANS 
I argued in the first chapter of this study that the doctrinal shift toward CIN 
compliance that occurred in Iraq and later in Afghanistan is remarkable because no clear 
historical pattern suggests a shift toward compliance in the face of strategic failure. The 
content of the new doctrine marks a radical break with previous doctrine in that it forged 
a new consensus about not only how to fight a war but about what the appropriate goal of 
war should be— the protection of the population rather than the destruction of enemy 
forces,
1
 the latter of which has been a core assumption in U.S. military doctrine since at 
least 1944.
2
  This chapter will examine alternative (though not necessarily opposing) 
explanations. Since my question is embedded within the larger concern of how change in 
doctrine occurs, in the pages that follow, I will first briefly review how previous literature 
has explained doctrinal innovation more generally.  Then, since not only the mechanisms 
of change but the particular choice of civilian protection is under examination, I will 
continue with a discussion of the recent theories of state behavior toward civilian in war, 
regardless of war type. I finish with locating the norms-based approach articulated in 
chapter one within the existing literature on civilians in war. 
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Summary of Argument 
To this point, I have argued that a constructivist approach is useful in explaining 
how what is right comes to be seen as what is useful. In the language of norms, the 
strength of the civilian immunity norm is both a negative and positive resource: it shapes 
doctrine through  regulative effects by constraining the range of strategic choices seen as 
appropriate and actionable; at a more fundamental level, it shapes doctrine through its 
constitutive role in producing an ethical, rules-based international order, providing a 
source of legitimacy to define “who we are” in relation to the enemy in the “war on 
terror,” as well as in the insurgencies on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.3 In the 
second chapter, I provided an historical overview to show gradual development of the 
civilian/combatant distinction and its constitutive role in the normative international 
political order.
4
   This argument has been specified already, so it will only briefly be 
supplemented with a further explanation of human rights diffusion theory.
5
 
Military Doctrine 
Military doctrine is the link between grand strategy and the use of force to meet 
political goals. Military doctrine provides a formal and “explicit articulation of the means 
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by which armed forces are to secure national security objectives.”6 Effective military 
doctrine achieves what Posen terms “political-military integration” or the fittedness of 
military means to political ends. When “political objectives and military doctrine are 
poorly reconciled,” states incur costs, lose wars, and at the extreme end, “jeopardize their 
survival.”7 Doctrine thus reflects the organization’s attempts to accurately grasp and 
convey the current state of warfare.
8
 In doing so, doctrine provides militaries with “goals, 
tasks, cognitive tools and guidance to prepare for and execute military operations suitable 
to the environment in which it operates.”9  In other words, doctrine lays out a broad 
vision of the best available strategies for succeeding within that context.
10
  
Clark argues that since doctrinal change must make it through a political and 
bureaucratic process, when innovation does succeed, it expresses a change in the 
prevailing consensus within the organization and in the civilian leadership as to how the 
security environment has changed and how wars are best fought in light of that change. 
My study contributes to this literature by explaining how the normative environment 
contributes to changing perceptions of the security environment that resulted in new 
doctrine in the two conflicts under study. 
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Existing debates about military doctrinal innovation follow the two major schools 
of thought represented by Posen and Rosen and have centered on whether internal 
(organizational) or external factors (civilian intervention) are responsible for its 
occurrence. Posen emphasizes the role of decision-makers inside the military who assess 
the changing security environment, while Rosen believes that if innovation is to occur, it 
must be imposed by the civilian administration as it responds to a shifting balance of 
power.
11
 Recent scholarship has attempted to bridge the two schools by theorizing that 
bureaucratic politics is responsible for the success of military innovation.
12
  
Interestingly, however, all agree that while the need for change is urgent in the 
face of strategic failure, it nevertheless rarely succeeds.  Battlefield conditions alone do 
not determine wide reaching change or innovation in doctrine. Instead, battlefield 
information must be interpreted and doctrine must then be ushered through a process of 
change. The U.S. in Vietnam, for example, never fully embraced counterinsurgency, 
despite the presence of the insurgency in South Vietnam and despite the efforts of 
General Creighton Abrams to push for the change.
13
 Even when doctrinal change 
succeeds, the logic of the strategic response is not predetermined but may follow any of a 
number of paths. The U.S. counterinsurgency in the Philippines, for example, mixed civil 
reforms with civilian victimization.
 14
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Since 1944, doctrine has been periodically changed, but the constant assumption 
has been that the way to win wars and achieve security is “through the destruction of 
enemy forces.”  This core assumption allowed new strategies to develop but prevented 
others. For example, the Active Defense doctrine, which held that the first battle was the 
most important determinant of strategic success,
15
  was adopted in the early 1970s even 
as Creighton Abrams’ attempts to innovate doctrine in Vietnam were not.16  
According to Clark, the primary obstacle to doctrinal innovation is the difficulty 
of achieving double-loop learning within the bureaucracy of the military. Double-loop 
learning is a term coined by Argyris and Schein to refer to organizational learning that 
questions the deep assumptions and goals of the organization in order to solve 
problems.
17
 This is difficult to achieve and rare because members of organizations tend to 
have vested interests in maintaining current assumptions, and members (and perhaps 
human beings broadly) tend to engage in “defensive reasoning”  when assumptions are 
questioned. This is in contradistinction to single loop learning which tries to solve 
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problems with different means but without ever questioning the appropriateness of the 
goals. Double-loop learning is pictured below:
  
Figure 2. Double Loop Learning
 18
 
 
A doctrinal entrepreneur must have the authority, access, and autonomy within 
the organization to set into motion the double loop learning process, creating a 
community of like-minded innovators who “update conceptual understandings regarding 
what, how, or where military force is to be applied.”19 This process entails identifying the 
problems with previous doctrine, especially its faulty assumptions, and developing 
solutions based on new assumptions better oriented to the current security environment. 
Success requires overcoming resistors who are attached to or who have a vested 
bureaucratic interest in maintaining the old doctrine, gaining the support of the civilian 
administration and then using that strengthened position to implement the new doctrine 
within the organization, thus achieving the double loop learning process.   
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According to Clark, who compares General Abrams’ failed attempt to innovate 
doctrine toward counterinsurgency in Vietnam with General Petraeus’ successful attempt 
in Iraq, outcomes are a function of the attributes of the bureaucratic position of each 
entrepreneur at each phase of the innovation process:  
In the face of strategic defeat, the attempt to innovate begins with members of an 
armed service. Within the organization, these individuals must convince their colleagues 
to revisit long held assumptions. They must then ‘exit’ the organization and present the 
need for doctrinal change to civilian authorities and convince them to intervene in 
support of their proposed innovations. With civilian intervention, innovators ‘re-enter’ 
the organization with the additional resources and authority necessary to attempt a change 
in operational behavior.
20
 
While Clark’s study shows strong support for the argument that authority, 
autonomy, and access are required in order to usher innovation through the bureaucracy, 
he concludes that this was not the case for the idea that back-channel access to the 
presidential administration determines support: both Abrams and Petraeus enjoyed 
access, but only Petraeus succeeded. As the above schematic demonstrates, overcoming 
defensive reasoning is the main obstacle to overturning assumptions and beginning to see 
goals as inappropriate. A bureaucratic position that allows access to key decision-makers 
is necessary but not sufficient to overcoming defensive reasoning. I suggest that the 
international normative environment, while not the only difference accountable for the 
two outcomes, is nevertheless an important one since it was in response to Vietnam that 
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the CIN was strengthened. While the experience of counterinsurgency in Vietnam did not 
translate into doctrinal innovation, the vulnerabilities of civilians caught in the cross-fire 
in Vietnam had a lasting effect on international norms. The images of civilian suffering 
broadcast by journalists stood in stark relief to the hearts and minds rhetoric.
21
  
International reaction to the large scale suffering of Vietnamese civilians during the 
conflict
22
 helped legal aspects of the civilian immunity norm gain significant traction in 
the 1970s, and Michael Walzer’s book, Just and Unjust Wars, sparked a renewed interest 
within both the international academy and among the American public about moral 
behavior in war.
23
 This means doctrinal entrepreneurs in Vietnam, as compared to 
entrepreneurs in the Global War on Terror, were lacking a key resource in selling the idea 
of population protection as a security issue. 
Theories of State Behavior Toward Civilians 
In order to lay the groundwork for arguing why a norms-based approach is 
necessary if we are to understand how the constraining normative environment shapes 
doctrine, it is necessary to first address the recent but quickly growing literature seeking 
to explain both when and why states do and do not target civilians in war. The theories 
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are grouped according to approach and include regime type, identity, military culture, and 
strategic-rational theories.
24
 
Regime Type: Democracy as Determinant 
Probably the most intuitive and popularly accepted argument about state behavior 
toward civilians is that democracies are more restrained in their treatment of civilians 
than are authoritarian regimes. Regime type arguments encompass two contradictory 
theses about how the attributes of a state affect its treatment of foreign civilians in war. 
The two relevant characteristics of democracies include the values of the populace and 
the institutional mechanisms of accountability that pressure state leaders.  
The theory that democracies are less likely to victimize civilians is an outgrowth 
of democratic peace theory.
25
  Because democracies are rooted in the liberal 
philosophical concepts of human dignity and individual freedom, their political cultures 
and institutional arrangements are based on the rule of law. The logic holds that domestic 
respect for the law would extend to international law and would thus counter the 
temptation to invoke the idea of collective guilt, that is conflating combatants, who pose a 
threat and can be legally killed, with civilians, who do not. The assumption is that these 
Kantian ideals and moral absolutes are reflected in the values of the democratic 
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populace,
26
 and that public opinion would electorally punish leaders who violate 
international norms so close in spirit to domestic norms. Such constraints, it is theorized, 
would not inhere in autocratic regimes. 
Some support for this thesis has been found in public opinion polls, for example 
when Mueller found that democratic public opinion generally does not support the direct 
victimizing of civilians.
27
 Engelhardt’s 1992 study also finds that “nondemocratic 
regimes are able to rely on brutalization tactics more readily than democracies.”28 
Davenport and Armstrong link the level of democracy to the level of repression in 
internal wars and find that strong democracies (but not weak) do not repress in internal 
wars.
29
 This holds with mass killings in guerrilla wars also: Valentino, Huth, and Balch-
Lindsay find that highly democratic states are 27% less likely than highly authoritarian 
states to engage in intentional killings of this type. This relationship is stronger when the 
regime’s existence is threatened by the insurgency, and when the insurgency enjoys a 
high level of support among the population.
30
 Watts adds that even in conventional 
warfare, “in cases short of total war, democracies have emphasized greater restraint than 
non-democracies in the use of air warfare in order to limit the killing of noncombatants, 
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even when doing so is perceived as a costly limitation.” Watts attributes this to domestic 
norms expressed in domestic politics, which is driven by public opinion.
31
  
 The democratic public opinion thesis does not necessarily hold in cases of 
indirect strategies of civilian victimization. Mueller, in measuring public opinion about 
U.S. behavior toward civilian victimization after the Gulf War, remarks that “the public's 
remarkable indifference to the massive death toll essentially caused by its government's 
sanctions policy in the decade since the war suggests that any avowed concern for the 
lives of foreign civilians is at best an expression of unreflective smugness and at worst 
one of arrant hypocrisy.”32 Moreover, Valentino et al’s findings about democratic 
behavior regarding mass killings in a guerrilla war leaves open the possibility that highly 
democratic regimes are less likely to generate their own guerrilla resistance movements 
strong enough to threaten the regime, nor are such movements likely to enjoy a high level 
of popular support. Models based on the relationship between democracies and 
insurgencies does not fit well with the object of this study  because a highly democratic 
intervening force may respond to different incentives than the domestic regime fighting 
for its life; the effects of the domestic political culture may not be as relevant in such 
cases.  
Some go further and insist that the logic of democratic institutions works against 
expected democratic values in the sense that politicians who are dependent on elections 
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to keep their positions feel more pressure to win wars. Reiter and Stam find that “when 
the people willingly offer consent for war, even wars of empire or genocide, then 
democratic governments have obliged.”33 Moreover, as Watts notes, democracies, more 
than autocracies, are averse to the casualties of its own soldiers and are thus likely to 
choose methods that shift the risk toward civilian populations, such as air power.
34
 
Further, some argue that democratic leaders are more likely to do “whatever it takes” to 
win so that they do not risk the next election for losing the war.
35
 In interstate warfare, 
Downes finds that, statistically, democracies are more likely to engage in mass killings, 
particularly in wars of attrition that they are desperate to win.
36
 Contra Valentino’s 
findings, the survival factor is not necessary to reach a threshold of desperation, however. 
For Downes, the fact that democratic leaders feel pressure to reduce costs and save the 
lives of their own soldiers is enough to spark mass killing. Interestingly, Downes includes 
guerrilla warfare as a subtype of attrition in interstate war, which may account for the 
differences between his and Valentino’s findings.  
Given that regime theory produces inconclusive results and relies on contradictory 
assumptions, it is not clear that regime type determines state behavior toward civilians. 
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As Bell points out, history demonstrates a mixed record of using civilian victimization 
strategies, and democratic publics are a fickle bunch, sometimes demonstrating a “rally 
round the flag effect,” and at other times showing a willingness to trade the lives of 
others when they perceive their own security to be at stake.
37
   However, there is clearly a 
strong identification of democracies with values that support civilian immunity. I will 
argue that this identification can be better understood from a norms perspective rather 
than as a too-broad “regime type” variable. 
Identity-Based Approaches to State Behavior toward Civilians 
Identity theories of civilian victimization are based on the observation that 
civilians are more likely to be targeted—or if the logic is extended, more civilian 
casualties are likely to be tolerated—when the population is viewed as “barbaric” or 
different in a way that inspires hostility or animosity. The relevant categories of 
difference are generally cultural, ethnic, racial, and religious and are taken as the key 
predictors for rationalizing exceptions to moral codes prohibiting the targeting of 
innocents. John Dower, for example, explains the atrocities of World War 2 involving 
Japan as the result of racist demonization of the enemy’s collective identity. 38 As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, the identity categories of “civilization versus 
barbarism” have been central to the development of the civilian immunity norm itself, 
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often mediating the fuzzy and problematic category of who counts and is thus deserving 
of protection as an “innocent civilian.” As Kinsella and others have asserted, the idea that 
only the “civilized” are entitled to civilian immunity runs deep in the history of the norm, 
with the result that identities outside of the European cultural tradition were more likely 
to be dehumanized and denied protection, particularly in colonial conflicts.
39
  
The identity thesis is even more strongly associated with the surge in ethnic and 
intrastate conflict in new, weak, or failing states after the Cold War.
40
 Kaufmann argues, 
for example, that cultural difference is associated with particularly intense violence 
against civilians in civil wars.
41
  While dehumanizing the enemy in order to rationalize 
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violence is common, as Downes points out, dehumanizing or “demonizing” the enemy 
occurs with much greater frequency than does civilian victimization.
42
  Moreover, 
asserting the presence of significant cultural difference, as an objective causal 
phenomenon, becomes difficult to sustain in civil conflict as well because cultural 
distance is not as great when people have lived together for long periods of time. In both 
Rwanda and Bosnia, for example, before the outbreak of conflict and mass killings, some 
groups had intermarried, worked and lived together, and mixed freely for long periods.  
Even in cases where difference is more pronounced, Bell rightly points out that identity-
based theory is “both over-predictive and under-predictive, since conflicts between 
different identity groups sometimes fail to employ civilian victimization, whereas similar 
identity groups sometimes turn to civilian victimization.”43 Downes and others concur 
that the mere fact of difference in identity does not predict state behavior toward 
civilians, since victimizing civilians occurs both when difference is present and when it is 
absent.
44
 
Because of its basis in affective motivations, theories of identity based on 
difference predict increasingly brutal treatment of civilians as a conflict progresses.
45
 
This logic does not hold when held up to the latest quantitative studies; rather, civilian 
victimization is more likely to be a means of last resort in international conflicts, and the 
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first resort in cases where the one belligerent aims to annex the land, either to expand 
their territory or to eliminate a potential fifth column.
 46
  Downes finds that the 
“barbarism” explanation is more likely an intervening variable—that is, when the intent 
to victimize civilians is present, invoking barbarism is likely as a means of rationalizing 
or legitimizing the treatment. Moreover, he adds that feelings of animosity toward a 
population is something more likely to be experienced by “soldiers on the battlefield 
more than those responsible for the strategic direction of the war and is this probably a 
better explanation for the battlefield atrocities than for policies of civilian 
victimization.”47  
Finally, identity theories based on either interstate or intrastate conflict tend to 
assume dyads such as state versus state or incumbent versus insurgent—both distinct, 
opposing (enemy) relationships between groups fighting for control of the battlefield. 
Like the regime model, this model does not fit well with the spectrum of transnational or 
internationalized conflicts comprised of internal foes as well as external intervening 
forces. This is important not because these wars are necessarily “new,” but because our 
old categories and ways of understanding them do not adequately account for the 
complex political nature of the interactions among actors with different goals—some of 
whom may have only an indirect stake in governance but who may have other goals.
48
  
                                                          
46
 Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures.” 
47
 Downes, Targeting Civilians in War, 26. One exception to this is argued by Valentino, who allows that 
the ethnic hatreds of leaders may result in mass killing. This is secondary, however, and perhaps 
instrumental to their primary power-seeking motivation, in Final Solutions: Mass killing and Genocide in 
the Twentieth Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
48
 The term “new war” is coined by Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Kaldor uses Bosnia as a prime example of 
new wars, which are characterized by their refusal to abide by the internal/external, 
111 
 
A more fundamental critique of the concept of “identity as difference” suggests 
that identity is often wrongly understood as the objective presence or absence of 
difference,
49
 as civilizational,
50
 or even as the affective collective consciousness of 
groups with long-standing traditions.
51
 While the effects of identity and culture are that 
they appear natural and objective among groups and between groups, identities are 
relational and fluid—the significance changes according to political and social context.52  
Fluidity is not a critique in itself, only an indicator that identity is social and part of the 
political struggle (reference Wendt’s theory of ego and alter in chapter one). A norms 
approach complements an identity approach by seeking to make that context more 
prominent. While identity has multiple dimensions, identity as a politicized concept only 
makes sense in the context of how identity is being interpreted and what is perceived to 
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be at stake.
53
 Lifting identity out of its social function and political context strips it of 
meaning; examining identity thus demands an approach suited to social and political 
analysis, which includes an accounting of strategy which affects and is affected by 
culture. First, a discussion of how military culture has been treated as an independent 
variable to explain civilian victimization follows.  
Military Culture as an Explanation for State Behavior toward Civilians 
Military culture theory centers on the “organizational constraints that influence 
when militaries do—and do not—victimize civilians in civil war.”54  Proponents argue 
that “the organizational culture of states’ militaries explains the propensity of states to 
escalate the use of force against civilians in wartime.”55 On this account, decisions about 
how to treat civilians are not completely separable from the “attitudes and behaviors of 
actors [who] are heavily conditioned by the norms, interests and culture of the 
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organization that acts on behalf of the state.”56 Observing the military is useful to explain 
state behavior toward civilians in war because, as Bell argues, the military is the agent 
most directly responsible for the treatment of civilians in war.
57
 Further, as Downes 
points out, the military is “in the business of using force to defeat the nation’s enemies, 
[and] organizational culture prescribes how and with what means the service should fight 
in wartime.”58 
Military culture is closely related to military doctrine in that “the organizational 
norms, beliefs and customs underlying military behavior—forms the foundation of 
strategies militaries employ to achieve their ends.”  However, from this angle doctrine is 
not conceptually distinct from culture but is rather taken as an expression of culture. The 
military culture perspective takes the view that how civilians fit into strategy is a product 
of culture since organizational culture shapes the goals of the military by “shaping [its] 
members’ understandings and expectations about the world”59 (Bell 10). What follows is 
an explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of military culture and then a review of 
how previous literature has used military culture as an explanation for state behavior 
toward civilians.  
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Organizational Culture 
Theories of military culture draw heavily on organizational culture theory, which 
overlaps to some extent with constructivist theories. Organizational culture can be 
thought of as an offshoot of broader organizational theory, which stresses both structural 
and cultural factors in explaining organizational behavior.
60
  Organizations, as purpose-
driven, decision-making hierarchies, are “influenced by both formal governance 
structures and informal norms of behavior—culture—that help determine the social 
orientation of the actors within them”61 Organizational culture encompasses both “a set of 
evaluative standards (such as norms or values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as 
rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and 
how they relate to one other.”62  
The concept of “culture” draws on broader sociological theories of culture, 
particularly social constructivism, the core insight of which is that social interaction 
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produces baseline agreement on how to interpret relevant aspects of reality.
63
 This social 
context forms the basis for the social identity of the group, constituted and expressed 
through the internal “taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, 
collective memories, and definitions” of the organization. 64 Shared culture allows the 
organization to “respond to the [external] environment and [to] organize internally to 
accomplish its goals).”65 Culture underlies decision-making by managing the scope of 
possible alternatives and stabilizing organizational preferences through the process of 
member socialization, guiding them in “the correct way to perceive, think, and feel” 
about challenges and problems.
66
   
Military culture, commonly understood as “the military’s personality, way of 
thinking, or values” is the specific application of the concept of organizational culture to 
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the military.
67
 These ways of thinking take the form of deep assumptions that inform 
norms and are directly observable in artifacts.
68
 This is possible because cultural 
attributes of the military become “institutionalized within the bureaucracy through a 
number of ways, including education and training, career promotion, doctrine and war 
plans, budgetary priorities, procurement programs, and force structures.” 69 
Review: How Military Culture Impacts Civilian Victimization 
The impact of military culture on civilian victimization is a fairly recent and 
limited area of inquiry, and the scholarship tends to examine the organizational culture of 
military services to determine the extent to which that culture prescribes strategy that 
either calls for, allows, or is averse to either putting civilians in the cross-hairs, or even 
tolerating large numbers of foreseen but unintentional civilian casualties.  Such strategies 
include those that are “punitive, indiscriminate, or focused on breaking civilian morale” 
even in the face of prohibitive norms.
70
   
Jeffrey Legro’s work in the mid 1990s is an influential example of such work. In 
comparing the cultures of the German and British military services during World War II, 
Legro shows that pre-existing organizational culture was decisive in setting preferences 
for the use of “unthinkable” means of warfare and also for the timing and variance of 
employing prohibited methods of fighting.  The prohibited strategies of escalation that 
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Legro examined include the use of submarines to bomb civilian ships, the strategic 
bombardment of civilian targets, and the use of chemical weapons.
71
 Legro acknowledges 
that international norms matter insofar as certain forms of warfare are considered 
“illegitimate,” but on his account the internal attributes of military culture are decisive as 
to whether or not such means will be employed. Legro’s study contributes to broader IR 
debates by concluding that, contrary to what either balance of power theories or 
international norms would predict, the organizational culture of the military was 
responsible for shaping the preferences of both the state and the military when it came to 
strategy.
72
 This is because 
 Informal beliefs interact with formal bureaucratic structure to shape the 
identity and cognition of groups [which matters because] the various 
military services favored some modes of warfare over others, valuated the 
strategic environment and enemy activity, and developed plans and 
capabilities to meet anticipated threats according to their various cultural 
predispositions.
73
 
According to Legro, the norms of military cultures may either support or compete 
with international humanitarian norms, and their willingness to violate international 
norms (or their propensity to comply with such norms) is dependent on internal ways of 
thinking rather than external (or international) norms. However, this view does not 
account for the fact that international norms against killing civilians were at their weakest 
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point in World War 2, and it is unclear whether this is an effect of military culture, a 
cause, or completely unrelated. Some attribute the willingness to victimize civilians 
during that time to cross-cultural ideas about “total war,” wherein civilians were seen as 
indistinguishable from the “nation.”74 Others attribute civilian victimization to the 
crudeness of targeting technology, though this is a backward looking narrative that 
ignores the purposeful targeting of civilians. Ward Thomas examines the U.S. military’s 
willingness to employ strategic bombardment during World War 2, but he compares this 
strategy to conflicts occurring later in the century, and finds that militaries gradually 
internalized post WW2 international ethics against such means and methods of warfare.
75
 
This study highlights the fact that culture changes as a complex result of political, 
technological, and normative changes, so that while militaries may exhibit organizational 
cultures set apart from the larger societies in which they operate, military culture does not 
exist in a vacuum.  
As Clausewitzian wisdom reminds us, the function of the military is as a tool of 
policy and not for the use of force as an end in itself. And in a constitutionally limited 
state, it is also constrained by the broader external environment, both internationally, to 
some extent, and domestically to a greater degree. Kier shows, for example, that military 
organizational culture and domestic political constraints shape military doctrine, which 
determines the tactics militaries use to fight during war.
76
 Similarly, Ward Thomas’ study 
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concludes that the strength and stability of international norms impacts the preferences 
and attitudes of the military. A more recent study by Colin Kahl argues that the U.S. 
military culture has changed a great deal in its attitudes toward civilian victimization 
since Vietnam,
77
 when it came under heavy criticism for its hearts and minds slogans 
juxtaposed to the media images of screaming, napalmed women and children. 
What sets Kahl’s cultural argument apart, however, is that he measures culture 
through the institutionalization of processes meant to uphold international norms by 
holding individual members of the military accountable through punishment mechanisms. 
Kahl notes that military judge advocates (JAGs) became increasingly important in 
upholding cultural respect for the Laws of War in the Iraq War, in addition to the 
“expansion of the law of war training program, and the integration of judge advocates 
into weapons procurement.”78 Dickenson also documents the presence of “judge advocate 
corps as ‘compliance agents’ within the military under the DoD Law of War program 
[which] led to greater U.S. military law of war compliance during the Iraq War.”79 Bell 
adds that such cultural changes can occur even in the absence of a highly professionalized 
military: “a military culture of civilian respect (MCCR) can explain state military 
behavior toward civilians better than competing theories of civilian victimization,” made 
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possible by “high-level military leadership interest, pervasive norm training programs, 
and norm enforcement structures.” 80   
Both Kahl and Dickensen document changes in Iraq, but it is not clear from their 
studies if crucial junctures within the conflict contributed to change. Kahl, for example, 
explains that it is the unwillingness of the U.S. to any longer employ strategies that target 
civilian morale that account for the precautions increasingly put into place. My study can 
add nuance to this by showing a more direct relationship between the civilian casualties 
that did occur, the attitudes about them within the military, and how the social context is 
read as a strategic matter. Changes to military culture can be treated as an outcome, in 
other words.  
Downes critiques the military culture approach for different reasons: because it 
fails to take into account the inherently strategic nature of military actors and the external 
pressures they face when fighting wars. Downes points out that if external factors, such 
as desperation to win on the battlefield, explain noncompliance with civilian immunity 
norms, then norms internal to military culture will give way under the right conditions.  
To demonstrate this, Downes examines the same case studies as Legro from World War 2  
but finds that military culture is indecisive in the face of objective strategic pressures. 
Thus, he cautions against assuming that the “norm of noncombatant immunity has 
become an integral part of the culture of the contemporary American military, implying 
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that in future wars the United States will refrain from intentional killing of noncombat-
ants, and will work hard to minimize inadvertent civilian damage as well.”81 
So while the military culture approach emphasizes unique identities and 
preferences that in turn independently shape the organization’s behavior, apart from and 
often against the influence of the external environment, Downes provides an important 
corrective to an overly cultural approach, which is that the most salient external 
environment for the military is the strategic environment.
82
 This approach is 
representative of a new strand in civilian studies and brings to the fore that the strategic 
environment does not operate in a parallel realm, separate from civilians, but rather 
civilians are often included in the strategic calculus.    
Strategic-Rationalist Theories: Why Civilians Are Sometimes Targeted 
The past decade has produced intense interest in the strategic aspects of civilians 
in war, particularly about the strategic value of civilians as military targets. This stream 
of scholarship is termed “strategic rationalist” theory by Bell (2012) because it 
“emphasize[s] the strategic incentives of targeting civilians. According to this school, 
actors target civilians because of the calculation that targeting civilians produces benefits 
and inflicts harm upon the enemy to allow them to achieve their goals.”83 Strategic 
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rationalist theories share a deep affinity with realism in the assumption that state 
decision-making takes place in an amoral context.  On this account, the utility of force is 
assumed, and victory is defined in a purely traditional military sense—by  defeating 
opposing forces. The role of the civilian in both interstate and intrastate conflicts is found 
in their support of the enemy forces, which is why the “innocence” of civilians is a fragile 
concept.  
In interstate conflict, states have been shown to intentionally victimize civilians 
when they are “desperate to win,” which is generally associated with fighting wars of 
attrition, guerrilla wars, and also when they desire to annex territory and wish to clear out 
the population.
84
  When applied to counterinsurgency, two logics prevail in this 
scholarship: one borrows from the Maoist handbook of Guerrilla warfare which imagines 
insurgents as fish swimming in a sea of civilian support, both ideological and material.
85
 
States will seek to counter insurgent strategies by “draining the sea,” or killing, forcibly 
removing, or otherwise victimizing civilians so as to deprive insurgents of cover and 
support.
86
  Another strand sees civilian support as an object, since civilians are conduits 
of valuable intelligence as well as potential supporters of the insurgency. This theory 
predicts that incumbents will employ calculated, measured violence against certain 
civilians, especially fence-sitters, in order to “deter defection.” As Bell points out, “actors 
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in civil conflict employ violence as a factor of the level of civilian control and the amount 
of information that is able to be gained from civilians through that control.”87 Strategic 
rationalist theories do not predict that states always target civilians, but that they employ 
a cost-benefit calculus and seek to lower the costs of war when they are desperate to 
win,
88
  or when civilian support to an insurgency significantly increases the threat level 
(to an incumbent).
89
 
The strategic-rationalist approach highlights an enigma, which is that 1.) anti-
civilian strategies continue to be used despite the fact that the civilian immunity norm is 
one of the strongest of all international norms, enjoying support from nearly all states and 
most civilian populations, and 2.) anti-civilian strategies continue to be used in 
counterinsurgency strategies despite the fact that the strategy can backfire by “stiffening 
the resolve” in the population.90  Bell argues that this latest scholarship, while increasing 
our understanding about the utility of force against civilians at the macro-level, suffers 
from two weaknesses when applied to individual cases in which civilian victimization 
does not occur: “not all political actors respond to strategic contexts in the same manner, 
and strategic-rationalist theories ignore the internal characteristics of the entity that 
actually conducts and executes the violence: the state military itself.”91 Furthermore, in 
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this line of inquiry, the absence of civilian victimization is seen as simply the absence of 
a strategic or at least rational incentive to victimize.  By prior assumption, this approach 
excludes the possibility of strategic incentives associated with constraint and instead 
simply assumes the irrelevance of constraining norms, even when choices are possible 
and strategy could go either way.   
Moreover, while both interstate war and civil war have garnered much attention, 
little attention has been paid to the dynamics of civilian victimization in transnational 
conflicts that contain elements of both intrastate and international conflict and include a 
variety of non-state actors, including both foreign and domestic insurgents.  This is 
particularly the case when one important actor is an intervening force and another a 
transnational terrorist. In such cases, the relational dynamics multiply well beyond the 
familiar dyads of incumbent and insurgent (intrastate) or belligerent and noncombatant 
(interstate) to include remote and local audiences. The closest examples would include 
past conflicts in which population protection strategies were employed, such as Britain in 
the Malaya conflict or France in Algiers. Notably, both of the intervening forces in these 
conflicts were former colonizers and had to grapple with complex issues of legitimacy in 
the eyes of both the domestic populations and the international community. 
Given the partial but important perspectives of the identity, regime, culture, and 
strategic theories of conflict, this study suggests that including a constructivist, norms-
based approach would further our attempts to understand the changes in orientation 
toward civilian victimization, particularly in cases where states are faced with a strategic 
choice and choose to comply rather than to violate civilian immunity.  Theories of 
civilian victimization are incomplete without analyzing the role that the normative 
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environment plays in influencing how states, especially intervening powers, come to see 
the protection of civilians as a strategic goal rather than as a strategic obstacle to be 
overcome.  
Norms-Based Constructivism: An Alternative Framework 
The review of the literature has produced two gaps in knowledge, first about how 
doctrinal entrepreneurs are able to overcome defensive reasoning in the innovation 
process such that assumptions about the effective use of force can be effectively 
challenged and then overturned. Second, it is unclear why the content of 
counterinsurgency doctrine would emphasize high degrees of population protection, 
when prior experience evidences a predilection toward coercive methods. My argument is 
that the constraining normative environment supplies the missing link through the 
strengthened civilian immunity norm. Moral norms matter—in this case the norm 
limiting the use of force against noncombatants--because they are a resource in the 
struggle for power. I begin by explaining how the constructivist approach is appropriate 
to explaining how and why this is so.  
Constructivism and the Power of Norms 
I have argued in the first chapter that mainstream constructivist IR, which is the 
type I invoke in this study, emphasizes that the identities and interests of actors are 
mutually constituted through the rules and norms that comprise the social and political 
context. Norms affect behavior; that is, they exhibit regulative effects, but they also 
exhibit constitutive effects as was shown in chapter two. This means that the interests of 
actors are closely tied to their identity within the international order, of which norms are a 
part. Norms that are important, especially those of with a moral dimension, exhibit 
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constitutive effects on identity and interests. Identity in this sense is not an objective set 
of characteristics derived from domestic culture, but is rather the outcome of a process of 
negotiation that occurs as actors define themselves in relation to other actors, and in 
relation to the social order itself.  Since identity itself is closely tied to interests, norms 
have strategic value. This means states have an interest in defining norms to suit their 
power goals, but they also have an interest in aligning their identities with existing, 
powerful norms.  Take, for example, how aspiring states made use of the norm of self-
determination of peoples, which creates political claims to legitimate self-rule based on 
an “imagined community” called a “people.”92  
This perspective differs from structural realists like Mearsheimer, who sees 
93
 
strategic behavior almost exclusively in material terms. On his account, norms have no 
independent effect since, as he puts it, the powerful make rules such that the international 
order of rules and norms merely “reflects the distribution of power in the world.”94 
Constructivism does not deny the importance of material factors, but it differs in the 
extent to which it accepts the assumption that actors are driven almost exclusively by 
material incentives, particularly in some mythical anarchical state of nature in which 
rules do not exist. While the early realist position against constructivism was based on 
what Donnelly calls a “philosophical rejection” rather than an empirical case against it, 
rationalist critiques since then have become more thoughtful and nuanced.  Keohane, for 
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example, considers that norms exist, but sees their causal value as limited, especially for 
constitutive norms, which form the background for strategic action. In order for norms to 
be effective, he explains, they require an agent, a norm entrepreneur, who engages in 
strategic action, employing the norm for some political purpose.
95
 Constructivists agree, 
but they do not see strategic and normative behavior as necessarily opposed; power and 
norms are not mutually exclusive. Constructivists, historians, political sociologists, and 
English School adherents all agree that norms both constrain and enable behavior.
96
 
Donnelly, a preeminent human rights scholar, argues that “rules and norms are important 
precisely because they allow states to achieve effects that they otherwise would not be 
able to.”97 
“War is a norms oriented activity,” according to Martha Finnemore, and norms 
can be permissive or not, weak or strong, but even so, and as even Morgenthau admits, 
moral norms set the outer limits of what it possible to imagine as behavioral alternatives. 
As the history of the civilian immunity norm has shown, the content of the norm is a 
product of inheritance but also fo the discourse and politics of the times.  All of this is not 
to say that the presence of a law, for example, determines state compliance. Indeed, this 
is why norms change, according to Sandholz and Stiles. Norms are cyclical, and “norm 
change frequently occurs when (1) when norms are in tension with one another and (2) 
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when the “fit” between norms and concrete experience is disputed.98 The norm’s saliency 
increases when disagreements ensue, positions are put forth, arguments are made, and 
new understandings are reached. Rulings may issue forth in formalized systems, which 
increases the strength and specificity of  the norm, or behavioral expectations may 
become customary; either way prior expectations alter and give way to new 
expectations.
99
  
The model of Sandholz and Stiles also identifies metanorms, the two major 
constitutive norms of international society that inform more specific norms: these are 
sovereignty and liberal norms, namely human rights. 
100
 According to Sandholz and 
Stiles, international order overall is moving more in the direction of liberal, human rights 
-based norms and away from sovereignty based norms.
101
 I concur, though as the 
previous chapter shows, the civilian immunity norm embodies the tension between 
sovereignty and humanity, which later became “human rights.” International law 
demonstrates this shifting metanorm as well, since the civilian immunity norm, which 
falls under IHL rather than IHRL, is increasingly interpreted from a human rights 
perspective. In popular terms as well, the invocation to protect civilians has become 
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almost indistinguishable from the idea of human rights.
102
 Thus the popular moral force 
of the norm has become more restrictive than the law requires, while at the same time, the 
meaning of “civilian” has extended to include repression within domestic societies in 
news accounts and in reporting by transnational advocacy networks such as HRW.  The 
significance is that state obligations to uphold human rights are criticized on the same 
grounds whether or not they have a governing relationship with the population or not. 
The “Responsibility to Protect” norm, though legally distinct and meant to compel 
humanitarian intervention, has come to occupy the same linguistic and moral space as 
civilian immunity.  
“The Civilian” has thus largely become a symbol for the human rights of all 
people to be immune from the harm that flows from states and non-state groups who use 
force. Killing civilians or otherwise violating their rights is now a major criterion for a 
lack of legitimacy for states and in some ways the popular litmus test for the legitimate 
use of force: it is the ticket to membership in the international order, at least for weaker 
states--the rule of both Saddam Hussein and Momar Qaddafi were delegitimized on just 
this basis. Insurgent groups in the Congo are now targeted by peacekeeping forces based 
on whether or not they kill civilians. And terrorist groups are identified as completely 
illegitimate precisely because they kill civilians, rather than because states reserve a 
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monopoly on violence for themselves.
103
 Thus the power of the civilian immunity norm 
lies in its close identification with human rights. And like any source of power, the norm 
serves as a resource in the political struggle between groups through its ability to 
legitimize (or not) the political goals of the group.  This study hypothesizes that the CIN 
matters when states see it as a resource by which to delegitimize its “terrorist” enemies.   
The Power of Human Rights to Change State Behavior 
Some of the most important early work on the power of human rights and how 
states relate to the norm is found in the volume edited by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink in 
1999.
104
 Though this volume is meant to explain the impact of human rights norms on 
domestic regimes, it reveals much about the influence of human rights to even large 
powerful states who already identify with human rights but whose sovereignty-leaning, 
even hegemonic foreign policies may be in tension, and even if they are out of reach of 
prosecution.
105
 This occurs through similar pressures that domestic regimes experience 
when violating human rights, which is attributable to “the diffusion of international 
norms in the human rights area.” (5). Though while Risse and Sikkink, writing in 1999, 
attribute the diffusion of human rights norms directly to transnational networks and their 
effects on public opinion, I begin with the assumption that those norms associated with 
human rights enjoy strong support. This is especially the case with the civilian immunity 
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norm, since nearly all states claim to support it and public opinion favors it across the 
globe. In an era of globalized communications and media, it is fair to assume that 
violence against civilians produces significant criticism.  
My argument is not that the criticism itself resulted in a doctrinal shift toward 
civilian immunity in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, but rather that states like the U.S. can 
be expected to use strong human rights norms as part of their legitimizing strategic 
narrative when employing force, and that the result is increased pressure to comply. 
Though the model does not exactly fit with my subject area (a state at war), Risse and 
Sikkink explain that “the process of human rights change always begins with some 
instrumentally or strategically motivated adaptation by national governments to growing 
domestic and transnational pressure.”106 This would be similar for states employing force 
in the name of human rights, particularly states who intervene using such justifications.  
When norms are strong, I would expect to see an identification with human rights since 
“human rights norms have a special status because they both prescribe rules for 
appropriate behavior, and help define identities of liberal states.”107 The invocation of 
human rights norms as a matter of identity would be likely in the  preconflict and war 
rhetoric of the civilian administration, which is easily identifiable in national security 
statements and public statements and speeches. Conversely, when a norm is not strong, 
one would expect to see other justifications for force, particularly those that emphasize 
sovereignty (such as I would expect to be the case in Vietnam, before human rights was 
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as strong and before the civilian immunity norm was codified). Once that narrative is 
employed, however, it invites scrutiny, which transnational groups and, increasingly, 
ordinary people with internet access and cellphones are able to participate in. The 
invocation of a norm already professed creates a situation in which a choice must be 
made as to how to respond. Any narrative of moral identification might provoke one of 
the three logics as states react to pressures from norm violations: 1. Adaptation and 
strategic bargaining; 2. moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, and persuasion; 3. 
Processes of institutionalization and habitualization.
108
 With states who are already 
liberal and strongly identify with human rights, I would expect to see a recognition of the 
pressure, but that the pressure military will react in ways that emphasize sovereignty until 
strategic failure forces a choice.  
My central theoretical argument is thus based on human rights diffusion theory—
when states invoke human rights norms for instrumental purposes (to uphold the anti-
terror norm), pressure to comply is increased, not for fear of punishment in this case but 
for purposes of legitimacy and standing in the international community 
109
 However, in 
keeping with doctrinal innovation theory, my argument is that the community of doctrinal 
entrepreneurs within the military began to see the increasing civilian casualties as a 
growing political problem, but that it was not until faced with strategic failure and a 
choice about using more force or less that strengthening the civilian immunity norm 
became seen as a strategic resource rather than as a constraint on strategy. My hypothesis 
                                                          
108
 Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink, Power of Human Rights, 11. 
109
 See especially Risse and Sikkink, "Introduction." 
133 
 
holds that the CIN becomes a more important resource when regaining a monopoly on 
force through force is not seen as an option. 
The norm becomes a strategic resource in three ways: first, the norm, as an 
important pre-existing part of the military’s culture, is used as a resource to socialize its 
members and to overcome resistance and attachments to attitudes about the use of force 
and troop protection over civilian protection. Second, the norm’s consistency with prior 
ideas about counterinsurgency provided a strong resource for attaining the support of the 
civilian administration, who had already made identity claims about the legitimacy of the 
use of force based on human rights norms. Further, the regulative effects of the strong 
civilian immunity norm made increased use of force against civilians untenable. Third, 
the civilian immunity norm bridges the state’s identity claims with its use of force and 
thus serves a source of legitimation. This is true for the local population,
110
 but it also 
addresses the standing of the U.S. in the international community, broadly defined as its 
moral standing and reliability in upholding norms constraining the use of force. As Reus-
Smit writes in 2004, at precisely a moment when the U.S. had gained social capital from 
the 9/11 attacks, Bush’s foreign policy became “muscular,” sparking “unease” and 
“widespread resentment,” and he has “crudely chipped away at America’s liberal identity 
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in international relations.
111
 My hypothesis is that the legitimacy of the initial invasion in 
each case helps to account for variance in the concern for reputational damage due to 
civilian casualties and thus the uneven doctrinal response.  
My overarching theory is that the military, as an agent of the state, engaged in a 
redefinition of interests in a manner consistent with constructivist logic: through a mutual 
constitution of identities and interests such that protecting civilians comes to be seen less 
as a constraint on strategy and more as a central tenet of strategy. By embracing a 
widely accepted norm that is associated with the broader human rights agenda, the U.S. 
(re)aligns its identity with the values of the international community while at the same 
time delegitimizing the identities of those who seek power through the targeting of 
civilians.
112
 In doing so, it reinforces the anti-terror norm and denies the legitimate use of 
force to the “other.” Thus this particular norm matters because of its role in structuring 
the normative environment that regulates membership in the international community,
113
 
which is strategically important in furthering the foreign policy goals of a “war of ideas” 
that legitimizes and guides the desired political outcome of the wars on the ground.   Seen 
in this light, the civilian immunity norm highlights the growing strategic importance of 
moral norms—as a factor in the security environment rather than as an artificially 
imposed moral constraint on strategic behavior.  
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In the language of norms, the strength of the civilian immunity norm acts  as both 
a negative and positive resource: it shapes doctrine through its regulative effects by 
constraining the range of strategic choices seen as appropriate and actionable; and at a 
more fundamental level, it shapes doctrine through the consequences of its constitutive 
role in producing an ethical, rules-based international order, providing a source of 
legitimacy to define “who we are” in relation to the enemy in the war on terror, as well as 
in the wars on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In doing so, it helps doctrine to link 
the use of the military with national security and foreign policy objectives. In the simplest 
terms, the military doctrinal shift drew on strength of the morally constraining 
environment by appealing to it instead of fighting against it. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IRAQ 
In this case study, consistent with my causal model, I will demonstrate how the 
instrumental use of civilian-centered human rights norms shapes the civilian-centered 
counterinsurgency doctrine. The chapter begins with a discussion of baseline attitudes 
about civilian and immunity in the year 2001, as interactions between the military and 
human rights groups began in earnest. The relationship is traced out through the steps 
normally seen in human rights diffusion: instrumental use, argumentation, and 
persuasion. The next section demonstrates how Bush employs the language of just war 
and human rights instrumentally while at the same time planning a War of Ideas meant to 
support the War in Iraq. Next, I will show how civilian casualties early in the Iraq War 
led to a crucial juncture whereby civilians were seen as strategic rather than as simply 
collateral objects. I go on to show how even the perception of violating civilian immunity 
became seen as a strategic liability when the U.S. experienced a crisis of legitimacy 
through the degradation of the American image. This narrowed the scope of alternatives, 
which eventually led to redefining the “problem” in the war in Iraq, including the 
acceptance of a loss of the monopoly on force. Once this occurs, the influence of the 
norm can be seen in the efforts to reshape and clarify counterinsurgency doctrine more in 
keeping with civilian immunity.    
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2001: Baseline Attitudes about Civilian Immunity 
This story begins in the period leading up to the war in Iraq, when the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT) had just begun, but before the military’s views on civilian casualties 
had been impacted to a great extent by either the Iraq or the Afghanistan experience. As 
argued in a previous chapter, civilian immunity has been an increasingly salient aspect of 
the normative international political order, and some members of the military had already 
started to recognize that civilian casualties were a political liability (though not yet a 
military one).  In response to U.S. involvement in conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and then 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the military and a group of human rights scholars from Harvard 
began building professional relationships in 2000 with a series of conferences and 
workshops entitled, the Project on the Means of Intervention.  The program was 
organized by the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, under the auspices of the Human 
Rights and National Security program. The goal of the early conferences was to 
encourage dialogue among academics, human rights experts, NGOs, members of the 
media, and high level military personnel.
 1
  
The 2001 workshop provides a good baseline snapshot of the attitudes of U.S. 
military personnel about issues pertaining to civilian casualties, media, and military 
practices. In order to begin to find “common ground,” panels were held, conference 
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papers presented, and keynote speakers of the highest level were brought in—in this 
instance General Wesley Clark, commander of the mission in Kosovo. The director of the 
Carr Center at that time was Sarah Sewall, who would emerge as one of the key human 
rights experts to contribute to the revision process of the C.O.I.N. manual in 2006. Sewall 
was present throughout this process and forged professional ties with Conrad Crane, one 
of the primary authors of C.O.I.N., who would also participate, as did, eventually, David 
Petraeus, John Nagl, and others who comprised much of the inner circle of what would 
become known as the counterinsurgency “community of innovators.”  
The attitudes expressed in this early conference roughly approximate what I 
described in chapter two as the two major  tendencies within the civilian immunity norm: 
sovereignty and human rights, itself a reflection of the two competing currents in the 
international order. Sovereignty in this sense refers to the interpretation of civilian 
immunity as a negative constraint on the sovereign war-making function of the state, and 
the human rights interpretation emphasizes the positive, rights-protecting responsibility 
of the liberal state toward civilians.
2
  The problem that necessitated the creation of 
dialogue between the human rights community and the military was the difference in 
perceptions, expectations, and assessments about civilian casualties among the different 
parties. Military personnel expressed some frustration with negative press coverage, and 
emphasized the previous decade’s impressive achievements in minimizing civilian 
casualties.  They presented concern for civilian casualties as an historical, evolutionary 
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process far removed from the enormous casualties of World War 2. In contrast, non-
military participants expressed continuing criticism about the way force was used; human 
rights workers were concerned about the “risk aversion” of U.S. personnel, pointing out 
that both Serbian and Kosovar civilians suffered a great deal as a result of the strategic 
choice of relentless air strikes, for example.  
  The conference began with an exploration of the most basic questions, including 
what the relationship was between international humanitarian law and war. The answer 
given by one military official provides a good summary of prevailing attitudes of the 
time, which saw military effectiveness and civilian casualties in direct opposition.  As the 
quote below also shows, the priority of force protection was, at this point, assumed by 
those speaking from a military perspective, confirming a deeply ingrained, organizational 
cultural perspective about risk aversion:  
As a starting point, it is fundamentally correct to say military operations 
and humanitarian concerns are at odds. Military operations are about 
destruction, and are often chaotic and confused. Humanitarian concerns 
are about minimizing this destruction. But this doesn’t tell us much. The 
real question is to what extent can military operations be carried out with 
minimum casualties without damaging effectiveness and accepting 
significantly higher casualties of friendly forces.
3
 
The starting assumptions about the role of ethics in the two communities were 
fairly far apart. Military participants’ thinking about civilian immunity at this time 
reflected a primarily technical outlook, and the scope of discussion was largely limited to 
choice of weaponry, targeting practices, and collateral damage modeling. Human rights 
                                                          
3
 Hazen, "Conference Report," 2. To get a relative sense of what “significantly higher” meant, U.S. 
casualties were practically zero during the Kosovo operations.   
140 
 
 
experts, however, saw humanitarian norms endangered by the reluctance to commit 
ground troops, which sparked a debate as to whether the trend in increased reliance on air 
power was good or bad for civilians.  
They also worriedly pointed out the expansive potential of “military necessity,” 
the civilian immunity norm’s ambiguous limiting principle. One such example brought 
up in discussions was the bombing of the television station in Belgrade, which human 
rights experts saw as illegal since it aimed to sever the link between the people and the 
government. Consistent with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of the time, however, some 
participants held more expansive, sovereignty-oriented views of military necessity, 
arguing that “media outlets provide effective mobilizing tools for the perpetration of 
violence and thus are legitimate targets.”4  Similar debates occurred about the bombing of 
electrical grids, which produce great civilian suffering but which was defended by some 
military participants as necessary to “provide military advantage by injecting friction into 
the system and temporarily disabling the enemy.”5 This difference in perspective also 
manifested in discussions about whether the concept of military necessity can be 
coherently applied to coercive strategies.
6
 
 Overall, many were conflicted about the role of international humanitarian law 
against a legitimizing backdrop of humanitarian intervention. (It should be noted that 
                                                          
4
 Ibid., 7. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
141 
 
 
though the GWOT had just begun, counterinsurgency in these discussions was not yet on 
the radar. The public discourse about civilian casualties, the use of force, and civilian 
immunity had not yet extended its reach to include issues of ground wars.) Still others 
brought up the difference between legal and moral standards for military behavior and 
suggested that “while international humanitarian law certainly places constraints upon the 
use of force, many thought that popular conceptions of “morality” had a far more 
powerful impact.”7  The report shows evidence of a nascent debate about whether more 
restrictive moral expectations put the U.S. at a disadvantage. (This debate would arise in 
relation to Iraq only later). One comment suggested a quite suspicious view of the norm 
of civilian immunity as a possible a weapon to constrain U.S. power: “New international 
humanitarian law is emerging, and if allowed to progress, law will become the most 
potent weapon deployed against the United States.” Some noted the seeming irrelevance 
of the norm in practice since “the distinction between civilian and non-civilian has 
become blurred due to the nature of modern warfare and the environments in which 
modern wars are fought,” especially urban environments.8  
Some military participants countered that a slew of lawyers were already involved 
in targeting decisions and that consideration for IHL (or LOAC, the preferred military 
usage) had become internalized into military decision-making.
9
 The debate was widened 
                                                          
7
 Ibid., 12. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid.  
142 
 
 
when one participant remarked that “it is a mistake for military planners to view 
humanitarian concerns as impediments to success in war. Wars are fought for political 
reasons, and ignoring humanitarian concerns runs the risk of winning the battle and 
losing the war.” The beginnings of the recognition of the need for legitimacy in 
humanitarian intervention surfaced because “the domestic public and international 
community, justifiably or not, holds Western militaries to a higher standard when they 
intervene for ostensibly humanitarian reasons.” Some acknowledged the more cautious 
targeting practices that might require, but “it was suggested that the U.S. could “afford” 
such caution only in limited circumstances. Still another “queried whether it would be 
either militarily prudent or politically necessary to apply these constraints to the war on 
terrorism.”10  Common ground was found, however, as military officials and human 
rights experts agreed that the U.S. public needed to be encouraged to have more realistic 
expectations about the humanitarian implications for the use of force.   
To sum,  analysis of the earliest conference report available (held in November 
2001) shows the  beginnings of a debate informed by concerns about legitimacy, 
especially the link between the reasons for using force to the moral issues about how 
force is applied. Some “asserted that many participants sought to distinguish between 
morally acceptable and legally justifiable actions, suggesting that there are tensions 
between them.” This conference also shows a baseline understanding of an oppositional 
relationship between humanitarian concerns about civilian casualties and military 
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effectiveness. The comments and concerns of military personnel demonstrate a certain 
level of internalization of the civilian immunity norm, though this attitude is inconsistent 
across participants and narrow in scope in the sense that it applies mostly to airpower. 
Interestingly, we see the first hints that some would assume a lesser degree of political 
pressure to incur risk to protect civilians in the GWOT than humanitarian intervention 
required.  Both groups wanted to better manage public expectations about the 
humanitarian consequences of employing force, however, though none at this point saw 
foreign publics as a concern; rather, the American public was the audience to which they 
were referring. Finally, military personnel and human rights experts both expressed an 
interest in “the NGO world saying ‘this is what we’d like to see,’ and the military saying 
‘this is the best we can do,’ and trying to narrow this gap.”11  These initial interactions 
mark a period  of “strategic bargaining” in the sense that it is seen as necessary to talk to 
the human rights community, but for many the attitude appears skeptical, mostly to 
defend the military’s actions. 
Origins of the Legitimacy Gap: the Instrumental Use of Civilian-Centered Norms 
If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means — 
sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And if war is forced upon us, 
we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military — 
and we will prevail.
12
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While those participating in the human rights policy conferences recognized the 
competition between the two very different goals of human rights and military action, the 
tensions between “just means” and “full force” was apparently lost on the George W. 
Bush administration. From the beginning of the GWOT, President George W. Bush 
engaged in a strategy of legitimation for his war policies by invoking moral concepts 
deriving from Just War. His rhetoric invokes the  jus ad bellum to justify the use of force 
in Iraq, and he employs the language of just means (jus in bello) in order to legitimize the 
U.S. identity as one that can be trusted to act ethically with that power, which works 
simultaneously to deny legitimacy to its enemies, both state and non-state.  
The War of Ideas and its Reliance on Just War Concepts 
The War of Ideas is a real component in the GWOT broadly and in the Wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan more narrowly, yet because words are used to sell action, this is 
often overlooked as mere rhetoric. The point of the War of Ideas is to deny support for 
extremist ideological movements hostile to the United States. In the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 (NSS 2002),
13
 Bush spells out the War of Ideas for the first time, and he 
explicitly states that the legitimacy factor is a central concern:  
We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international 
terrorism. This includes using the full influence of the United States, and 
working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of 
terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light 
as slavery, piracy, or genocide.
14
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Besides starving terrorism of legitimacy, the War of Ideas would also include the 
following three goals: 
 Denying “fertile ground” for extremist Islamist ideology by 
promoting Muslim moderates.  
 Addressing “underlying conditions” with the help of the 
international community  
 Use public diplomacy to counter extremist rule and to promote 
identification with American ideological concepts such as 
freedom.15  
The efforts to delegitimize terrorism were, of course, well under way by the time 
this document was published. Bush employed a familiar tool which is itself the 
supporting language of civilian immunity and just war, but which has also historically 
been used to violate the spirit of distinction between combatant and noncombatant: 
civilization versus barbarism/savagery: “this is civilization’s fight;” “the civilized world 
is with us;” and "we wage a war to save civilization itself."16  
That terrorism poses a universal threat to “civilization” was not terribly 
controversial in the U.S. or elsewhere in the wake of 9/11. As Mendelsohn argues, “Al 
Qaeda poses a challenge to the sovereignty of specific states but it also challenges the 
international society as a whole. This way, the challenge that Al Qaeda represents is 
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putting the survival of the system under risk.”17 Kinsella adds that “what marks President 
Bush and his administration as the right defenders of ‘civilization is their claims to 
protect ‘civilians.’”18 Most agree that to kill civilians for political purposes is wrong and 
should be condemned. Naming terrorists as the “enemy of civilization” labels them not as 
emergent actors who threaten the state monopoly of violence but as illegitimate in their 
very identity. While their actions necessitate war, “who they are” precludes conferring 
any legitimacy on their political claims or grievances precisely because “targeting 
innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong;”19 To be a “terrorist” 
means to be defined by the use of unjust means (killing civilians), which renders 
impossible just cause and puts terrorists beyond the pale as actors—irreconcilable with, 
and so incapable of inclusion within, any moral international order.  
The analysis above is supported by the congressional testimony of Douglas 
Feith,
20
 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the time, who was also in charge of the 
initial civilian reconstruction effort during the Iraq War. Feith helped to shape the Bush 
stance toward the Geneva Conventions, and he explains that Donald Rumsfeld 
summoned him and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers to 
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provide a memo about the Geneva Conventions with “talking points” for a National 
Security Council meeting in February 2002, during the period the Bush Doctrine was still 
being formulated. Though the issue was at this time centered on torture and POW status, 
Feith explains that the “memo represented the thinking of the top civilian and military 
leadership of the Defense Department,”21 whose stance was that the U.S. “had a 
compelling interest in showing respect for Geneva.” It was considered important because 
“Geneva is crucial for our own armed forces” in order to be treated as the law prescribes 
in case of capture, and it was “an essential component of military culture.”  Moreover, 
Feith adds, it is “’morally important, crucial to US morale’ and it is also ‘practically 
important, for it makes US forces the gold standard in the world, facilitating our winning 
cooperation from other countries.’”22  Finally, Feith adds, the Geneva Conventions—and 
here he specifically refers to the core content of the civilian immunity norm—are crucial 
in the war on terror: 
[our] position is dictated by the logic of our stand against terrorism. I argued: 
 The essence of the Convention is the distinction between soldiers 
and civilians (i.e., between combatants and non-combatants). 
 Terrorists are reprehensible precisely because they negate that 
distinction by purposefully targeting civilians.
23
 
The war on terror became controversial as the universalism of the “human rights 
interests” of civilization morphed into the sovereignty-based power interests of the 
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United States, despite the belief that values and interests had fused. This was evident 
when Bush employed the language of just war and terrorism for the purposes of 
legitimizing the use of force against other states: in this case, Iraq. As part of his broader 
foreign policy program known as the Bush Doctrine, the rhetoric Bush crafted at this 
early point was directed toward mobilizing the domestic audience by “branding” the war 
in Iraq as a secondary but crucial front in the GWOT. As others have pointed out, 
however, the nature of global media today makes it nearly impossible to target only one 
audience since “the media invites domestic and international responses, publicizing the 
debate.”24  
The NSS 2002 aims to ensure an order whereby all nations would “protect basic 
human rights”25 by furthering the sovereign power interests of the U.S.: “The U.S. 
national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that 
reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”26 This document, while 
building on the brief surplus of legitimacy afforded the U.S. in fighting Al Qaeda, made 
instrumental use of Just War concepts (civilian immunity , human rights, and democracy 
more broadly) to legitimate the expansion of its own power across the globe. Most 
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famously, Bush turned the Just War concept of preemption into prevention,
27
 a move 
which served to undermine the stability of the international normative order and reaffirm 
European publics’ initial assessment of Bush as “mak[ing] decisions based entirely on 
U.S. interests.”28  As Hurd argues, his instrumental use and distortion of this norm was 
damaging on many fronts:  
The American challenge to the customary law on preemption threatens to 
delegitimize both the existing norms and the social basis of US power, 
while also attempting to legitimize American interests and new 
understandings of the norms. It therefore shows the productive and 
destructive aspects of the power of legitimation in world politics. 
Legitimation is the link between states and the normative structures of 
international society.
29
 
Defining rogue states as illegitimate based on their anti-human rights, “terrorist” 
ideology, they too are denied any just cause because their identity precludes the 
possibility: “we make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor 
or provide aid to them.”30 In attempting to blur the line between the identities of state and 
non-state actor by conflating illegitimate violence against foreign civilians (terrorism) 
with illegitimate violence within a state  (human rights violations), Bush serves to 
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strengthen the normative power of both human rights and civilian immunity, and more 
specifically, reinforces a civilian-centered human rights ethic.  
By employing international society’s morally constraining norms in an identity 
contest with both terrorists and rogue states, however, Bush reinforces expectations that 
the United States be held to a higher standard in war, undermining the legitimacy of the 
traditional bias states have maintained toward an expansive, sovereignty-based definition 
of military necessity.  Couching the build-up to the Iraq War in the rhetoric of Just War 
and undermining its long historical struggle to separate jus ad bellum from jus in bello (as 
explained in chapter 2) by fusing unjust cause with unjust means, Bush’s garbled 
communication strategies enact three unintended consequences: 1.) he creates moral 
confusion about who the enemy is and what type of treatment they are entitled to. This is 
true of the U.S. public and many of the soldiers at the lower levels, as confirmed by my 
interviews.
31
 2.) he invites judgment of his own war according to those same criteria, and  
3.) he undermines  both the physical wars and the wars of ideas by placing them at odds.   
By instrumentally using norms meant to limit war-making power for the purposes 
of expansion of power, Bush drew unprecedented attention to the contradictions between 
the American values of rule of law, democracy, and the protection of human rights and 
American aspirations for global hegemony.  As Ikenberry explains, people feared that 
Bush had abandoned the post WW2 social compact that allowed U.S. power to exist 
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relatively unchallenged by the rest of the world because it rested on how actual, ordinary 
people, that is, civilians, experienced American power.
32
 The precarious balance 
previously employed by the U.S. through strategic restraint had rested on the 
“institutionalization of hegemonic strategy, [which] serves the interest of the United 
States by making its power more legitimate, expansive, and durable.  The price is that 
some restraints are indeed placed on the exercise of power.”33 As Ikenberry suggests, in 
rejecting the restraints on its own power, the U.S. emphasized its “imperial face” over its 
“liberal face,” which intensified insecurity and inflamed public opinion in many states 
across the world.
34
 Anti-Americanism, which the War of Ideas was meant to remedy, 
instead was fanned in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq.  
This worsened as two of the three legs of the stool constructed by the 
administration to justify its invasion disintegrated (Saddam Hussein’s alleged cooperation 
with terrorists and his program of WMDs). This left only one leg, humanitarian 
intervention, which meant that the legitimacy of U.S. military action in Iraq rested 
precariously on the promise that the good of removing the previous regime would 
outweigh the violation of Iraq’s state sovereignty, not to mention the destruction and 
misery wreaked on its people.  As damage to the U.S. reputation began to accrue in the 
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larger international community,
35
 a legitimacy gap began to expand between the values 
and identity promoted in the War of Ideas and the material reality of the physical wars.  
With a unilaterally conceived and implemented foreign policy goal lacking international 
support, particularly amongst foreign publics,
36
 the stated goal in Iraq became the 
creation of a stable, democratic state that respects human rights and that would become 
an ally in the war on terror.
37
 Hearkening back to the previous social compact of strategic 
restraint, the material goals of the war were now firmly embedded within normative 
claims about making life better for ordinary people through freedom, prosperity, and 
human dignity.  
The criteria by which to judge U.S. power and thus U.S. identity was promoted  
by the U.S. itself through its attempt to establish its place within international society as a 
global hegemon that was fierce to its enemies but protective of its friends. In using the 
rhetoric of restraint and principle but appealing to the desire for destruction and revenge, 
Bush set an emotionally powerful tone for the nation, including some in the military. As 
my interviews with military personnel have revealed, Iraqi civilians came to be seen as 
                                                          
35
 See Pew Report on the image of the U.S. one year into the Iraq War, accessed 3-1-2013, available online: 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2004/03/16/a-year-after-iraq-war/.  
36
 Pew Global Research Center traces the public opinion of foreign publics and demonstrates the damage to 
U.S. image due to its foreign policy. See for example, “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years, 2001-
2008, accessed 3-1-2013, .http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-
2001-2008/.  
37
 Cited on Common Dreams website, accessed March 1, 2013, online: 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0929-23.htm. 
 
153 
 
 
the enemy by many in the early days of the war. As a result, the latent tensions regarding 
the moral dimensions of the civilian immunity norm that existed pre-Iraq, between the 
humanitarian justification for force versus the suffering it causes for innocent civilians, 
would be amplified ten-fold.  
What the U.S. civilian leadership did not yet understand, but what some in the 
U.S. military would learn fairly quickly, is that the narrative (the actual story that 
interprets and guides the  ideas and perceptions of people about events) and the 
legitimacy it confers or destroys, was not an ancillary rhetorical issue; rather, the War of  
Ideas impacted directly on the material success or failure of a war waged on behalf of 
democratic values and human rights, by a powerful Western democracy,  against non-
state actors in a state it was responsible for “breaking.”38  What was just as important was 
that, as in any war, the enemy was watching, listening, and behaving in a strategic 
manner as well. Moreover, the enemies were multiple, and Al Qaeda, who had been 
working out its own narrative of morality and legality about killing civilians, provided an 
alternative narrative about the justness of killing civilians, aiming at the Achilles heel of 
American legitimacy: its limited ability to see the gap between its own words and its 
deeds. At the same time Bush was formulating his use of norms, al Qaeda’s official 
spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, posted the following on al Qaeda’s web site in June 
                                                          
38
 This term refers to Colin Powell’s oft-quoted admonition to President Bush that in Iraq, “you break it, 
you own it.” Explained in David Samuels, "A conversation with Colin Powell," The Atlantic, March 2011 
2007. 
154 
 
 
2002. Using the same language of WMDs that Bush was using, he wrote a justification 
for killing Americans based on American behavior toward Muslim civilians:  
Due to the American bombings and siege of Iraq, more than 1,200,000 
Muslims were killed in the past decade…The Americans have still not 
tasted from our hands what we have tasted from theirs. The [number of] 
killed in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are but a tiny part of 
the exchange for those killed in Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines, 
Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. We have not reached parity 
with them. We have the right to kill four million Americans – two million 
of them children – and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple 
hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with 
chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal 
maladies that have afflicted the Muslims because of [Americans’] 
chemical and biological weapons. America knows only the language of 
force. America is kept at bay by blood alone.
39
 
Iraq: Post Invasion 2003-4 
The U.S. enjoyed its brief, shining moment in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of 
the invasion, which was militarily successful by most accounts in the sense that it 
achieved its goal of defeating and removing the previous regime.  Cheers for the 
liberators soon gave way to chaos, however, as it became apparent that there was a lack 
of any real post-invasion plan or even capability for state-building. Thomas Ricks 
documents the “fiasco” of those years when many ordinary Iraqis turned from optimism 
to suspicion: a failure to police the unruly mobs who destroyed Iraqi cultural heritage; a 
lack of civilian capacity to assist the military in building infrastructure and institutions; 
de-Baathification and the dissolution of the Iraqi military by L. Paul Bremer produced 
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angry, unemployed, and well -armed Sunnis who began resisting what they correctly 
predicted would be a Shia-majority dominated government.
40
   
What is less acknowledged by most accounts of the invasion and early post-
invasion period is that the lack of planning included an absence of clear, unified 
expectations and training on how to treat civilians. While the air strikes in the “shock and 
awe” campaign employed precise weaponry and careful collateral damage planning, they 
also used cluster munitions in residential areas.
41
  Civilian immunity considerations were 
institutionalized in air strike targeting procedures, but how ground troops behaved toward 
civilians fell to the ethical leadership exhibited (or not) by  individual leaders. Though 
some units were expected to (and did) exercise ethical judgment in distinguishing 
between combatant and civilian, others describe a  free-for- all environment in which, as 
one soldier put it, the rules of engagement were to “kill anything that moves.”42 Others 
described the mood as vengeful and dark after 9/11, and all agreed that force protection 
was an absolute, unquestioned priority: “better to send a bullet than a soldier” was 
mentioned as a common slogan of the time.   
Despite the words of President Bush, who characterized the invasion as "one of 
the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history,"
43
 the reality of the war on 
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the ground was experienced differently by many of those in uniform and the civilians 
with whom they interacted. Bush, in an address to the nation (which was of course 
transmitted throughout the world by global media), said “the people you liberate will 
witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military. In this conflict, 
America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality.” 
After condemning Saddam Hussein on the grounds of his violations of human rights, 
Bush adds, “I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make 
every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.”44 In the meantime, the military was 
not, as General Tommy Franks put it, “in the business of doing body counts,”45 but an 
initial damage assessment by Human Rights Watch estimated that the invasion killed 
thousands.
46
   
In the face of the grave material disaster forming on the ground, the lack of basic 
needs being met and the massive disruption to an already severely damaged society and 
economy, the War of Ideas faded into the background. Neither the State Department nor 
the DoD thought much about what would be required to implement it or even how it 
would relate to the war on the ground. While the military had always engaged in 
psychological operations, the goal of manipulating perceptions was negative: to support 
the use of destructive force and defeating the enemy. The last U.S. experience with a war 
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of ideas meant to promote positive U.S. values, identity, and power occurred during the 
Cold War, when the state department ran a fairly vibrant public diplomacy effort. As was 
the case with many of the other traditionally civilian responsibilities, this capability did 
not exist early in the war. Perhaps more importantly, it was only gradually becoming 
apparent that what happened on the battlefields and in the neighborhoods of Iraq had any 
bearing on the larger ideological war of perceptions relating to the GWOT.  As President 
Bush had explained, the War of ideas was meant to address and remedy the fertile ground 
for terrorism and anti-American feeling, yet those very enabling conditions were taking 
root in Iraq.   
In the meantime, the Project for the Means of Intervention continued to hold 
conferences and meetings continued between a core of approximately 60 “veteran 
participants” along with a diverse crowd described as consisting of “intergenerational, 
international, senior to junior; analytic and operational, [and] “unusual” suspects.” Some 
could be considered “norms entrepreneurs,” and others were not. As events in Iraq heated 
up, the meetings became “informal, off-the-record, and intensive.” The causes of civilian 
suffering and how to reduce it was the main topic of discussion, and assumptions and 
perspectives of human rights experts and the military were far off. Issues were raised 
about the utility and difficulty of keeping track of civilian casualties, along with 
discussions about what was and was not within the control of the U.S. government. It was 
noted that while the location, capabilities, and intentions of the adversary were not in 
control of the U.S., the “rules of engagement (ROE), quality of intelligence, and strategy” 
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were. No consensus, or even emphasis at this time suggested that both sides had decided 
that civilian suffering was itself a strategic consideration, though it was assumed that the 
issue was a matter that impacted the “Western ‘center of gravity’ in the sense of affecting 
“local political and military allies, coalition partners, domestic political support, and 
international legitimacy.”47  
By 2003, the outcomes of the conferences showed an acknowledgement of the 
salience of civilian casualties, and despite the tensions between a military that tended 
toward the presumption that progress toward civilian suffering was already as good as it 
gets, the results of the conference highlighted the need to  
 ‘increase communication among military, political leadership, 
human rights groups, and broader public’ about CD issues 
 Develop greater understanding of how conduct of U.S. military 
operations and other factors affect civilians during war 
 Help make U.S. use of force as consistent as possible with 
humanitarian principles 
 Make U.S. use of force more effective48 
Back inside the military, it became clear to many that an insurgency was brewing 
from the beginning, but that fact did not compel a unified doctrinal response.
49
 Rather, in 
the absence of a clear doctrine to address such a contingency, early attempts at building 
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infrastructure, providing basic services, and working to restore order and stability took 
place within the context of a disintegrating relationship between soldiers and civilians.  
Anti-occupation sentiment grew in key areas, and as soldiers experienced the terror tactic 
of road-side IEDs, suspicion and tension built between the populace and the military. 
Checkpoint incidences of killing civilians increased, and soldiers kept their physical 
distance from the people, which exacerbated an already shaky foundation undermined by 
poor communication, cultural distance, and the sense of soldiers as outsiders. The initial 
euphoria about U.S. liberation that was touted (and by most accounts generally believed) 
by the administration, was soon clearly being experienced as occupation by many 
Iraqis.
50
 Promises of prosperity and freedom instead gave way to destitution, insecurity, 
and growing chaos.   
U.S. forces were trained for conventional war, in which destroying the enemy is 
the goal, and civilians in many cases became indistinguishable from insurgents, both in 
their physical appearance, but also, some interviewees suggest, in the minds of some of 
the soldiers. One remarked: “we began to look at them as the enemy.” Lacking in training 
and preparation for such a development, many confirmed a widespread mood of avenging 
9/11. Other interviewees suggested that most events involving civilian casualties and 
abuse were never brought to light by the media: “there are lots of things you’ve never 
heard about on the news.” This is likely due to the practice of controlling the media by 
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embedding reporters; one interviewee mentioned a specific incident in which a soldier 
went on a rampage against civilians in the Iraqi town of Hit after losing several of his 
buddies to an IED attack. According to this account, the soldier was prosecuted, but this 
was not a big media hit, at least in the U.S.  Two events that did attract global media 
attention, however, were seen by most of the interviewees as tarnishing the reputation of 
the military in a significant way,
51
 contributing to the spread of an already growing 
insurgency, and represented a tipping point in the early stages of the war. These two 
events both centered on perceptions of the unethical treatment of Iraqi civilians by 
American soldiers: the scandal at Abu Ghraib and the first battle of Fallujah in April of 
2004.   
The scandal at Abu Ghraib resulted from the brutal, degrading, sometimes deadly 
treatment of detainees that was captured in film clips, photographs, journals, stories, and 
official reports by the ICRC and Human Rights Watch.
  52
 The investigation began within 
the military, but traditional media brought it to life—a special on 6o Minutes and then an 
article by the famed journalist Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker.
53
 Photographs were 
leaked and disseminated across the globe via the internet, and the world was shocked by 
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the depraved, sadistic images of torture and sexual degradation against the prisoners.
54
 
Further, it was mentioned that the released photos were relatively tame compared to the 
still unreleased photos of rape, torture, beatings, intimidation, and death. Hersh notes that 
military officials described American soldiers ‘severely beating an Iraqi prisoner nearly 
to death, having sex with a female Iraqi prisoner, and ‘acting inappropriately with a dead 
body.’ The officials said there also was a videotape, apparently shot by U.S. personnel, 
showing Iraqi guards raping young boys.”55   
Military officers describe this exposure as devastating to the war cause, but 
interestingly, several sources note that the Iraqi reaction was not the main concern, since 
this was not surprising to many of them—this was a surprise to those outside of Iraq. 
Despite the public stance of the civilian administration that this was the result of a few 
bad apples, one interviewee said that the abusive attitudes in Abu Ghraib reflected a 
wider attitude toward civilians. He described his own reaction to the outing of Abu 
Ghraib as consistent with the general reaction of those around him: “Well, we’d been 
caught is what I thought when I first heard” he said.  When asked if it was the global 
public or the Iraqi public he was concerned about, he indicated it was the perceptions of 
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the American audience they most feared: “we were afraid they’d find out we were acting 
like animals.”56    
The response of public officials at the time indicated grave concern that the 
damage to the U.S. image undermines the war in a way that transcends domestic support. 
TIME magazine published the following: 
Senator Joe Biden, ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee 
and a supporter of the decision to invade Iraq, characterized the 
revelations of abuse as the single most significant blow to U.S. prestige in 
the Arab world over the past decade. Anthony Cordesman, the widely 
respected defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies was equally forthright: "Those Americans who mistreated the 
prisoners may not have realized it, but they acted in the direct interests of 
al-Qaeda, the insurgents, and the enemies of the U.S.," he said. The reason 
is that they came at a point when U.S. standing in the Arab world was 
already at an all-time low. Says Cordesman, "These negative images 
validate all other negative images and interact with them." In other words, 
they function as a multiplier by providing photographic "proof" of the 
demonic picture of the U.S. painted by anti-American propagandists.
57
 
As if Abu Ghraib were not bad enough, in the same month the U.S. became 
embroiled in the single most damaging battle of the war thus far: Fallujah. Fallujah is a 
city in Iraq that was initially friendly to U.S. forces. It eventually became a hotbed of 
insurgency, however, fueled by anti-occupation resentment. An overwhelmingly Sunni 
city, its residents suffered high unemployment from the de-Baathification policies 
undertaken by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA).
58
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A series of incidents occurred that sparked mistrust and anger between the 
soldiers and citizens. First, only a month into the invasion, 700 troops entered the city and 
took over a local school as part of their base. Residents resented the closure of the school, 
and within five days, protests around the school grew more ominous, with evidence of 
rock-throwing by citizens, some children, and claims by soldiers that they were taking 
fire. While other reports confirm sporadic violence against soldiers over time, Human 
Rights Watch did not find credible evidence to support that soldiers were under fire on 
the day in question. The event culminated with soldiers climbing to the roof and opening 
fire on the crowds, resulting in about seventeen civilian deaths.
59
  
As unrest and resistance grew over the next year, troops pulled out of the city, 
and, in keeping with Bush’s policy goal to hand over control to local forces, Iraqi security 
forces attempted to keep control. The situation grew more volatile as insurgents 
massacred police, and as they gained mass support of the city’s residents. Moreover, the 
lack of control in the city allowed it to become inundated with foreign fighters, most 
notably Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
60
 The event that sparked major combat operations was 
when four American Blackwater contractors accidentally took a wrong turn into the city 
and were killed by insurgents. Images of a cheering crowd who then mutilated the 
corpses and hung them from a bridge enraged Americans, including President Bush and 
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CPA head, L. Paul Bremer.
61
 Troops were hurriedly called in, before there was really 
time to “shape” the terrain or empty the city of civilians, and the goal of searching out 
and killing insurgents resulted in an estimated 700-2000 Iraqi deaths (some claim 700 
civilians), and from 38-100 U.S. soldiers. The city was destroyed, and many of the people 
displaced. Several of my interviewees confirmed a “shoot anything that moves” mentality 
and noted that Fallujah is known for what was a common practice in the early days of 
Iraq, which was to count all males of a certain age as insurgents. None of the soldiers I 
spoke with were in the battle and instead relied on the internal accounts and stories 
spread amongst soldiers.  Such a characterization has become almost conventional within 
the military because even some of the newer soldiers have been taught that Fallujah was 
the antithesis of what good counterinsurgency should be. It is also known at this time that 
white phosphorous was used to drive insurgents from houses, and an amateur American 
filmmaker who entered Fallujah right after the battle interviewed residents, (and later 
soldiers), who showed him hateful graffiti left by soldiers on the furniture of a resident: “I 
hate Iraq and all Iraqis.”62   
What is remarkable about the preceding events is not necessarily the brutality of 
war, but the spirit of openness and self-reflection about such incidents that is increasingly 
evident in the military today. The military literature is filled with monographs seeking to 
make sense of such events in the interest of organizational learning. Major Sherry Oehler, 
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for example, who writes on the unintended consequences of killing civilians,  confirms 
my own assertion that the instrumental use of international norms matters for what 
happens on the ground: she notes that “the Bush administration’s policy on denying 
“unlawful combatants” privileges as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions 
enabled troops freedom of maneuver to accomplish these missions, however, the policy 
contributed to the ambiguity on the ground with regard to the treatment of civilians.”63 
Bush at the time of Fallujah demonstrated little recognition of this, as evidenced by the 
fact that his public comments leading up to Fallujah continued to justify force by 
instrumentally employing the norms-language of democracy, civilian immunity, and 
human rights: “they want to kill innocent life to try to get us to quit,” he said. Bush 
promised that “U.S. troops will use whatever force is needed to quell uprisings in 
Fallujah…and “we will deal with those who want to stop the march to freedom.”64  
Bush’s determination to make an example of Fallujah for killing American 
“civilians” and his stated willingness to use all available means suggest that he was no 
longer concerned with the image of the U.S. military or state as being in line with civilian 
immunity. His attempts to signal resolve are indicative of a sovereignty-oriented reading 
of the CIN wherein military necessity enables more civilian casualties. I suggest that this 
is a tipping point in the war whereby it became very clear that killing civilians entailed 
damage to the U.S. social reputation, and that the importance of the War of Ideas was 
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first connected to success in the physical war. This is so because, despite the tough talk 
about force, the political pressure created by the carnage was immense, and it was 
decisive in stopping the battle despite material definitions of “winning.”65  
Some of the interviewees present in Iraq during the Fallujah period named 
Fallujah as a tipping point: “We looked around, and we’d killed all these people, but now 
what? What were we doing?” This was not lost on many Iraqis. One Iraqi man spoke to 
the American press weeks after Fallujah, and  
he recalls that his growing uneasiness with the US occupation turned into 
something steelier a few weeks ago, when he saw the first images of 
civilian casualties carried from Fallujah on the Arab satellite channels Al 
Jazeera and Al Arabiya. ‘They showed us what they really are.’66  
The military denied that there were many casualties or that ROE were broken, but 
according to an intelligence report leaked to Wikileaks, it was immediately recognized 
that the perception of civilian casualties had damaged the legitimacy of the American 
mission by creating “political pressure” and building on anger already present from Abu 
Ghraib.
67
  
A very influential series of articles published in Military Review, the Army’s 
internal journal, in 2005 demonstrate that the thinking of the leadership was in keeping 
with both the general sentiment expressed by my interviewees and that of the intelligence 
report. Metz writes  
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U. S. forces unilaterally halted combat operations after a few days due to a 
lack of support from the interim Iraqi Government and international 
pressures amid unsubstantiated enemy reports of collateral damage and 
excessive force. Marines won virtually every combat engagement 
throughout the battle and did so within the established rules of 
engagement. The missing element was an overall integrated information 
component to gain widespread support of significant influencers and to 
prepare key populations for the realities of the battle plan. Without such 
advance support, the finest combat plan executed by competent and brave 
Soldiers and Marines proved limited in effectiveness. The insurgent forces 
established links with regional and global media outlets that had agendas 
of their own. The failure to mass effects in the global information sphere 
proved decisive on the battleground in Fallujah.
68
  
Metz, who works in information operations, highlights that perceptions are 
directly relevant to the larger war on terror, which now had direct links to the battlefields 
of Iraq. He cites Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was writing to al- Zarqawi about the War of 
Ideas from the perspective of Al Qaeda and now AQI as well, and that this was based on 
civilian casualties: “. . . I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this 
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a 
race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”69 Metz adds that it is specifically the 
perception “that combat operations are indiscriminate, disproportionate, and in violation 
of the rules of war” that caused the failure of the April 2004 incursion into Fallujah.70 It 
became quite clear after Fallujah that communication was seen as not simply words but 
                                                          
68
 Thomas F. Metz et al, "Massing Effects in the Information Domain," Military Review, (May-June 2006), 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CALL/docs/09-11/ch-4.asp. 
69
 Ayman  al-Zawahiri, "Intercepted Letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," (9 July 2005), as quoted in Metz et 
al, "Massing Effects.” 
70
 Ibid. 
168 
 
 
as strategic interaction, and that winning the War of Ideas was now seen as directly 
connected to winning the ground war. 
Furthermore, the military began to realize what Bush did not: that the U.S. was 
light years behind the enemy in acknowledging this basic fact: “[Our] units are facing an 
adaptive, relentless, and technologically savvy foe who recognizes that the global 
information network is his most effective tool for attacking what he perceives to be the 
center of gravity- public opinion, both domestic and international.”71  By early 2006, 
Bush’s own former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, 
Joseph Collins, published an open letter in the Armed Forces Journal warning Bush that 
‘[i] f our strategic communications on Iraq don't improve, the strategy for victory will fail 
and disastrous consequences will follow.’"72 
Transitioning Counterinsurgency: Ideas within the Military 
By 2004, post Fallujah, the insurgency was spreading, and now the multi-
faceted character of it was becoming clear. The Shiite cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr’s faction had also revolted after L. Paul Bremer shut down his 
region’s television station and arrested one of his men. 73   The battle was 
not nearly as damaging as Fallujah because the civilians separated 
themselves from the fighter and literally stood aside. As David Kilcullen 
explains in the Small War Journal Blog, however, refraining from killing 
civilians while going after the enemy is not the end of the road because 
they still have to choose sides: “in that instance [in Sadr City], and a 
couple of others, the local Shia population actually stood to one side and 
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waited for us to secure them, but once they saw we weren't planning to 
stay permanently they were too exposed to support us.”74  
According to a Shiite cleric at the time, Fallujah had for a brief time united Iraq—
against the United States. “What happened in Fallujah made every Iraqi think it could 
happen in their own town, and that united us.”75 The battle in Fallujah however, in 
destroying much of the city, had displaced both insurgents and civilians, which 
destabilized other areas in the North and contributed to later sectarian tensions.
76
  
With Iraq further destabilizing and beginning to fragment, it became clear to 
many in the military that the character of the conflict required a change in approach. 
While information operations were about controlling the narrative and thus perceptions, 
John Nagl, co-author of the final C.O.I.N. manual (FM3-24) attributes the need for a 
change to the Information revolution’s effects not only on the image of the U.S., but on 
the “nature of warfare, especially insurgency.”77 The debate within the military about 
counterinsurgency began to view the actual place of the civilian and ethical treatment 
toward them as a strategic matter. Despite popular conceptions, the foundations for the 
C.O.I.N. manual were being laid months before General Petraeus took over the 
Combined Arms Center and began the famous re-writing of the field manual.  
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As I continue with my case, a caveat is in order: at the highest levels of the 
military, I have not heard my thesis confirmed in public speech, though most lower and 
mid-level military participants in my study
78
 confirmed the idea that civilian casualties 
early in the Iraq conflict were a significant reason for the later change in doctrine toward 
population protection, and many elaborated that the doctrine was needed to get soldiers to 
“change their attitudes toward the Iraqi people and quit seeing them as the enemy.” “We 
had to learn that they’re not all terrorists, that they have a culture of their own, and that 
hurting them hurt the mission.” Nagl’s characterization draws a direct line between 
civilian casualties and material effects on the battlefield, however, when he wrote in the 
Small Wars Journal Blog that  
the key to success in a counterinsurgency environment is not to create 
more insurgents than you capture or kill. A stray tank round that kills a 
family could create dozens of insurgents for a generation. Thus, it is 
essential to use force as carefully and with as much discrimination as is 
possible.
79
 
Nagl also described the need for a change in doctrine as arising because 
counterinsurgency was previously a special forces task. They needed to “reenergize the 
force” as a whole. The “big army, conventional war-fighting army needed to be reminded 
that fighting counterinsurgency” was their job, and the temporary manual that had been 
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hastily put together in October 2004 was about to expire.
80
 What has been left unsaid by 
military leadership is that the history of special forces and CIA running 
counterinsurgency operations (in Latin America for example) were secretive and far 
removed from both the spirit and letter of LOAC. The CIA “murder manual,” for 
example, was described as a training manual for the Nicaraguan guerrillas in “how to 
kidnap, assassinate, blackmail, and dupe civilians.”81  
Counterinsurgency Debate: More Carrots, Less Sticks 
The doctrinal change that eventually occurred addresses the deficit in military 
culture toward civilians, and the debate leading up to the new manual in 2005 seemed to 
recognize this deficit. What the debate in 2005 achieved was to help clarify the logic of 
counterinsurgency in accordance with the changing political/strategic environment. 
Ironically, while the public and legal discourse in the U.S. had exploded with questions 
as to whether or not the civilian immunity norm was obsolete or should be discarded in 
the face of irregular warfare, military insiders were carefully interrogating assumptions 
about the use of force, exploring and explicating new goals, and starting to identify what 
needed to change in order to reach those goals. The community of innovators that shaped 
the debate engaged in a redefinition of some of the key counterinsurgency concepts in a 
way that took into account the need to remedy the existing legitimacy gap with the moral 
content of civilian immunity and by doing so, attempt to bridge the war of ideas with the 
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war on the ground. The body of published works taken as a whole attempted to change 
ideas about how to fight by matching them with revised interests and American identity, 
creating a conceptual link between the ethical treatment of civilians and national security 
imperatives and foreign policy goals. 
In response to perceptions of failure associated with failing to live up to civilian-
centered human rights norms, the debate found in the 2005 (post-Fallujah but pre-
Petraeus period) issues of Military Review
82
 are indications that human rights demands 
are having an effect: adaptation, moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, and 
persuasion are all present. Processes of institutionalization and habitualization would not 
be expected to come until later, after the adoption of C.O.I.N., which this chapter will not 
cover.
83
    
The first counterinsurgency manual put out in October, 2004 was a hurried 
attempt to draw lessons learned from past counterinsurgencies.
84
 The manual shows that 
prior ideas about how to manage insurgencies emphasize the tactical and operational 
levels, but not the strategic level, which is the vital difference between it and the later 
FM3-24. Meant for “division-level leaders and below,” it was not meant to challenge the 
prevailing assumptions in the military about the utility of force and the way it should be 
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employed. Furthermore, it reflected Rumsfeld’s priority that responsibility for the 
aftermath of the Iraq War was to be shifted onto Iraq,
85
 the host nation (HN): “a basic 
premise of counterinsurgency is that the ultimate responsibility rests with the HN.” And, 
“one of the key recurring lessons is that the United States cannot win other countries’ 
wars for them, but can certainly help legitimate foreign governments overcome attempts 
to overthrow them.” Lessons from past counterinsurgency experience were thus 
interpreted in a manner meant to uphold current strategic assumptions, and despite the 
change in circumstances, the manual reflected an understanding of the U.S. as having a 
supporting role in the counterinsurgency (as it did in Latin America) rather than as a 
primary actor: “the use of combat forces is a presidential decision and serves only as a 
temporary or provisional solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and 
provide security for the populace.
86
 However, since the war was one of choice by the 
U.S., and ostensibly for the purposes of humanitarian intervention, the situation in Iraq 
hardly matched the traditional model of insurgency as resulting from the internal organic 
uprising of elites with grievances. Instead, it was the result of an invasion and post-
invasion policies, including the dismantling of its prior institutions.  
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Though the first manual contained the basic elements of C.O.I.N. in terms of 
population protection as a goal,
87
  and it emphasized that officers should “prevent 
indiscriminate use of force,” this is overshadowed by force protection. The manual notes 
that human rights are a likely grievances and something to be taken into consideration, 
but it sees them as competing with the use of force and kinetic operations: 
“Counterinsurgency operations must balance elimination of grievances (that is, reform to 
include elimination of human rights abuses) and security force action that eliminates the 
insurgents.”88 The manual also emphasizes the media effects of collateral damage and the 
psychological effects on the populace as damaging to the mission: “Do not hurt the 
people, but kill the insurgents. Where US forces violate this dictum, US policies may 
fail.”89 However, consistent with remarks by one of my interviewees that “civilians were 
treated as objects, not human beings,” civilians are mentioned in the same subheading as 
“Resource Control:” “Combat operations are developed to neutralize the insurgent and, 
together with population and resources control measures, establish an environment 
within which political, social, and economic progress is possible.”90 An entire section 
discussed coercive practices toward civilians, which included the extreme measure of 
forceable relocation of populations if deemed necessary.
91
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In contrast to the inconsistent focus of the prior counterinsurgency manual, which 
emphasizes that combat operations are in tension with population protection, the series of 
articles published in Military Review during 2005
92
 emphasize the importance of limiting 
force and protecting the civilian, both for ethical and strategic reasons. In doing so, it lays 
the intellectual groundwork for shifting the “center of gravity” from the insurgent to the 
civilian.  
The articles in the year preceding C.O.I.N. emphasize the synthesis of moral 
identity, moral behavior, and strategic goals in the war in Iraq. There is an emphasis on 
developing Information Operations capabilities, but also on how information operations 
require challenging the assumption that force produces victory: “U.S. forces find, engage, 
capture, and kill terrorists, but this traditional approach to counterinsurgency does not 
adequately counter the insurgents’ information environment strategy.”93 There was a 
growing recognition that all negative experiences and images of the U.S. hurt the 
mission, but that changes are not simply about controlling the story through counter-
stories, but about changing the hearts and minds of soldiers as well. In acknowledging the 
damage done by Abu Ghraib, the author emphasizes the changes that must occur as a 
result: “The stark images from Abu Ghraib prison fade from the news only until the next 
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U.S. soldier must answer formal charges for what happened there. The Army is ensuring 
what happened will not happen again.”94 
Competing perspectives appear on occasion, for example, one that argues for the 
primacy of force protection. The author defends force protection as a strategic necessity 
because of the casualty sensitivity of the American public: “the enemy also learned that 
America’s vulnerable center of gravity is dead American soldiers.”95 The overwhelming 
tenor of the publication at this time though is of change, not one of maintaining the status 
quo. Part of this change is a concerted effort to explain the importance of ideas and the 
physical war as being connected and of drawing distinctions between terrorists and 
insurgents versus the U.S. military through their actions:  “The United States must also 
understand that when its forces react negatively and kick down doors in night raids, they 
are helping the enemy improve his own information environment. Their actions will 
annoy and alienate citizens who might no longer cooperate or who might begin actively 
supporting the insurgents.”96  
Others seek to bring the context of the current war back into its original 
humanitarian framework: “If the military is to conduct the Global War on Terrorism in an 
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effects-based campaign, then all military operations must become part of that plan. 
Consider, for instance, the secondary effects of a humanitarian relief operation. As part of 
the Global War on Terrorism, such an operation well executed serves the campaign 
plan.”97 Even suicide attacks are explained, not as Arab or Muslim cultural defects—
which was common in the U.S. at the time, but as strategic aims of insurgencies, 
including al Qaeda, which increased with anti-occupation resentments. The author argues 
that closer engagement with the people could defuse the underlying conditions that give 
rise to such strategies.
98
  
A British officer, in a frank and rather controversial article, observed the effects 
of U.S. military culture and made an explicit criticism: “It was apparent that many 
considered that the only effective, and morally acceptable, C.O.I.N. strategy was to kill or 
capture all terrorists and insurgents; they saw military destruction of the enemy as a 
strategic goal in its own right.”99 Others attempted to show what went wrong in past 
operations to demonstrate the strategic utility of ethical behavior and to counter the 
tendency to rely on excessive force and permissive ROE. Brian Mcallister Linn drew 
lessons from the Philippines counterinsurgency about the “necessity of having officers of 
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character, initiative, and humanity in counterinsurgency operations.“100 Another author 
discussed how important maintaining or repairing perceptions of moral character were in 
British counterinsurgencies and yet another in the French Algerian War. Montgomery 
McFate, an anthropologist working for the DoD, argued that as soon as coalition forces 
toppled Saddam Hussein, they became de facto players in the Iraqi social system.”101 She 
encouraged cultural knowledge, both in terms of understanding Arab culture and on 
reflecting on the military’s own strategic character and how that affects outcomes: “the 
American solution to the conflict [in Vietnam] was the use of overwhelming force in the 
form of strategic bombing and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, neither of which 
resulted in victory.
102
 
C.O.I.N. Revision 
By the time David Petraeus was installed as the head of the Combined Arms 
Center in November 2005, the raw mass of intellectual ideas that formed the foundation 
of C.O.I.N. had been circulating throughout the organization. Petraeus almost 
immediately announced that there would be a revision, and the process sped forward, 
making extensive use of some of the articles already published in Military Review. He 
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employed John Nagl as editor and Conrad Crane, the military historian, as primary 
author.  
The Human Rights Conferences at the Carr Center had, in the meantime, been 
ongoing, and the mood had shifted within the meetings as well. The November 2005 
meeting was attended by Petraeus, Crane, Susan Rice, and about 85 others. Participants 
looked back at historical counterinsurgencies, seeking to learn lessons, and most agreed 
that giving up on the idea of force used in a conventional way was a necessity. When 
discussing how some states employed brutal methods against populations even within 
counterinsurgencies, most agreed that this was no longer possible for “Western nations 
prosecuting counterinsurgency campaigns as they would be viewed as collective 
punishments that deny fundamental human rights to innocent populations.”103 Indeed, 
“conference participants were generally critical of what they called ‘terrorism to fight 
terrorism’ employed by the French in Algeria.”104 Not only were they critical in ethical 
terms, but they spoke of past brutality as counterproductive: “in Vietnam, too, 
indiscriminate force was counterproductive and undermined overall political 
objectives.”105  
The general feeling at this time was that political considerations required an 
ethical stance and that this had to trump military considerations, and not vice versa. 
                                                          
103
 Sarah Sewall, "Counterinsurgnecy in Iraq: Implications of Irregular Warfare for the U.S. Government," 
(John F. Kennedy School of Government: Harvard University, 2005), 3. 
104
 Ibid., 4. 
105
 Ibid. 
180 
 
 
While some questioned the possibility that an insurgency could be eliminated without 
dirty tactics, another claimed that such assertions being “floated around: were 
“garbage.”106 As a consensus emerged about the limited utility of force in such situations, 
the discussion turned to more technical aspects of putting counterinsurgency into 
practice: how institutions were to be built, what was needed from the U.S. government, 
and what difficulties lay ahead.  
The relationships built between the human rights community and the military was 
consummated with the C.O.I.N. revision conference in February 2006, when Crane and 
Petraeus included the Human Rights Policy group as part of the 150 total academics, 
journalists, CIA and State Department members that were invited to provide criticism and 
feedback.  Tyler Mozelle, of the Carr Center, says in an interview, “this work was a 
major milestone in American history and throughout the world of military policy because 
we were able to broaden the aperture of thinking about US national security to include a 
more humane approach to thinking about war, civilian casualties, and the ethical 
dimensions of US foreign policy.”107     
The C.O.I.N. manual (FM3-24) was published a year later in December 2006, and 
it was downloaded more than a million times. Sarah Sewall, of the Carr Center, wrote the 
introduction for the University of Chicago Press version published shortly thereafter, and 
she calls it “radical” in the way it challenges the “American way of war.” Sewall notes 
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that the manual’s purpose transcends the immediate need to find a workable strategy and 
claims that its direction “raises some fundamental questions about the legitimacy, 
purposes, and limits of U.S. power.”108   
The manual is directed toward practitioners, but its engagement in a redefinition 
of interests and identity is clear: protecting the population is the new center of gravity, 
and given the strength of the moral, human rights dimensions of civilian immunity, and 
their instrumental connection to the justification of the war, this was the only possible 
choice that allowed the U.S. to salvage its identity, other than walking away from the 
fight. The War of Ideas and the war on the ground needed to be consistent; indeed, 
Petraeus describes the shift in Iraq as a “surge of ideas.”109 Concerned about whether the 
soldiers would embrace the ethical stance deemed necessary, he urged them to accept one 
of the key tenets of the manual, which is to “live our values.”110  He states: 
Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that will be won or lost in 
the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and 
our forces has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a 
narrative that works, and continually drive the themes home through all 
forms of media….Live our values. Do not hesitate to kill or capture the 
enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. Living our values 
distinguishes us from our enemies.
111
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In sum, I find strong support for my central hypothesis that civilian-centered 
norms helped to shape the civilian-centric population protection doctrine known as 
C.O.I.N..  Attitudes toward civilian casualties show movement ranging from early 
sovereignty-based attitudes about military necessity and proportionality (collateral 
damage as inevitable), even overtly abusive attitudes, toward an increasing emphasis on 
distinction over time; this movement is relative to the political pressure resulting from the 
civilian casualties that drew press attention. The result was a period of self-reflection in 
which the U.S. foreign policy goal of instituting a democratic state friendly to the U.S. 
and unfriendly to terrorist ideology was seen to be endangered. As it became clear that a 
new doctrine was needed, members of the military and human rights experts, in 
interaction, decided that this doctrinal change needed to be based on the moral or at least 
ethical actions of the U.S. military regarding the treatment of civilians. My interviews 
confirm this, with one recently trained cadet stating that they are now taught to be 
extremely careful of civilian casualties because “we are the human instrument of U.S. 
foreign policy, and everything we do reflects on the whole nation.” Compare this to some 
of the stories told to me by enlistees—that he was never told what the Geneva 
Conventions were, or that civilians were looked at as enemies. Emma Sky, adviser to 
Petraeus and Odierno in Iraq, remarked that "the biggest mindset change was for the U.S. 
to look at Iraqis as not the enemy, but to look at the Iraqis as people who needed 
protecting.”112   
                                                          
112
 Quoted in Peter Bergen, "How Petraeus Changed the U.S. Military," CNN.com, (November 11, 2012). 
183 
 
 
Further, it was recognition of the strength and salience of the norms protecting 
civilians that drove concern for the presence of media rather than the other way around; 
this is clear from the lack of concern about abuses before they hit the media. Media is an 
empty vessel, but the strategic narrative that is woven from available norms can either 
legitimize or delegitimize the actions of actors.  Since the legitimacy gap was eventually 
seen to fuel the insurgency, both global and local, the legitimacy gap created a crucial 
juncture which required at some point either changing the U.S.‘s purported values—in 
this case abandoning or at least downplaying identification with human rights and civilian 
immunity, or changing behavior and thus the definition of what it means to “win.” My 
argument is that the military took on the political burden handed it by Bush, and 
attempted to change its behavior. 
Furthermore, documenting the increasing interaction between human rights 
organizations and the U.S. military reveals the diffusion of human rights norms, 
beginning with the instrumental use of the CIN, to argumentation about civilian 
casualties, to efforts to persuade members of the strategic value of abiding by a more 
human rights-orientation toward civilians. Finally, I find support for the three conditions 
under which this transformation in strategy occurs: the questionable legitimacy of the 
initial invasion, the need to delegitimize terror, and the recognition of a loss of a 
monopoly of force.  
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2001: Baseline Attitudes about Civilian Immunity 
This story begins in the period leading up to the war in Iraq, when the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT) had just begun, but before the military’s views on civilian casualties 
had been impacted to a great extent by either the Iraq or the Afghanistan experience. As 
argued in a previous chapter, civilian immunity has been an increasingly salient aspect of 
the normative international political order, and some members of the military had already 
started to recognize that civilian casualties were a political liability (though not yet a 
military one).  In response to U.S. involvement in conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and then 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the military and a group of human rights scholars from Harvard 
began building professional relationships in 2000 with a series of conferences and 
workshops entitled, the Project on the Means of Intervention.  The program was 
organized by the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, under the auspices of the Human 
Rights and National Security program. The goal of the early conferences was to 
encourage dialogue among academics, human rights experts, NGOs, members of the 
media, and high level military personnel.
 1
  
The 2001 workshop provides a good baseline snapshot of the attitudes of U.S. 
military personnel about issues pertaining to civilian casualties, media, and military 
practices. In order to begin to find “common ground,” panels were held, conference 
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papers presented, and keynote speakers of the highest level were brought in—in this 
instance General Wesley Clark, commander of the mission in Kosovo. The director of the 
Carr Center at that time was Sarah Sewall, who would emerge as one of the key human 
rights experts to contribute to the revision process of the C.O.I.N. manual in 2006. Sewall 
was present throughout this process and forged professional ties with Conrad Crane, one 
of the primary authors of C.O.I.N., who would also participate, as did, eventually, David 
Petraeus, John Nagl, and others who comprised much of the inner circle of what would 
become known as the counterinsurgency “community of innovators.”  
The attitudes expressed in this early conference roughly approximate what I 
described in chapter two as the two major  tendencies within the civilian immunity norm: 
sovereignty and human rights, itself a reflection of the two competing currents in the 
international order. Sovereignty in this sense refers to the interpretation of civilian 
immunity as a negative constraint on the sovereign war-making function of the state, and 
the human rights interpretation emphasizes the positive, rights-protecting responsibility 
of the liberal state toward civilians.
2
  The problem that necessitated the creation of 
dialogue between the human rights community and the military was the difference in 
perceptions, expectations, and assessments about civilian casualties among the different 
parties. Military personnel expressed some frustration with negative press coverage, and 
emphasized the previous decade’s impressive achievements in minimizing civilian 
casualties.  They presented concern for civilian casualties as an historical, evolutionary 
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process far removed from the enormous casualties of World War 2. In contrast, non-
military participants expressed continuing criticism about the way force was used; human 
rights workers were concerned about the “risk aversion” of U.S. personnel, pointing out 
that both Serbian and Kosovar civilians suffered a great deal as a result of the strategic 
choice of relentless air strikes, for example.  
  The conference began with an exploration of the most basic questions, including 
what the relationship was between international humanitarian law and war. The answer 
given by one military official provides a good summary of prevailing attitudes of the 
time, which saw military effectiveness and civilian casualties in direct opposition.  As the 
quote below also shows, the priority of force protection was, at this point, assumed by 
those speaking from a military perspective, confirming a deeply ingrained, organizational 
cultural perspective about risk aversion:  
As a starting point, it is fundamentally correct to say military operations 
and humanitarian concerns are at odds. Military operations are about 
destruction, and are often chaotic and confused. Humanitarian concerns 
are about minimizing this destruction. But this doesn’t tell us much. The 
real question is to what extent can military operations be carried out with 
minimum casualties without damaging effectiveness and accepting 
significantly higher casualties of friendly forces.
3
 
The starting assumptions about the role of ethics in the two communities were 
fairly far apart. Military participants’ thinking about civilian immunity at this time 
reflected a primarily technical outlook, and the scope of discussion was largely limited to 
choice of weaponry, targeting practices, and collateral damage modeling. Human rights 
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experts, however, saw humanitarian norms endangered by the reluctance to commit 
ground troops, which sparked a debate as to whether the trend in increased reliance on air 
power was good or bad for civilians.  
They also worriedly pointed out the expansive potential of “military necessity,” 
the civilian immunity norm’s ambiguous limiting principle. One such example brought 
up in discussions was the bombing of the television station in Belgrade, which human 
rights experts saw as illegal since it aimed to sever the link between the people and the 
government. Consistent with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of the time, however, some 
participants held more expansive, sovereignty-oriented views of military necessity, 
arguing that “media outlets provide effective mobilizing tools for the perpetration of 
violence and thus are legitimate targets.”4  Similar debates occurred about the bombing of 
electrical grids, which produce great civilian suffering but which was defended by some 
military participants as necessary to “provide military advantage by injecting friction into 
the system and temporarily disabling the enemy.”5 This difference in perspective also 
manifested in discussions about whether the concept of military necessity can be 
coherently applied to coercive strategies.
6
 
 Overall, many were conflicted about the role of international humanitarian law 
against a legitimizing backdrop of humanitarian intervention. (It should be noted that 
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though the GWOT had just begun, counterinsurgency in these discussions was not yet on 
the radar. The public discourse about civilian casualties, the use of force, and civilian 
immunity had not yet extended its reach to include issues of ground wars.) Still others 
brought up the difference between legal and moral standards for military behavior and 
suggested that “while international humanitarian law certainly places constraints upon the 
use of force, many thought that popular conceptions of “morality” had a far more 
powerful impact.”7  The report shows evidence of a nascent debate about whether more 
restrictive moral expectations put the U.S. at a disadvantage. (This debate would arise in 
relation to Iraq only later). One comment suggested a quite suspicious view of the norm 
of civilian immunity as a possible a weapon to constrain U.S. power: “New international 
humanitarian law is emerging, and if allowed to progress, law will become the most 
potent weapon deployed against the United States.” Some noted the seeming irrelevance 
of the norm in practice since “the distinction between civilian and non-civilian has 
become blurred due to the nature of modern warfare and the environments in which 
modern wars are fought,” especially urban environments.8  
Some military participants countered that a slew of lawyers were already involved 
in targeting decisions and that consideration for IHL (or LOAC, the preferred military 
usage) had become internalized into military decision-making.
9
 The debate was widened 
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when one participant remarked that “it is a mistake for military planners to view 
humanitarian concerns as impediments to success in war. Wars are fought for political 
reasons, and ignoring humanitarian concerns runs the risk of winning the battle and 
losing the war.” The beginnings of the recognition of the need for legitimacy in 
humanitarian intervention surfaced because “the domestic public and international 
community, justifiably or not, holds Western militaries to a higher standard when they 
intervene for ostensibly humanitarian reasons.” Some acknowledged the more cautious 
targeting practices that might require, but “it was suggested that the U.S. could “afford” 
such caution only in limited circumstances. Still another “queried whether it would be 
either militarily prudent or politically necessary to apply these constraints to the war on 
terrorism.”10  Common ground was found, however, as military officials and human 
rights experts agreed that the U.S. public needed to be encouraged to have more realistic 
expectations about the humanitarian implications for the use of force.   
To sum,  analysis of the earliest conference report available (held in November 
2001) shows the  beginnings of a debate informed by concerns about legitimacy, 
especially the link between the reasons for using force to the moral issues about how 
force is applied. Some “asserted that many participants sought to distinguish between 
morally acceptable and legally justifiable actions, suggesting that there are tensions 
between them.” This conference also shows a baseline understanding of an oppositional 
relationship between humanitarian concerns about civilian casualties and military 
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effectiveness. The comments and concerns of military personnel demonstrate a certain 
level of internalization of the civilian immunity norm, though this attitude is inconsistent 
across participants and narrow in scope in the sense that it applies mostly to airpower. 
Interestingly, we see the first hints that some would assume a lesser degree of political 
pressure to incur risk to protect civilians in the GWOT than humanitarian intervention 
required.  Both groups wanted to better manage public expectations about the 
humanitarian consequences of employing force, however, though none at this point saw 
foreign publics as a concern; rather, the American public was the audience to which they 
were referring. Finally, military personnel and human rights experts both expressed an 
interest in “the NGO world saying ‘this is what we’d like to see,’ and the military saying 
‘this is the best we can do,’ and trying to narrow this gap.”11  These initial interactions 
mark a period  of “strategic bargaining” in the sense that it is seen as necessary to talk to 
the human rights community, but for many the attitude appears skeptical, mostly to 
defend the military’s actions. 
Origins of the Legitimacy Gap: the Instrumental Use of Civilian-Centered Norms 
If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means — 
sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And if war is forced upon us, 
we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military — 
and we will prevail.
12
 
                                                          
11
 Ibid., 11. 
12
 George W. Bush, "Text of President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address," The Washington Post 
2003. 
144 
 
 
While those participating in the human rights policy conferences recognized the 
competition between the two very different goals of human rights and military action, the 
tensions between “just means” and “full force” was apparently lost on the George W. 
Bush administration. From the beginning of the GWOT, President George W. Bush 
engaged in a strategy of legitimation for his war policies by invoking moral concepts 
deriving from Just War. His rhetoric invokes the  jus ad bellum to justify the use of force 
in Iraq, and he employs the language of just means (jus in bello) in order to legitimize the 
U.S. identity as one that can be trusted to act ethically with that power, which works 
simultaneously to deny legitimacy to its enemies, both state and non-state.  
The War of Ideas and its Reliance on Just War Concepts 
The War of Ideas is a real component in the GWOT broadly and in the Wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan more narrowly, yet because words are used to sell action, this is 
often overlooked as mere rhetoric. The point of the War of Ideas is to deny support for 
extremist ideological movements hostile to the United States. In the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 (NSS 2002),
13
 Bush spells out the War of Ideas for the first time, and he 
explicitly states that the legitimacy factor is a central concern:  
We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international 
terrorism. This includes using the full influence of the United States, and 
working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of 
terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light 
as slavery, piracy, or genocide.
14
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Besides starving terrorism of legitimacy, the War of Ideas would also include the 
following three goals: 
 Denying “fertile ground” for extremist Islamist ideology by 
promoting Muslim moderates.  
 Addressing “underlying conditions” with the help of the 
international community  
 Use public diplomacy to counter extremist rule and to promote 
identification with American ideological concepts such as 
freedom.15  
The efforts to delegitimize terrorism were, of course, well under way by the time 
this document was published. Bush employed a familiar tool which is itself the 
supporting language of civilian immunity and just war, but which has also historically 
been used to violate the spirit of distinction between combatant and noncombatant: 
civilization versus barbarism/savagery: “this is civilization’s fight;” “the civilized world 
is with us;” and "we wage a war to save civilization itself."16  
That terrorism poses a universal threat to “civilization” was not terribly 
controversial in the U.S. or elsewhere in the wake of 9/11. As Mendelsohn argues, “Al 
Qaeda poses a challenge to the sovereignty of specific states but it also challenges the 
international society as a whole. This way, the challenge that Al Qaeda represents is 
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putting the survival of the system under risk.”17 Kinsella adds that “what marks President 
Bush and his administration as the right defenders of ‘civilization is their claims to 
protect ‘civilians.’”18 Most agree that to kill civilians for political purposes is wrong and 
should be condemned. Naming terrorists as the “enemy of civilization” labels them not as 
emergent actors who threaten the state monopoly of violence but as illegitimate in their 
very identity. While their actions necessitate war, “who they are” precludes conferring 
any legitimacy on their political claims or grievances precisely because “targeting 
innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong;”19 To be a “terrorist” 
means to be defined by the use of unjust means (killing civilians), which renders 
impossible just cause and puts terrorists beyond the pale as actors—irreconcilable with, 
and so incapable of inclusion within, any moral international order.  
The analysis above is supported by the congressional testimony of Douglas 
Feith,
20
 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the time, who was also in charge of the 
initial civilian reconstruction effort during the Iraq War. Feith helped to shape the Bush 
stance toward the Geneva Conventions, and he explains that Donald Rumsfeld 
summoned him and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers to 
                                                          
17
 Barak Mendelsohn, "Sovereignty under attack: the international society meets the Al Qaeda network," 
Review of International Studies 31, no. 01 (2005): 45. 
18
 Kinsella, "Discourses of Difference,” 163. 
19
 George W Bush, Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military 
Academy West Point, New York [Speech] (The White House, June 1, 2002), accessed March 2, 2012, 
available online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html., p. 2. 
20
 "Statement by Douglas J. Feith before the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Subcommittee 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary,"  ( July 15, 2008). 
147 
 
 
provide a memo about the Geneva Conventions with “talking points” for a National 
Security Council meeting in February 2002, during the period the Bush Doctrine was still 
being formulated. Though the issue was at this time centered on torture and POW status, 
Feith explains that the “memo represented the thinking of the top civilian and military 
leadership of the Defense Department,”21 whose stance was that the U.S. “had a 
compelling interest in showing respect for Geneva.” It was considered important because 
“Geneva is crucial for our own armed forces” in order to be treated as the law prescribes 
in case of capture, and it was “an essential component of military culture.”  Moreover, 
Feith adds, it is “’morally important, crucial to US morale’ and it is also ‘practically 
important, for it makes US forces the gold standard in the world, facilitating our winning 
cooperation from other countries.’”22  Finally, Feith adds, the Geneva Conventions—and 
here he specifically refers to the core content of the civilian immunity norm—are crucial 
in the war on terror: 
[our] position is dictated by the logic of our stand against terrorism. I argued: 
 The essence of the Convention is the distinction between soldiers 
and civilians (i.e., between combatants and non-combatants). 
 Terrorists are reprehensible precisely because they negate that 
distinction by purposefully targeting civilians.
23
 
The war on terror became controversial as the universalism of the “human rights 
interests” of civilization morphed into the sovereignty-based power interests of the 
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United States, despite the belief that values and interests had fused. This was evident 
when Bush employed the language of just war and terrorism for the purposes of 
legitimizing the use of force against other states: in this case, Iraq. As part of his broader 
foreign policy program known as the Bush Doctrine, the rhetoric Bush crafted at this 
early point was directed toward mobilizing the domestic audience by “branding” the war 
in Iraq as a secondary but crucial front in the GWOT. As others have pointed out, 
however, the nature of global media today makes it nearly impossible to target only one 
audience since “the media invites domestic and international responses, publicizing the 
debate.”24  
The NSS 2002 aims to ensure an order whereby all nations would “protect basic 
human rights”25 by furthering the sovereign power interests of the U.S.: “The U.S. 
national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that 
reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”26 This document, while 
building on the brief surplus of legitimacy afforded the U.S. in fighting Al Qaeda, made 
instrumental use of Just War concepts (civilian immunity , human rights, and democracy 
more broadly) to legitimate the expansion of its own power across the globe. Most 
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famously, Bush turned the Just War concept of preemption into prevention,
27
 a move 
which served to undermine the stability of the international normative order and reaffirm 
European publics’ initial assessment of Bush as “mak[ing] decisions based entirely on 
U.S. interests.”28  As Hurd argues, his instrumental use and distortion of this norm was 
damaging on many fronts:  
The American challenge to the customary law on preemption threatens to 
delegitimize both the existing norms and the social basis of US power, 
while also attempting to legitimize American interests and new 
understandings of the norms. It therefore shows the productive and 
destructive aspects of the power of legitimation in world politics. 
Legitimation is the link between states and the normative structures of 
international society.
29
 
Defining rogue states as illegitimate based on their anti-human rights, “terrorist” 
ideology, they too are denied any just cause because their identity precludes the 
possibility: “we make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor 
or provide aid to them.”30 In attempting to blur the line between the identities of state and 
non-state actor by conflating illegitimate violence against foreign civilians (terrorism) 
with illegitimate violence within a state  (human rights violations), Bush serves to 
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strengthen the normative power of both human rights and civilian immunity, and more 
specifically, reinforces a civilian-centered human rights ethic.  
By employing international society’s morally constraining norms in an identity 
contest with both terrorists and rogue states, however, Bush reinforces expectations that 
the United States be held to a higher standard in war, undermining the legitimacy of the 
traditional bias states have maintained toward an expansive, sovereignty-based definition 
of military necessity.  Couching the build-up to the Iraq War in the rhetoric of Just War 
and undermining its long historical struggle to separate jus ad bellum from jus in bello (as 
explained in chapter 2) by fusing unjust cause with unjust means, Bush’s garbled 
communication strategies enact three unintended consequences: 1.) he creates moral 
confusion about who the enemy is and what type of treatment they are entitled to. This is 
true of the U.S. public and many of the soldiers at the lower levels, as confirmed by my 
interviews.
31
 2.) he invites judgment of his own war according to those same criteria, and  
3.) he undermines  both the physical wars and the wars of ideas by placing them at odds.   
By instrumentally using norms meant to limit war-making power for the purposes 
of expansion of power, Bush drew unprecedented attention to the contradictions between 
the American values of rule of law, democracy, and the protection of human rights and 
American aspirations for global hegemony.  As Ikenberry explains, people feared that 
Bush had abandoned the post WW2 social compact that allowed U.S. power to exist 
                                                          
31
 As will be shown in the next section, many at the lower levels expressed that many soldiers had the 
attitude that they were avenging 9/11 in the early years of the Iraq War.  
151 
 
 
relatively unchallenged by the rest of the world because it rested on how actual, ordinary 
people, that is, civilians, experienced American power.
32
 The precarious balance 
previously employed by the U.S. through strategic restraint had rested on the 
“institutionalization of hegemonic strategy, [which] serves the interest of the United 
States by making its power more legitimate, expansive, and durable.  The price is that 
some restraints are indeed placed on the exercise of power.”33 As Ikenberry suggests, in 
rejecting the restraints on its own power, the U.S. emphasized its “imperial face” over its 
“liberal face,” which intensified insecurity and inflamed public opinion in many states 
across the world.
34
 Anti-Americanism, which the War of Ideas was meant to remedy, 
instead was fanned in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq.  
This worsened as two of the three legs of the stool constructed by the 
administration to justify its invasion disintegrated (Saddam Hussein’s alleged cooperation 
with terrorists and his program of WMDs). This left only one leg, humanitarian 
intervention, which meant that the legitimacy of U.S. military action in Iraq rested 
precariously on the promise that the good of removing the previous regime would 
outweigh the violation of Iraq’s state sovereignty, not to mention the destruction and 
misery wreaked on its people.  As damage to the U.S. reputation began to accrue in the 
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larger international community,
35
 a legitimacy gap began to expand between the values 
and identity promoted in the War of Ideas and the material reality of the physical wars.  
With a unilaterally conceived and implemented foreign policy goal lacking international 
support, particularly amongst foreign publics,
36
 the stated goal in Iraq became the 
creation of a stable, democratic state that respects human rights and that would become 
an ally in the war on terror.
37
 Hearkening back to the previous social compact of strategic 
restraint, the material goals of the war were now firmly embedded within normative 
claims about making life better for ordinary people through freedom, prosperity, and 
human dignity.  
The criteria by which to judge U.S. power and thus U.S. identity was promoted  
by the U.S. itself through its attempt to establish its place within international society as a 
global hegemon that was fierce to its enemies but protective of its friends. In using the 
rhetoric of restraint and principle but appealing to the desire for destruction and revenge, 
Bush set an emotionally powerful tone for the nation, including some in the military. As 
my interviews with military personnel have revealed, Iraqi civilians came to be seen as 
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the enemy by many in the early days of the war. As a result, the latent tensions regarding 
the moral dimensions of the civilian immunity norm that existed pre-Iraq, between the 
humanitarian justification for force versus the suffering it causes for innocent civilians, 
would be amplified ten-fold.  
What the U.S. civilian leadership did not yet understand, but what some in the 
U.S. military would learn fairly quickly, is that the narrative (the actual story that 
interprets and guides the  ideas and perceptions of people about events) and the 
legitimacy it confers or destroys, was not an ancillary rhetorical issue; rather, the War of  
Ideas impacted directly on the material success or failure of a war waged on behalf of 
democratic values and human rights, by a powerful Western democracy,  against non-
state actors in a state it was responsible for “breaking.”38  What was just as important was 
that, as in any war, the enemy was watching, listening, and behaving in a strategic 
manner as well. Moreover, the enemies were multiple, and Al Qaeda, who had been 
working out its own narrative of morality and legality about killing civilians, provided an 
alternative narrative about the justness of killing civilians, aiming at the Achilles heel of 
American legitimacy: its limited ability to see the gap between its own words and its 
deeds. At the same time Bush was formulating his use of norms, al Qaeda’s official 
spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, posted the following on al Qaeda’s web site in June 
                                                          
38
 This term refers to Colin Powell’s oft-quoted admonition to President Bush that in Iraq, “you break it, 
you own it.” Explained in David Samuels, "A conversation with Colin Powell," The Atlantic, March 2011 
2007. 
154 
 
 
2002. Using the same language of WMDs that Bush was using, he wrote a justification 
for killing Americans based on American behavior toward Muslim civilians:  
Due to the American bombings and siege of Iraq, more than 1,200,000 
Muslims were killed in the past decade…The Americans have still not 
tasted from our hands what we have tasted from theirs. The [number of] 
killed in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are but a tiny part of 
the exchange for those killed in Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines, 
Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. We have not reached parity 
with them. We have the right to kill four million Americans – two million 
of them children – and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple 
hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with 
chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal 
maladies that have afflicted the Muslims because of [Americans’] 
chemical and biological weapons. America knows only the language of 
force. America is kept at bay by blood alone.
39
 
Iraq: Post Invasion 2003-4 
The U.S. enjoyed its brief, shining moment in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of 
the invasion, which was militarily successful by most accounts in the sense that it 
achieved its goal of defeating and removing the previous regime.  Cheers for the 
liberators soon gave way to chaos, however, as it became apparent that there was a lack 
of any real post-invasion plan or even capability for state-building. Thomas Ricks 
documents the “fiasco” of those years when many ordinary Iraqis turned from optimism 
to suspicion: a failure to police the unruly mobs who destroyed Iraqi cultural heritage; a 
lack of civilian capacity to assist the military in building infrastructure and institutions; 
de-Baathification and the dissolution of the Iraqi military by L. Paul Bremer produced 
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angry, unemployed, and well -armed Sunnis who began resisting what they correctly 
predicted would be a Shia-majority dominated government.
40
   
What is less acknowledged by most accounts of the invasion and early post-
invasion period is that the lack of planning included an absence of clear, unified 
expectations and training on how to treat civilians. While the air strikes in the “shock and 
awe” campaign employed precise weaponry and careful collateral damage planning, they 
also used cluster munitions in residential areas.
41
  Civilian immunity considerations were 
institutionalized in air strike targeting procedures, but how ground troops behaved toward 
civilians fell to the ethical leadership exhibited (or not) by  individual leaders. Though 
some units were expected to (and did) exercise ethical judgment in distinguishing 
between combatant and civilian, others describe a  free-for- all environment in which, as 
one soldier put it, the rules of engagement were to “kill anything that moves.”42 Others 
described the mood as vengeful and dark after 9/11, and all agreed that force protection 
was an absolute, unquestioned priority: “better to send a bullet than a soldier” was 
mentioned as a common slogan of the time.   
Despite the words of President Bush, who characterized the invasion as "one of 
the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history,"
43
 the reality of the war on 
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the ground was experienced differently by many of those in uniform and the civilians 
with whom they interacted. Bush, in an address to the nation (which was of course 
transmitted throughout the world by global media), said “the people you liberate will 
witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military. In this conflict, 
America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality.” 
After condemning Saddam Hussein on the grounds of his violations of human rights, 
Bush adds, “I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make 
every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.”44 In the meantime, the military was 
not, as General Tommy Franks put it, “in the business of doing body counts,”45 but an 
initial damage assessment by Human Rights Watch estimated that the invasion killed 
thousands.
46
   
In the face of the grave material disaster forming on the ground, the lack of basic 
needs being met and the massive disruption to an already severely damaged society and 
economy, the War of Ideas faded into the background. Neither the State Department nor 
the DoD thought much about what would be required to implement it or even how it 
would relate to the war on the ground. While the military had always engaged in 
psychological operations, the goal of manipulating perceptions was negative: to support 
the use of destructive force and defeating the enemy. The last U.S. experience with a war 
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of ideas meant to promote positive U.S. values, identity, and power occurred during the 
Cold War, when the state department ran a fairly vibrant public diplomacy effort. As was 
the case with many of the other traditionally civilian responsibilities, this capability did 
not exist early in the war. Perhaps more importantly, it was only gradually becoming 
apparent that what happened on the battlefields and in the neighborhoods of Iraq had any 
bearing on the larger ideological war of perceptions relating to the GWOT.  As President 
Bush had explained, the War of ideas was meant to address and remedy the fertile ground 
for terrorism and anti-American feeling, yet those very enabling conditions were taking 
root in Iraq.   
In the meantime, the Project for the Means of Intervention continued to hold 
conferences and meetings continued between a core of approximately 60 “veteran 
participants” along with a diverse crowd described as consisting of “intergenerational, 
international, senior to junior; analytic and operational, [and] “unusual” suspects.” Some 
could be considered “norms entrepreneurs,” and others were not. As events in Iraq heated 
up, the meetings became “informal, off-the-record, and intensive.” The causes of civilian 
suffering and how to reduce it was the main topic of discussion, and assumptions and 
perspectives of human rights experts and the military were far off. Issues were raised 
about the utility and difficulty of keeping track of civilian casualties, along with 
discussions about what was and was not within the control of the U.S. government. It was 
noted that while the location, capabilities, and intentions of the adversary were not in 
control of the U.S., the “rules of engagement (ROE), quality of intelligence, and strategy” 
158 
 
 
were. No consensus, or even emphasis at this time suggested that both sides had decided 
that civilian suffering was itself a strategic consideration, though it was assumed that the 
issue was a matter that impacted the “Western ‘center of gravity’ in the sense of affecting 
“local political and military allies, coalition partners, domestic political support, and 
international legitimacy.”47  
By 2003, the outcomes of the conferences showed an acknowledgement of the 
salience of civilian casualties, and despite the tensions between a military that tended 
toward the presumption that progress toward civilian suffering was already as good as it 
gets, the results of the conference highlighted the need to  
 ‘increase communication among military, political leadership, 
human rights groups, and broader public’ about CD issues 
 Develop greater understanding of how conduct of U.S. military 
operations and other factors affect civilians during war 
 Help make U.S. use of force as consistent as possible with 
humanitarian principles 
 Make U.S. use of force more effective48 
Back inside the military, it became clear to many that an insurgency was brewing 
from the beginning, but that fact did not compel a unified doctrinal response.
49
 Rather, in 
the absence of a clear doctrine to address such a contingency, early attempts at building 
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infrastructure, providing basic services, and working to restore order and stability took 
place within the context of a disintegrating relationship between soldiers and civilians.  
Anti-occupation sentiment grew in key areas, and as soldiers experienced the terror tactic 
of road-side IEDs, suspicion and tension built between the populace and the military. 
Checkpoint incidences of killing civilians increased, and soldiers kept their physical 
distance from the people, which exacerbated an already shaky foundation undermined by 
poor communication, cultural distance, and the sense of soldiers as outsiders. The initial 
euphoria about U.S. liberation that was touted (and by most accounts generally believed) 
by the administration, was soon clearly being experienced as occupation by many 
Iraqis.
50
 Promises of prosperity and freedom instead gave way to destitution, insecurity, 
and growing chaos.   
U.S. forces were trained for conventional war, in which destroying the enemy is 
the goal, and civilians in many cases became indistinguishable from insurgents, both in 
their physical appearance, but also, some interviewees suggest, in the minds of some of 
the soldiers. One remarked: “we began to look at them as the enemy.” Lacking in training 
and preparation for such a development, many confirmed a widespread mood of avenging 
9/11. Other interviewees suggested that most events involving civilian casualties and 
abuse were never brought to light by the media: “there are lots of things you’ve never 
heard about on the news.” This is likely due to the practice of controlling the media by 
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embedding reporters; one interviewee mentioned a specific incident in which a soldier 
went on a rampage against civilians in the Iraqi town of Hit after losing several of his 
buddies to an IED attack. According to this account, the soldier was prosecuted, but this 
was not a big media hit, at least in the U.S.  Two events that did attract global media 
attention, however, were seen by most of the interviewees as tarnishing the reputation of 
the military in a significant way,
51
 contributing to the spread of an already growing 
insurgency, and represented a tipping point in the early stages of the war. These two 
events both centered on perceptions of the unethical treatment of Iraqi civilians by 
American soldiers: the scandal at Abu Ghraib and the first battle of Fallujah in April of 
2004.   
The scandal at Abu Ghraib resulted from the brutal, degrading, sometimes deadly 
treatment of detainees that was captured in film clips, photographs, journals, stories, and 
official reports by the ICRC and Human Rights Watch.
  52
 The investigation began within 
the military, but traditional media brought it to life—a special on 6o Minutes and then an 
article by the famed journalist Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker.
53
 Photographs were 
leaked and disseminated across the globe via the internet, and the world was shocked by 
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the depraved, sadistic images of torture and sexual degradation against the prisoners.
54
 
Further, it was mentioned that the released photos were relatively tame compared to the 
still unreleased photos of rape, torture, beatings, intimidation, and death. Hersh notes that 
military officials described American soldiers ‘severely beating an Iraqi prisoner nearly 
to death, having sex with a female Iraqi prisoner, and ‘acting inappropriately with a dead 
body.’ The officials said there also was a videotape, apparently shot by U.S. personnel, 
showing Iraqi guards raping young boys.”55   
Military officers describe this exposure as devastating to the war cause, but 
interestingly, several sources note that the Iraqi reaction was not the main concern, since 
this was not surprising to many of them—this was a surprise to those outside of Iraq. 
Despite the public stance of the civilian administration that this was the result of a few 
bad apples, one interviewee said that the abusive attitudes in Abu Ghraib reflected a 
wider attitude toward civilians. He described his own reaction to the outing of Abu 
Ghraib as consistent with the general reaction of those around him: “Well, we’d been 
caught is what I thought when I first heard” he said.  When asked if it was the global 
public or the Iraqi public he was concerned about, he indicated it was the perceptions of 
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the American audience they most feared: “we were afraid they’d find out we were acting 
like animals.”56    
The response of public officials at the time indicated grave concern that the 
damage to the U.S. image undermines the war in a way that transcends domestic support. 
TIME magazine published the following: 
Senator Joe Biden, ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee 
and a supporter of the decision to invade Iraq, characterized the 
revelations of abuse as the single most significant blow to U.S. prestige in 
the Arab world over the past decade. Anthony Cordesman, the widely 
respected defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies was equally forthright: "Those Americans who mistreated the 
prisoners may not have realized it, but they acted in the direct interests of 
al-Qaeda, the insurgents, and the enemies of the U.S.," he said. The reason 
is that they came at a point when U.S. standing in the Arab world was 
already at an all-time low. Says Cordesman, "These negative images 
validate all other negative images and interact with them." In other words, 
they function as a multiplier by providing photographic "proof" of the 
demonic picture of the U.S. painted by anti-American propagandists.
57
 
As if Abu Ghraib were not bad enough, in the same month the U.S. became 
embroiled in the single most damaging battle of the war thus far: Fallujah. Fallujah is a 
city in Iraq that was initially friendly to U.S. forces. It eventually became a hotbed of 
insurgency, however, fueled by anti-occupation resentment. An overwhelmingly Sunni 
city, its residents suffered high unemployment from the de-Baathification policies 
undertaken by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA).
58
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A series of incidents occurred that sparked mistrust and anger between the 
soldiers and citizens. First, only a month into the invasion, 700 troops entered the city and 
took over a local school as part of their base. Residents resented the closure of the school, 
and within five days, protests around the school grew more ominous, with evidence of 
rock-throwing by citizens, some children, and claims by soldiers that they were taking 
fire. While other reports confirm sporadic violence against soldiers over time, Human 
Rights Watch did not find credible evidence to support that soldiers were under fire on 
the day in question. The event culminated with soldiers climbing to the roof and opening 
fire on the crowds, resulting in about seventeen civilian deaths.
59
  
As unrest and resistance grew over the next year, troops pulled out of the city, 
and, in keeping with Bush’s policy goal to hand over control to local forces, Iraqi security 
forces attempted to keep control. The situation grew more volatile as insurgents 
massacred police, and as they gained mass support of the city’s residents. Moreover, the 
lack of control in the city allowed it to become inundated with foreign fighters, most 
notably Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
60
 The event that sparked major combat operations was 
when four American Blackwater contractors accidentally took a wrong turn into the city 
and were killed by insurgents. Images of a cheering crowd who then mutilated the 
corpses and hung them from a bridge enraged Americans, including President Bush and 
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CPA head, L. Paul Bremer.
61
 Troops were hurriedly called in, before there was really 
time to “shape” the terrain or empty the city of civilians, and the goal of searching out 
and killing insurgents resulted in an estimated 700-2000 Iraqi deaths (some claim 700 
civilians), and from 38-100 U.S. soldiers. The city was destroyed, and many of the people 
displaced. Several of my interviewees confirmed a “shoot anything that moves” mentality 
and noted that Fallujah is known for what was a common practice in the early days of 
Iraq, which was to count all males of a certain age as insurgents. None of the soldiers I 
spoke with were in the battle and instead relied on the internal accounts and stories 
spread amongst soldiers.  Such a characterization has become almost conventional within 
the military because even some of the newer soldiers have been taught that Fallujah was 
the antithesis of what good counterinsurgency should be. It is also known at this time that 
white phosphorous was used to drive insurgents from houses, and an amateur American 
filmmaker who entered Fallujah right after the battle interviewed residents, (and later 
soldiers), who showed him hateful graffiti left by soldiers on the furniture of a resident: “I 
hate Iraq and all Iraqis.”62   
What is remarkable about the preceding events is not necessarily the brutality of 
war, but the spirit of openness and self-reflection about such incidents that is increasingly 
evident in the military today. The military literature is filled with monographs seeking to 
make sense of such events in the interest of organizational learning. Major Sherry Oehler, 
                                                          
61
 Manning, "Road to Fallujah." 
62
 Ibid. 
165 
 
 
for example, who writes on the unintended consequences of killing civilians,  confirms 
my own assertion that the instrumental use of international norms matters for what 
happens on the ground: she notes that “the Bush administration’s policy on denying 
“unlawful combatants” privileges as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions 
enabled troops freedom of maneuver to accomplish these missions, however, the policy 
contributed to the ambiguity on the ground with regard to the treatment of civilians.”63 
Bush at the time of Fallujah demonstrated little recognition of this, as evidenced by the 
fact that his public comments leading up to Fallujah continued to justify force by 
instrumentally employing the norms-language of democracy, civilian immunity, and 
human rights: “they want to kill innocent life to try to get us to quit,” he said. Bush 
promised that “U.S. troops will use whatever force is needed to quell uprisings in 
Fallujah…and “we will deal with those who want to stop the march to freedom.”64  
Bush’s determination to make an example of Fallujah for killing American 
“civilians” and his stated willingness to use all available means suggest that he was no 
longer concerned with the image of the U.S. military or state as being in line with civilian 
immunity. His attempts to signal resolve are indicative of a sovereignty-oriented reading 
of the CIN wherein military necessity enables more civilian casualties. I suggest that this 
is a tipping point in the war whereby it became very clear that killing civilians entailed 
damage to the U.S. social reputation, and that the importance of the War of Ideas was 
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first connected to success in the physical war. This is so because, despite the tough talk 
about force, the political pressure created by the carnage was immense, and it was 
decisive in stopping the battle despite material definitions of “winning.”65  
Some of the interviewees present in Iraq during the Fallujah period named 
Fallujah as a tipping point: “We looked around, and we’d killed all these people, but now 
what? What were we doing?” This was not lost on many Iraqis. One Iraqi man spoke to 
the American press weeks after Fallujah, and  
he recalls that his growing uneasiness with the US occupation turned into 
something steelier a few weeks ago, when he saw the first images of 
civilian casualties carried from Fallujah on the Arab satellite channels Al 
Jazeera and Al Arabiya. ‘They showed us what they really are.’66  
The military denied that there were many casualties or that ROE were broken, but 
according to an intelligence report leaked to Wikileaks, it was immediately recognized 
that the perception of civilian casualties had damaged the legitimacy of the American 
mission by creating “political pressure” and building on anger already present from Abu 
Ghraib.
67
  
A very influential series of articles published in Military Review, the Army’s 
internal journal, in 2005 demonstrate that the thinking of the leadership was in keeping 
with both the general sentiment expressed by my interviewees and that of the intelligence 
report. Metz writes  
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U. S. forces unilaterally halted combat operations after a few days due to a 
lack of support from the interim Iraqi Government and international 
pressures amid unsubstantiated enemy reports of collateral damage and 
excessive force. Marines won virtually every combat engagement 
throughout the battle and did so within the established rules of 
engagement. The missing element was an overall integrated information 
component to gain widespread support of significant influencers and to 
prepare key populations for the realities of the battle plan. Without such 
advance support, the finest combat plan executed by competent and brave 
Soldiers and Marines proved limited in effectiveness. The insurgent forces 
established links with regional and global media outlets that had agendas 
of their own. The failure to mass effects in the global information sphere 
proved decisive on the battleground in Fallujah.
68
  
Metz, who works in information operations, highlights that perceptions are 
directly relevant to the larger war on terror, which now had direct links to the battlefields 
of Iraq. He cites Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was writing to al- Zarqawi about the War of 
Ideas from the perspective of Al Qaeda and now AQI as well, and that this was based on 
civilian casualties: “. . . I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this 
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a 
race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”69 Metz adds that it is specifically the 
perception “that combat operations are indiscriminate, disproportionate, and in violation 
of the rules of war” that caused the failure of the April 2004 incursion into Fallujah.70 It 
became quite clear after Fallujah that communication was seen as not simply words but 
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as strategic interaction, and that winning the War of Ideas was now seen as directly 
connected to winning the ground war. 
Furthermore, the military began to realize what Bush did not: that the U.S. was 
light years behind the enemy in acknowledging this basic fact: “[Our] units are facing an 
adaptive, relentless, and technologically savvy foe who recognizes that the global 
information network is his most effective tool for attacking what he perceives to be the 
center of gravity- public opinion, both domestic and international.”71  By early 2006, 
Bush’s own former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, 
Joseph Collins, published an open letter in the Armed Forces Journal warning Bush that 
‘[i] f our strategic communications on Iraq don't improve, the strategy for victory will fail 
and disastrous consequences will follow.’"72 
Transitioning Counterinsurgency: Ideas within the Military 
By 2004, post Fallujah, the insurgency was spreading, and now the multi-
faceted character of it was becoming clear. The Shiite cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr’s faction had also revolted after L. Paul Bremer shut down his 
region’s television station and arrested one of his men. 73   The battle was 
not nearly as damaging as Fallujah because the civilians separated 
themselves from the fighter and literally stood aside. As David Kilcullen 
explains in the Small War Journal Blog, however, refraining from killing 
civilians while going after the enemy is not the end of the road because 
they still have to choose sides: “in that instance [in Sadr City], and a 
couple of others, the local Shia population actually stood to one side and 
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waited for us to secure them, but once they saw we weren't planning to 
stay permanently they were too exposed to support us.”74  
According to a Shiite cleric at the time, Fallujah had for a brief time united Iraq—
against the United States. “What happened in Fallujah made every Iraqi think it could 
happen in their own town, and that united us.”75 The battle in Fallujah however, in 
destroying much of the city, had displaced both insurgents and civilians, which 
destabilized other areas in the North and contributed to later sectarian tensions.
76
  
With Iraq further destabilizing and beginning to fragment, it became clear to 
many in the military that the character of the conflict required a change in approach. 
While information operations were about controlling the narrative and thus perceptions, 
John Nagl, co-author of the final C.O.I.N. manual (FM3-24) attributes the need for a 
change to the Information revolution’s effects not only on the image of the U.S., but on 
the “nature of warfare, especially insurgency.”77 The debate within the military about 
counterinsurgency began to view the actual place of the civilian and ethical treatment 
toward them as a strategic matter. Despite popular conceptions, the foundations for the 
C.O.I.N. manual were being laid months before General Petraeus took over the 
Combined Arms Center and began the famous re-writing of the field manual.  
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As I continue with my case, a caveat is in order: at the highest levels of the 
military, I have not heard my thesis confirmed in public speech, though most lower and 
mid-level military participants in my study
78
 confirmed the idea that civilian casualties 
early in the Iraq conflict were a significant reason for the later change in doctrine toward 
population protection, and many elaborated that the doctrine was needed to get soldiers to 
“change their attitudes toward the Iraqi people and quit seeing them as the enemy.” “We 
had to learn that they’re not all terrorists, that they have a culture of their own, and that 
hurting them hurt the mission.” Nagl’s characterization draws a direct line between 
civilian casualties and material effects on the battlefield, however, when he wrote in the 
Small Wars Journal Blog that  
the key to success in a counterinsurgency environment is not to create 
more insurgents than you capture or kill. A stray tank round that kills a 
family could create dozens of insurgents for a generation. Thus, it is 
essential to use force as carefully and with as much discrimination as is 
possible.
79
 
Nagl also described the need for a change in doctrine as arising because 
counterinsurgency was previously a special forces task. They needed to “reenergize the 
force” as a whole. The “big army, conventional war-fighting army needed to be reminded 
that fighting counterinsurgency” was their job, and the temporary manual that had been 
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hastily put together in October 2004 was about to expire.
80
 What has been left unsaid by 
military leadership is that the history of special forces and CIA running 
counterinsurgency operations (in Latin America for example) were secretive and far 
removed from both the spirit and letter of LOAC. The CIA “murder manual,” for 
example, was described as a training manual for the Nicaraguan guerrillas in “how to 
kidnap, assassinate, blackmail, and dupe civilians.”81  
Counterinsurgency Debate: More Carrots, Less Sticks 
The doctrinal change that eventually occurred addresses the deficit in military 
culture toward civilians, and the debate leading up to the new manual in 2005 seemed to 
recognize this deficit. What the debate in 2005 achieved was to help clarify the logic of 
counterinsurgency in accordance with the changing political/strategic environment. 
Ironically, while the public and legal discourse in the U.S. had exploded with questions 
as to whether or not the civilian immunity norm was obsolete or should be discarded in 
the face of irregular warfare, military insiders were carefully interrogating assumptions 
about the use of force, exploring and explicating new goals, and starting to identify what 
needed to change in order to reach those goals. The community of innovators that shaped 
the debate engaged in a redefinition of some of the key counterinsurgency concepts in a 
way that took into account the need to remedy the existing legitimacy gap with the moral 
content of civilian immunity and by doing so, attempt to bridge the war of ideas with the 
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war on the ground. The body of published works taken as a whole attempted to change 
ideas about how to fight by matching them with revised interests and American identity, 
creating a conceptual link between the ethical treatment of civilians and national security 
imperatives and foreign policy goals. 
In response to perceptions of failure associated with failing to live up to civilian-
centered human rights norms, the debate found in the 2005 (post-Fallujah but pre-
Petraeus period) issues of Military Review
82
 are indications that human rights demands 
are having an effect: adaptation, moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, and 
persuasion are all present. Processes of institutionalization and habitualization would not 
be expected to come until later, after the adoption of C.O.I.N., which this chapter will not 
cover.
83
    
The first counterinsurgency manual put out in October, 2004 was a hurried 
attempt to draw lessons learned from past counterinsurgencies.
84
 The manual shows that 
prior ideas about how to manage insurgencies emphasize the tactical and operational 
levels, but not the strategic level, which is the vital difference between it and the later 
FM3-24. Meant for “division-level leaders and below,” it was not meant to challenge the 
prevailing assumptions in the military about the utility of force and the way it should be 
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employed. Furthermore, it reflected Rumsfeld’s priority that responsibility for the 
aftermath of the Iraq War was to be shifted onto Iraq,
85
 the host nation (HN): “a basic 
premise of counterinsurgency is that the ultimate responsibility rests with the HN.” And, 
“one of the key recurring lessons is that the United States cannot win other countries’ 
wars for them, but can certainly help legitimate foreign governments overcome attempts 
to overthrow them.” Lessons from past counterinsurgency experience were thus 
interpreted in a manner meant to uphold current strategic assumptions, and despite the 
change in circumstances, the manual reflected an understanding of the U.S. as having a 
supporting role in the counterinsurgency (as it did in Latin America) rather than as a 
primary actor: “the use of combat forces is a presidential decision and serves only as a 
temporary or provisional solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and 
provide security for the populace.
86
 However, since the war was one of choice by the 
U.S., and ostensibly for the purposes of humanitarian intervention, the situation in Iraq 
hardly matched the traditional model of insurgency as resulting from the internal organic 
uprising of elites with grievances. Instead, it was the result of an invasion and post-
invasion policies, including the dismantling of its prior institutions.  
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Though the first manual contained the basic elements of C.O.I.N. in terms of 
population protection as a goal,
87
  and it emphasized that officers should “prevent 
indiscriminate use of force,” this is overshadowed by force protection. The manual notes 
that human rights are a likely grievances and something to be taken into consideration, 
but it sees them as competing with the use of force and kinetic operations: 
“Counterinsurgency operations must balance elimination of grievances (that is, reform to 
include elimination of human rights abuses) and security force action that eliminates the 
insurgents.”88 The manual also emphasizes the media effects of collateral damage and the 
psychological effects on the populace as damaging to the mission: “Do not hurt the 
people, but kill the insurgents. Where US forces violate this dictum, US policies may 
fail.”89 However, consistent with remarks by one of my interviewees that “civilians were 
treated as objects, not human beings,” civilians are mentioned in the same subheading as 
“Resource Control:” “Combat operations are developed to neutralize the insurgent and, 
together with population and resources control measures, establish an environment 
within which political, social, and economic progress is possible.”90 An entire section 
discussed coercive practices toward civilians, which included the extreme measure of 
forceable relocation of populations if deemed necessary.
91
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In contrast to the inconsistent focus of the prior counterinsurgency manual, which 
emphasizes that combat operations are in tension with population protection, the series of 
articles published in Military Review during 2005
92
 emphasize the importance of limiting 
force and protecting the civilian, both for ethical and strategic reasons. In doing so, it lays 
the intellectual groundwork for shifting the “center of gravity” from the insurgent to the 
civilian.  
The articles in the year preceding C.O.I.N. emphasize the synthesis of moral 
identity, moral behavior, and strategic goals in the war in Iraq. There is an emphasis on 
developing Information Operations capabilities, but also on how information operations 
require challenging the assumption that force produces victory: “U.S. forces find, engage, 
capture, and kill terrorists, but this traditional approach to counterinsurgency does not 
adequately counter the insurgents’ information environment strategy.”93 There was a 
growing recognition that all negative experiences and images of the U.S. hurt the 
mission, but that changes are not simply about controlling the story through counter-
stories, but about changing the hearts and minds of soldiers as well. In acknowledging the 
damage done by Abu Ghraib, the author emphasizes the changes that must occur as a 
result: “The stark images from Abu Ghraib prison fade from the news only until the next 
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U.S. soldier must answer formal charges for what happened there. The Army is ensuring 
what happened will not happen again.”94 
Competing perspectives appear on occasion, for example, one that argues for the 
primacy of force protection. The author defends force protection as a strategic necessity 
because of the casualty sensitivity of the American public: “the enemy also learned that 
America’s vulnerable center of gravity is dead American soldiers.”95 The overwhelming 
tenor of the publication at this time though is of change, not one of maintaining the status 
quo. Part of this change is a concerted effort to explain the importance of ideas and the 
physical war as being connected and of drawing distinctions between terrorists and 
insurgents versus the U.S. military through their actions:  “The United States must also 
understand that when its forces react negatively and kick down doors in night raids, they 
are helping the enemy improve his own information environment. Their actions will 
annoy and alienate citizens who might no longer cooperate or who might begin actively 
supporting the insurgents.”96  
Others seek to bring the context of the current war back into its original 
humanitarian framework: “If the military is to conduct the Global War on Terrorism in an 
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effects-based campaign, then all military operations must become part of that plan. 
Consider, for instance, the secondary effects of a humanitarian relief operation. As part of 
the Global War on Terrorism, such an operation well executed serves the campaign 
plan.”97 Even suicide attacks are explained, not as Arab or Muslim cultural defects—
which was common in the U.S. at the time, but as strategic aims of insurgencies, 
including al Qaeda, which increased with anti-occupation resentments. The author argues 
that closer engagement with the people could defuse the underlying conditions that give 
rise to such strategies.
98
  
A British officer, in a frank and rather controversial article, observed the effects 
of U.S. military culture and made an explicit criticism: “It was apparent that many 
considered that the only effective, and morally acceptable, C.O.I.N. strategy was to kill or 
capture all terrorists and insurgents; they saw military destruction of the enemy as a 
strategic goal in its own right.”99 Others attempted to show what went wrong in past 
operations to demonstrate the strategic utility of ethical behavior and to counter the 
tendency to rely on excessive force and permissive ROE. Brian Mcallister Linn drew 
lessons from the Philippines counterinsurgency about the “necessity of having officers of 
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character, initiative, and humanity in counterinsurgency operations.“100 Another author 
discussed how important maintaining or repairing perceptions of moral character were in 
British counterinsurgencies and yet another in the French Algerian War. Montgomery 
McFate, an anthropologist working for the DoD, argued that as soon as coalition forces 
toppled Saddam Hussein, they became de facto players in the Iraqi social system.”101 She 
encouraged cultural knowledge, both in terms of understanding Arab culture and on 
reflecting on the military’s own strategic character and how that affects outcomes: “the 
American solution to the conflict [in Vietnam] was the use of overwhelming force in the 
form of strategic bombing and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, neither of which 
resulted in victory.
102
 
C.O.I.N. Revision 
By the time David Petraeus was installed as the head of the Combined Arms 
Center in November 2005, the raw mass of intellectual ideas that formed the foundation 
of C.O.I.N. had been circulating throughout the organization. Petraeus almost 
immediately announced that there would be a revision, and the process sped forward, 
making extensive use of some of the articles already published in Military Review. He 
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employed John Nagl as editor and Conrad Crane, the military historian, as primary 
author.  
The Human Rights Conferences at the Carr Center had, in the meantime, been 
ongoing, and the mood had shifted within the meetings as well. The November 2005 
meeting was attended by Petraeus, Crane, Susan Rice, and about 85 others. Participants 
looked back at historical counterinsurgencies, seeking to learn lessons, and most agreed 
that giving up on the idea of force used in a conventional way was a necessity. When 
discussing how some states employed brutal methods against populations even within 
counterinsurgencies, most agreed that this was no longer possible for “Western nations 
prosecuting counterinsurgency campaigns as they would be viewed as collective 
punishments that deny fundamental human rights to innocent populations.”103 Indeed, 
“conference participants were generally critical of what they called ‘terrorism to fight 
terrorism’ employed by the French in Algeria.”104 Not only were they critical in ethical 
terms, but they spoke of past brutality as counterproductive: “in Vietnam, too, 
indiscriminate force was counterproductive and undermined overall political 
objectives.”105  
The general feeling at this time was that political considerations required an 
ethical stance and that this had to trump military considerations, and not vice versa. 
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While some questioned the possibility that an insurgency could be eliminated without 
dirty tactics, another claimed that such assertions being “floated around: were 
“garbage.”106 As a consensus emerged about the limited utility of force in such situations, 
the discussion turned to more technical aspects of putting counterinsurgency into 
practice: how institutions were to be built, what was needed from the U.S. government, 
and what difficulties lay ahead.  
The relationships built between the human rights community and the military was 
consummated with the C.O.I.N. revision conference in February 2006, when Crane and 
Petraeus included the Human Rights Policy group as part of the 150 total academics, 
journalists, CIA and State Department members that were invited to provide criticism and 
feedback.  Tyler Mozelle, of the Carr Center, says in an interview, “this work was a 
major milestone in American history and throughout the world of military policy because 
we were able to broaden the aperture of thinking about US national security to include a 
more humane approach to thinking about war, civilian casualties, and the ethical 
dimensions of US foreign policy.”107     
The C.O.I.N. manual (FM3-24) was published a year later in December 2006, and 
it was downloaded more than a million times. Sarah Sewall, of the Carr Center, wrote the 
introduction for the University of Chicago Press version published shortly thereafter, and 
she calls it “radical” in the way it challenges the “American way of war.” Sewall notes 
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that the manual’s purpose transcends the immediate need to find a workable strategy and 
claims that its direction “raises some fundamental questions about the legitimacy, 
purposes, and limits of U.S. power.”108   
The manual is directed toward practitioners, but its engagement in a redefinition 
of interests and identity is clear: protecting the population is the new center of gravity, 
and given the strength of the moral, human rights dimensions of civilian immunity, and 
their instrumental connection to the justification of the war, this was the only possible 
choice that allowed the U.S. to salvage its identity, other than walking away from the 
fight. The War of Ideas and the war on the ground needed to be consistent; indeed, 
Petraeus describes the shift in Iraq as a “surge of ideas.”109 Concerned about whether the 
soldiers would embrace the ethical stance deemed necessary, he urged them to accept one 
of the key tenets of the manual, which is to “live our values.”110  He states: 
Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that will be won or lost in 
the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and 
our forces has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a 
narrative that works, and continually drive the themes home through all 
forms of media….Live our values. Do not hesitate to kill or capture the 
enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. Living our values 
distinguishes us from our enemies.
111
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In sum, I find strong support for my central hypothesis that civilian-centered 
norms helped to shape the civilian-centric population protection doctrine known as 
C.O.I.N..  Attitudes toward civilian casualties show movement ranging from early 
sovereignty-based attitudes about military necessity and proportionality (collateral 
damage as inevitable), even overtly abusive attitudes, toward an increasing emphasis on 
distinction over time; this movement is relative to the political pressure resulting from the 
civilian casualties that drew press attention. The result was a period of self-reflection in 
which the U.S. foreign policy goal of instituting a democratic state friendly to the U.S. 
and unfriendly to terrorist ideology was seen to be endangered. As it became clear that a 
new doctrine was needed, members of the military and human rights experts, in 
interaction, decided that this doctrinal change needed to be based on the moral or at least 
ethical actions of the U.S. military regarding the treatment of civilians. My interviews 
confirm this, with one recently trained cadet stating that they are now taught to be 
extremely careful of civilian casualties because “we are the human instrument of U.S. 
foreign policy, and everything we do reflects on the whole nation.” Compare this to some 
of the stories told to me by enlistees—that he was never told what the Geneva 
Conventions were, or that civilians were looked at as enemies. Emma Sky, adviser to 
Petraeus and Odierno in Iraq, remarked that "the biggest mindset change was for the U.S. 
to look at Iraqis as not the enemy, but to look at the Iraqis as people who needed 
protecting.”112   
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Further, it was recognition of the strength and salience of the norms protecting 
civilians that drove concern for the presence of media rather than the other way around; 
this is clear from the lack of concern about abuses before they hit the media. Media is an 
empty vessel, but the strategic narrative that is woven from available norms can either 
legitimize or delegitimize the actions of actors.  Since the legitimacy gap was eventually 
seen to fuel the insurgency, both global and local, the legitimacy gap created a crucial 
juncture which required at some point either changing the U.S.‘s purported values—in 
this case abandoning or at least downplaying identification with human rights and civilian 
immunity, or changing behavior and thus the definition of what it means to “win.” My 
argument is that the military took on the political burden handed it by Bush, and 
attempted to change its behavior. 
Furthermore, documenting the increasing interaction between human rights 
organizations and the U.S. military reveals the diffusion of human rights norms, 
beginning with the instrumental use of the CIN, to argumentation about civilian 
casualties, to efforts to persuade members of the strategic value of abiding by a more 
human rights-orientation toward civilians. Finally, I find support for the three conditions 
under which this transformation in strategy occurs: the questionable legitimacy of the 
initial invasion, the need to delegitimize terror, and the recognition of a loss of a 
monopoly of force.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AFGHANISTAN 
While the invasion of Iraq was widely condemned as the aggressive, even illegal 
use of force, the GWOT campaign in Afghanistan enjoyed a higher level of legitimacy 
and enjoyed broad international support—at least in the beginning. Though polling data 
suggests that many foreign publics would have preferred a law-enforcement rather than a 
military approach,
1
 the general feeling was that, since the U.S. was attacked, the war 
complied with the spirit if not the letter of international law by acting in accordance with 
the right to self-defense, as defined in the U.N. Charter, Chapter I, Article 2 (4).
2
 This 
initial legitimacy surplus, I argue, explains why civilian casualties, though politically 
salient, were not perceived with the same urgency as they were in Iraq. Indeed, the crisis 
in Iraq overshadowed Afghanistan, siphoning away resources, attention, and manpower, 
creating the conditions for worsening civilian casualties over time. It was not until after 
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the surge, when the level of violence in Iraq began to cool, that serious attention was paid 
to Afghanistan, and civilian casualties were seen as a serious strategic threat. I will argue 
that Afghanistan’s version of C.O.I.N. and its emphasis on the protection of civilians 
served not only as an attempt to reverse the previous strategic failure, but also to repair 
the American image and rebuild the legitimacy of the American use of force by regaining 
what others have called its “moral authority.”  Because of this, the military habitualizes 
and institutionalizes civilian-centered human rights norms into its future vision of 
American military culture and war-making. Moreover, since this case study is entangled 
with that of Iraq because it constitutes a second theater of war within the overarching 
GWOT, I will treat this case as distinct from, but overlapping with Iraq in terms of the 
C.O.I.N. doctrine.  
Early Invasion, 2001-2002: Framing and Legitimacy 
In contrast to the unilateral approach in Iraq, President Bush emphasized global 
unity in the days leading up to Afghanistan.  Operation Enduring Freedom was 
understood by many in the military as multilateral—a broad-based struggle against 
terrorists, whose political program was delegitimized by their threat to the international 
social order. This threat comes particularly from their rejection of international norms, 
especially that of civilian immunity. Bush labeled terrorism not only in terms of a 
strategy or behavior but also as an immutable identity of murderous “outlaws and killers 
of innocents.”1   This notion of “outlaw” builds on contemporary ideas of terrorists as 
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criminals and as such reinforces the idea of international society as the realm of law; but 
as I argue in the previous chapter about Iraq, the reluctance to treat terrorists as merely 
criminals triggers international humanitarian law, or the laws of war protecting innocents 
and banning torture.  
Moreover, as I explained in chapter two, the definition of terrorism is inherently 
political in that its meaning has always been tied to legitimacy claims about the state 
monopoly on the use of force; the anti-terror norm has therefore traditionally been 
conceptualized as resting on foundational (or meta) norms of sovereignty. Even more 
recent is the idea that terrorism, through the expansion of its destructive capability, now 
constitutes a threat to the international order itself by threatening this monopoly.  Since 
the Munich Massacre of 1972, however, the anti-terrorism norm has been popularly 
framed primarily in terms of the civilian immunity norm (as the killing of innocent 
civilians).  Since then, this definition of terrorism has been a crucial axis in the legitimacy 
struggle between Israel and Palestinian resistance groups; the legitimacy of political 
claims to disputed lands and rights to sovereignty have been constructed in close 
alignment with identity based on the legitimate use of force.  This particular conflict 
draws from the larger international normative environment whereby newly independent 
states sought recognition of anti-colonial resistance groups fighting wars of 
independence. Such groups attempted to legitimize their own identity claims as legitimate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Available on the American Presidency Project, 
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fighters by asserting the priority of jus ad bellum, or just cause, over jus in bello. 
Powerful states such as the U.S. worried that resistance groups would be effectively 
granted exemptions from IHL and thus would gain an advantage in the battlefield, since 
the legal strictures of civilian immunity seek to protect the principle of distinction by 
demanding that combatants distinguish themselves from civilians through visible 
symbols such as uniforms and openly carrying their weapons. The U.S. rejected certain 
parts of the 1977 Additional Protocols not so much on the possible damage to civilian 
immunity incurred by subordinating the jus in bello to the jus ad bellum, but on the 
grounds that “terrorists” must not be legitimized as parties to a conflict at all. In order to 
demonstrate its own support of the moral dimensions of civilian protection in 
contradistinction to terrorists, and in affirmation of its innate liberal values/identity, 
President Reagan promised that the U.S. would respect civilian immunity irrespective of 
international law.
2
  
In Afghanistan, President Bush builds on this already established civilian-centered 
identity contest between states and non-state actors by defining the particular threat of 
terrorism against the United States not only as a global threat in terms of its broad 
territorial reach but as a universal threat in terms of the normative order of the entire 
international society of states. By tapping into the larger normative context of terrorism 
and civilian immunity, Bush, in the early post-9/11 days, ties the legitimacy of the initial 
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Afghan invasion to the global interests of states and by extension to “innocent civilians.” 
The legitimacy of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan is framed not only as a single act of 
self-defense but as an act in the unified interests of the international order of states that 
uphold civilian interests: “many nations understand what NATO expressed, that an attack 
on us is really an attack on legitimate governments and on freedom.”3 The Taliban’s 
draconian style of rule and blatant disregard for human rights made it easy to conflate it 
with Al Qaeda and override concerns about sovereignty that  intervention and “regime 
change” would otherwise likely trigger.  The legitimacy of the invasion of Afghanistan 
was widely seen as just despite the fact that no state or regime had actually attacked the 
United States. As Ballard, Lamm, and Wood write,  
Though there are people who believe that the cost of war is never justifiable, the 
campaign in Afghanistan will always stand out as one of the very few conflicts in history 
that was avidly supported in its initial stages by most of the nations of the world. In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, nearly seventy 
nations actively voiced support for a response against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The 
Taliban had been vilified in the international press and had twice before been sanctioned 
by the United Nations. This was initially therefore both a just and internationally popular 
war.
4
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While Bush’s war plans found explicit support in the jus ad bellum traditions 
ensconced in international law, jus in bello formed the normative background for not just 
the defeat but the destruction of Al Qaeda. It would soon become the foreground as well 
when Bush drew a sharp contrast between the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the one hand, and 
American identity on the other by invoking the moral aspects of the jus in bello, 
especially the principle of distinction. Clearly demarcating the line between civilian and 
combatant, Bush promises the American people that even as the enemy is being pursued, 
“at the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of 
America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine, and 
supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan.”5 
Though Bush does not explicitly promise at this time to minimize harm to civilians that 
would result from the use of force, he reinforces the identity of the U.S. as the legitimate 
protector of all, not just American, innocent civilians. The Afghanistan war thus begins 
with a surplus of legitimacy, resting largely on the moral consensus regarding the 
illegitimacy of the terrorists’ use of force as opposed to that employed by the coalition 
led by the United States, and later the ISAF and NATO. 
Early Attitudes Toward Civilian Casualties    
During the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, a mix of precision 
weaponry was employed, and some interviewees with experience or opinions on 
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Afghanistan characterized the initial airstrikes as precise and careful, while 
acknowledging that, as one person put it, “it was shit for civilians.” The emphasis on 
precision weaponry and careful targeting fits with the earliest attitudes of many military 
personnel expressed in the Carr Center’s Human Rights Conferences, who saw criticism 
of U.S. targeting practices as rather unfair, idealistic, and lacking in historical 
perspective. According to reports published by Carl Conetta, civilian casualties in the 
initial weeks of the invasion were estimated at 1000-1400 attributable to direct military 
action.
6
  Conetta points out, however,  that the rate of civilians killed per bomb dropped 
was higher than would be expected when compared to the recent Kosovo conflict because 
the “mission objectives, operational plans, and the character of the enemy might interact 
to exert  considerable upward pressure on the civilian casualty count.”7 Notably, since the 
objective was regime change as well as rooting out and destroying Al Qaeda, targets 
included residential areas where both groups lived and operated close to civilians.
8
 
Targeting was not purposefully indiscriminate, but “targeting residential areas meant a 
much reduced margin for error in attack, generally,” and extending the battle into 
outlying areas as fighters fled endangered refugee flows. Cluster bombs were also 
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employed to a greater extent in this conflict than in Kosovo two years before. Further, 
relying on local intelligence meant that sometimes locals exploited or falsified 
intelligence in order to bring harm to their own enemies.  Strategically partnering with 
the Northern Alliance, comprised mostly of ethnic minorities, against the Pashtun 
Taliban, while pragmatic in the short run, facilitated brutality and human rights abuses 
and exacerbated ethnic divisions between the Pashtuns on the one hand, who had always 
ruled, and the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen on the other.
9
   
Although the earliest phases of the campaign were seen by many of those I 
interviewed as relatively precise, attitudes at the highest levels indicate a recognition of a 
conventional trade-off  between military necessity and minimizing civilian casualties, 
mediated by the emphasis on force protection. This is evidenced by the willingness to 
incur more civilian casualties than would otherwise be necessary in order to 
accommodate foreign policy objectives that saw the destruction of the enemy as the 
overriding goal. The “nature” of non-state actors, who are intermingled with the civilian 
population, was seen to some degree as an enabling rather than constraining factor in the 
use of force. The New York Times published an investigative report of eleven bombing 
sites over a period of six months and concluded that the focus on overwhelming force and 
force protection, along with a reluctance to rely on ground troops for better intelligence, 
meant that "the American air campaign in Afghanistan, based on a high-tech, out-of-
harm's-way strategy, has produced a pattern of mistakes that have killed hundreds of 
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Afghan civilians."
10
 The report also documented that denying civilian casualties was 
often the first public response, even in the face of contrary evidence. Responding to the 
Times article in a Pentagon briefing, Rumsfeld defended the performance of the military 
regarding civilian deaths, insisting that the campaign represented historical progress in 
minimizing civilian casualties. Thom Shanker, New York Times reporter, notes that  
Rumsfeld appeared to balance the “tragedy of innocent civilian deaths” against the 
accomplished goals of driving the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan: ''Today the 
Taliban are no longer in power; Al Qaeda is on the run,'' said Rumsfeld. ''The 
humanitarian crisis has been averted, and the Afghan people have been liberated. And 
Afghanistan is once again a free nation.''
11
 
In the early years, since civilian casualties were viewed as an unavoidable cost of 
doing business, little credence was given to the possibility that civilian casualties could 
become more than a temporary public relations challenge. Interestingly, however, a small 
number of enlisted soldiers reflected a “common sense” assessment that Afghans would 
rebel against any force that killed its innocent bystanders. Higher level interviewees 
(officer level) recalled little to no discussion in the early years about the idea that civilian 
casualties might grow into a political problem that would  reverberate directly back onto 
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the battlefield, let alone a political problem that would affect the long term ability of the 
U.S. to achieve its foreign policy goals in the region.  
This was so despite the fact that civilian casualties became an issue for local and 
regional audiences almost immediately, particularly in Pakistan. The Boston Globe 
reported only weeks into the campaign that “the president, General Pervez Musharraf, is 
under pressure both from fundamentalist political parties that have called on the army to 
oust him and from some moderates who say he is ignoring Pakistanis' concerns for their 
fellow Muslims in Afghanistan.”12 The New York Times report documented rising anger 
in areas like the hamlet of Kakrat in Oruzgan Province where four entire villages were 
strafed, and some Afghan officials warned of the resulting pressures on their ability to 
govern:  'We have to be given a larger role,'' said Dr. Abdullah, the Afghan foreign 
minister, in an interview. ''If things do not improve, well, I will certainly pray for the 
Americans and wish them success, but I will no longer be able to take part in this.''
13
 
Moreover, the earliest indications were that the enemy saw civilian casualties as a 
propaganda tool, not only for a local audience, but for a regional, even global audience of 
Arabs and Muslims who already believed in the U.S. willingness to kill their own kind.
14
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The Taliban reported what the U.S. claimed were inflated civilian casualty figures,
15
 
accusing the U.S. of intentionally killing civilians, and called it a “global bully. News 
reports repeated the Taliban’s message that ‘urged Muslims to rise up against the United 
States and to kill Americans wherever they can.’”16 
Early assessments by some political and military personnel outside of the 
immediate circle around Bush, however, did see civilian casualties as politically 
problematic. Former assistant defense secretary under Reagan, Lawrence Korb, noted 
two reasons to worry: "No. 1, we are a moral country. These people aren't aiding and 
abetting bin Laden; they're terrified by him. And No. 2, the more you kill, the more you 
run the risk of inflaming the Muslim world and breaking apart the coalition.”17  This 
assessment competed with a more prevalent idea that held that civilian casualties required 
merely the correct spin: one member of the House Armed Services Committee, 
Representative Todd Akin, a Republican from Missouri, believed that the problem was 
not casualties per se but the way they were being perceived. Urging the administration to 
take notice, he stated,  
I think we have to underscore the fact that the terrorists have intentionally 
targeted civilian targets. They have intentionally done that, whereas we are 
making every effort not to hit civilian targets. So there is a black-and-
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white contrast. We feel so strongly on this principle that we are even 
assuming additional military risks.
18
  
The response from the administration came mostly from Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, and echoed (or perhaps helped to construct) the prevailing attitudes of 
some of the military participants in the Human Rights conferences at the time, who 
believed that because the enemy manipulated and propagandized civilian casualties, it 
garnered an unfair, even unjust advantage. This sentiment was reported by some of the 
interviewees under study to be widely held. Emphasizing—even acknowledging in some 
cases—casualties was seen as feeding into the enemy’s illegitimate and distorted 
narrative. Nevertheless, the players were embedded in an identity contest, and 
Rumsfeld’s response was thus to place the moral onus on the enemy, claiming that the 
enemy was responsible for the civilian casualties that did occur and by implicating 
civilians as cooperators or supporters of the regime: 
 There's no question but that people who were in close proximity to these isolated 
ammunition dumps, who very likely were there for a good reason, because they were part 
of that activity, may very well have been casualties ... They were not cooking cookies 
inside those tunnels.
19
  
Civilians who were acknowledged to be innocent were the victims of the enemy’s 
unethical ways of war: 
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Rumsfeld said that while the U.S. has been ‘very careful’ about avoiding 
civilian casualties when possible, the Taliban is making it increasingly 
difficult not to hit civilians. ‘They are systematically using mosques and 
schools and hospitals for command-and-control centers [and] for 
ammunition storage,’ Rumsfeld said. ‘They are placing artillery and tanks 
and armored vehicles in close proximity to hospitals and schools and 
residential areas.’20 
Even so, the administration recognized the need to sway the populace, though 
early attempts at hearts and minds were crude and took for granted that the claim that 
killing was “unintentional,” a key concept in the civilian immunity norm that permits for 
the possibility of foreseeable collateral damage, would absolve the U.S. from moral 
culpability in the eyes of multiple audiences, including the local population.  Planes 
dropped leaflets “in an effort to reassure them the bombardment was not aimed at them. 
One leaflet showed a western soldier in camouflage and helmet shaking hands with a man 
in traditional Afghan dress in front of a mountain scene.” Other attempts used war planes 
to broadcast news in Afghan dialects “in the ongoing battle for the hearts and minds of 
the Afghan people.”21 
With faith in the utility of conventional force and in the American attitude that, as 
one interviewee put it, “we were so sure we were the good guys,” the war of ideas aimed 
at only the vaguest goal of countering anti-Americanism. However, the U.S. information 
Agency, whose once vibrant public diplomacy program was given short shrift once 
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relegated to the State Department, was under-resourced and under-prioritized.
22
  
Interagency cooperation attempted public diplomacy initiatives, but no meaningful 
connection was made between the conduct of the military and the goals of anti-
Americanism. For example, soon after the initial fall of the Taliban, when Al Qaeda had 
retreated to Pakistan, President Bush announced that Radio America would be broadcast 
and that the media infrastructure would be built up in the country. There was a notable 
lack of any discussion within the administration that directly linked the use of 
overwhelming force or civilian casualties to a damaged American image, nor was this 
issue tied in any important way to battlefield conditions in Afghanistan. While discussion 
between the military and the human rights workers at the Carr Center Conventions 
focused on the trade-off between force protection and civilian casualties as a human 
rights issue, no linkage was yet made between American interests and protecting 
civilians. The separation between politics and military force was assumed, and according 
to one high level military official, little thought was given to civilian casualties as one 
factor contributing to the influx of Pakistani fundamentalist fighters crossing the border 
to assist the Taliban.  
Whereas initial indicators were that American image would suffer, politicians and 
military decision-makers alike traditionally focus on domestic public opinion; the masses 
make up the “passions” in what Clausewitz calls the trinity of war, providing the patriotic 
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fervor, political and financial support to keep the war going. At this point, American 
domestic public opinion gave little cause for concern. Though some peace-oriented 
groups protested, expressions of mainstream public opinion demonstrated a tendency to 
tolerate civilian casualties, a predictable pattern for the American public, who has proved 
quite willing in the past to trade civilian lives for “security.”23 A letter to the editor 
responding to the July 2002 New York Times report on civilian casualties captures the 
mood of the country and its preference for force protection over minimizing civilian 
casualties: 
If only hundreds of Afghan civilians died as we liberated their country for 
them, that's a relatively small price for them to pay. It was their country; 
why should we take the ground losses? We must minimize mistakes, but 
your article places more credence on the reports and opinions of a few 
civilians with little knowledge of tactics of modern warfare than it does on 
our own personnel who are risking and giving their lives for these people. 
Like much of Europe and the Middle East, Afghans are biting the hand 
that feeds them and frees them.
24
    
Despite the mood of the U.S. public, the importance of civilian casualties for 
America’s image and its ability to prevail in the long run was not lost on elected officials 
like John Kerry who worried that “the U.S. appears to be losing the propaganda war in 
Afghanistan and in the Arab world. Strikes that hit civilians, and bombing during 
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Ramadan, they said, can do nothing for the U.S. case.”25 Stephen Tanner argues that the 
damage to American image was in its loss of “moral authority.”   
After a month of the U.S. bombing campaign rumblings began to reach 
Washington from Europe, the Mideast, and Pakistan where Musharraf had 
requested the bombing to cease. Having begun the war with the greatest 
imaginable reservoir of moral authority, the U.S. was on the verge of 
letting it slip away through high-level attacks using the most ghastly 
inventions its scientists could come up with.
26
 
Still, little evidence exists that civilian casualties were recognized at the time as a 
strategic issue among those positioned as top decision-makers or even among junior 
officers or enlisted personnel interviewed for this study.  One special forces enlisted 
soldier who was one of the first to land in Afghanistan remarked that he received no 
training at all in complying with the Geneva Conventions, and indeed, was not even 
vaguely familiar with the treaty throughout the duration of his service.  
Even if the moral issue of civilian casualties contained the seeds of a broader, 
strategic problem in the minds of some, this issue receded among coalition forces not 
long after the Taliban had been toppled and al-Qaeda had been driven out. Just as non-
state combatants melted away only to recoup and return another day, the damage set into 
motion by civilian casualties soon took a back seat to larger issues of legitimacy 
concerning U.S. foreign policy, especially fears about its intentions to project its military 
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power across the globe. It was only months after 9/11, in January 2002—before the 
smoke had even cleared in Afghanistan—that Bush gave his State of the Union speech in 
which he famously named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “axis of evil.” As a result, 
the image of the U.S. in the eyes of international publics suffered tremendously. Pew 
reports a decline across the board in global public opinion toward the U.S. during the 
Bush years but notes that the decline began in the early days of the Afghanistan and 
continued through Iraq: 
America won a measure of global sympathy after the terrorist attacks of 
Sept. 11, 2001, but the inaugural Pew Global Attitudes survey showed that 
by spring 2002 favorability ratings for the U.S. had already dropped in 
many countries since the start of the decade. Surveys conducted after the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 found further declines. Positive views of 
the United States declined in 26 of the 33 countries where the question 
was posed in both 2002 and 2007.
27
 
The U.S. image suffered especially with the publics of some Arab and Muslim 
countries, and this drop correlated with disturbingly high levels of confidence in Osama 
bin Laden and higher than would be expected support for suicide bombings as a 
legitimate tactic in war. The percentage of Jordan’s population that saw the U.S. in a 
favorable light dropped from an already low twenty five percent in 2002 to a staggeringly 
low one percent in 2003. Fifty three percent of Jordanian Muslims likewise expressed a 
favorable view of Osama bin Laden, specifically responding in a positive way to the 
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statement that “bin Laden would do the right thing in world affairs.”28 In Jordan in 2002, 
forty three percent said that suicide bombing was often or sometimes justified, and that 
number crept up to nearly the sixty percent mark until 2005, when it dropped 
precipitously. Not coincidentally, 2005 is the year Amman experienced firsthand what it 
means to be the object of terrorism when the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda (AQI) bombed 
three hotels in Amman, one of which was hosting a wedding party with hundreds of 
guests. The bombing was said to be in retaliation for the Jordanian government’s 
cooperation in the GWOT. The attack sparked massive public protests, but in a stunning 
reversal, they were directed not toward government policy but against the attacks and al-
Qaeda itself. Fares Braizat, a political scientist in Jordan University's Center for Strategic 
Studies remarked that  
in an opinion poll conducted [the year before] by his office, 67 percent of 
Jordanian adult respondents had considered al Qaeda in Iraq ‘a legitimate 
resistance organization’. That attitude may be changing, he said Friday, 
explaining that he had spoken since the attacks to 10 survey participants 
who held favorable views of al Qaeda; nine of them had changed their 
minds.
29
 
To the extent that the support of Arab and Muslim publics was seen as relevant in 
the GWOT by both terrorists and their state foes, the Jordan case demonstrates the 
centrality of civilian casualties to shifting the balance of legitimacy to either side in the 
larger war of ideas.  Yet, this was not apparent at the time and reflected a severe 
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disconnect between the U.S. self-understanding about its own identity and the legitimacy 
of its use of force versus that of others.  Paul Rogers writes in February 2002 about the 
“mood of the majority” in the global south as being fundamentally at odds with the U.S. 
perception of its own actions: “The U.S. sees the legitimacy of a war on terror born of the 
shock of its own vulnerability. Much of the rest of the world sees it as a further example 
of the control of the international system by an elite minority.”30 Identity, however, is 
inherently social and thus is negotiated, which means that one cannot simply assert 
identity; rather, it must be accepted, or at least not contested. Since the war of ideas was 
about countering anti-Americanism and promoting American values in opposition to that 
of terrorists, civilian casualties in the early days of Afghanistan had already cost the U.S. 
in the war of ideas with key audiences well before it appeared to be losing control of the 
ground war in Afghanistan and even before the Iraqi insurgency—it just didn’t know it 
yet.
31
   
To what extent damage to a state’s image induces a change in behavior is another 
matter.  Anthony Cordesman, a respected military strategist writing in 2002 about the 
lessons of the Afghanistan conflict, saw the potential for civilian casualties to become a 
political problem for a global audience, but he also determined that when the world 
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supports the use of force, they will also allow for a level of civilian casualties as a cost of 
doing business: 
The global reaction to the fall of the Taliban and Al Qaeda shows that the 
United States and its allies can continue to act in spite of enemy 
propaganda and the use of collateral damage as a political weapon, and 
that media and human rights criticism that ignores reality and attempts to 
make any use of military force impossible has little effect. The media and 
the public will—and they should—react to every attack that produces any 
form of civilian casualties, friendly fire, or collateral damage. If the world 
accepts the need for military action, however, it will also accept the 
inevitability of such losses.
32
 
Translated in terms of this study, the willingness to incur civilian casualties is at 
least partly a function of legitimacy, and reputational damage alone, among limited 
audiences, did not necessarily equate to a loss of legitimacy. It is not until the U.S. sees 
that reputational consequences deriving from civilian casualties impact its ability to 
“win” the ground war, and no other options appear consistent with U.S. and military 
identity, that the war of ideas is seen as essential to the war on the ground.  Eventually, 
what it means to win, however, will have to be redefined within the moral limits of 
civilian immunity, at least in Afghanistan.
33
  
Middle Years, 2003-2007: A Secondary Effort 
If all signs pointed to the beginning of a downward slide in American image 
among local and regional publics, the Afghanistan conflict nevertheless dropped out of 
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the headlines once international attention shifted to Bush’s plans to invade Iraq. With the 
Taliban initially defeated and Al Qaeda’s training camps and bases destroyed, 
Afghanistan became, as one high-level military official put it, a “secondary effort” for 
many years.
34
  In reality, as has been well documented elsewhere, the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda both had merely retreated, and much of the leadership that remained had crossed 
into the mountainous Pakistani Pashtun region known as the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA). Robert Cassidy documents the rise of the (neo)Taliban, writing 
that Pakistan provided a safe haven whereby they recouped, assessed their losses, and 
gathered up funds from people as geographically diverse as  
‘businessmen in Karachi, goldsmiths in Peshawar, wealthy Saudis and 
Kuwaitis,’ and even ‘sympathetic officers’ in the Pakistani army and ISI. 
Pashtuns who resented the harsh treatment of Afghan civilians at the 
hands of the Coalition forces and a host of new recruits were assembling 
in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province.
35
  
Civilian casualties were therefore producing recruiting effects, but at this point in 
the conflict, casualties were one of the many factors that made up the complex internal 
political dynamics taking place between the Pakistani government and the Taliban, not to 
mention the emerging Pakistani Taliban insurgency. Nevertheless, with popular support 
for Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. in the GWOT at only fifteen percent by 2007, it is 
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reasonable to assume that civilian casualties were fuel for the fire, especially among those 
predisposed to sympathize with Salafi-Jihadist movements.
36
   
Against the backdrop of this “unfinished and temporarily forgotten war in 
Afghanistan,” U.S. attention and energy was drawn into Iraq like moth to a flame. As I 
have documented in chapter four, strategic failure in an invasion already lacking 
legitimacy came to be defined increasingly in terms of a failure to view the population 
protection as the goal. What was key in Iraq was that the humanitarian basis for the 
invasion and foreign policy goal of democratizing the country and turning it into an ally 
on the war on terror guided the idea that civilians themselves had to buy into the package 
of ideas being sold to them by primarily the United States military. The fact that invading 
Iraq at all was a priority so early in the beginning of the Afghanistan war, however, was a 
political choice independent of effects induced by civilian casualties. What this meant for 
Afghanistan was a shortage of troops and thus an excessive reliance on airpower, which 
affected how and to what extent the military was able to pursue its goals of destroying the 
al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, providing stability and security—the goal of ISAF 
shortly after the initial invasion—and fighting the emerging insurgency as it became 
evident that this was occurring. An overreliance on airpower constrained the decision 
calculus toward more civilian casualties, and between the initial heavy bombing of 
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Afghanistan and then Iraq, a dearth of precision guided munitions meant that other less 
precise weaponry would be used as needed.
37
  
The lack of resources and attention feeding into Afghanistan created optimal 
material conditions for the gradual resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. As Richard 
Holbrooke put it in an interview, Afghanistan “was abandoned a second time by the 
previous administration more or less in 2004, 2005. The administration almost eliminated 
the foreign aid assistance programs, went in the wrong direction, and the Taliban took 
advantage of it. ...”38 Civilian casualties at this time worked to confirm the narrative of 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda that had begun in the invasions, feeding into local and regional 
recruitment efforts.
 39
 This assessment, however, is retrospective, for as will be detailed 
below, it was not until 2005 that civilian casualties were seen as a “key operational 
issue,” and Karzai began to complain privately.40 Even then, it was not until 2009 that the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which by then came under joint U.S. 
leadership with Operation Enduring Freedom, consistently prioritized reducing civilian 
casualties as the core of a population protection strategy.
41
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Torture and Effects on Legitimacy 
In the meantime, the U.S. suffered severe damage to its image among a broader, 
global audience due to the infamous torture and illegal detainment debates associated 
with Guantanamo Bay. While these issues may seem largely beyond the scope of this 
study since they do not bear directly on the treatment of civilians, they do feed directly 
into issues of legitimacy and the U.S. use of force. Torture and civilian immunity rest 
side by side in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the third and fourth conventions 
respectively, of the treaty at the core of contemporary international humanitarian law.
42
  
Further, the debates surrounding torture formed the backdrop for U.S. decisions about 
how to approach civilian casualties in the years leading up to an Afghanistan-specific 
version of C.O.I.N..   
The torture controversy affected U.S. reputation based on its conduct, its reversal 
on customary international law, and its place in the larger international order.
43
 This 
hinged on the fact that the U.S. staked its identity and force claims on its stewardship of 
the international liberal order of law and rights on the one hand, while actively promoting 
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the idea of a space free from the rule of law on the other. This hypocrisy was not lost on 
many outside of the United States. Denying prisoners habeus corpus, detaining them in 
Guantanamo Bay where U.S. laws of due process did not apply, defending “enhanced 
interrogation techniques,” and then diverting detainees to more torture-friendly locations 
via extraordinary rendition—all damaged the American image among friend and foe 
alike. More specific to this study, it undermined the war of ideas by confirming the 
strategic narrative of Al Qaeda that U.S. values are hollow and particularistic in that they 
do not apply to Muslims. An assessment by Dennis Blair, Director of Intelligence under 
Obama, confirms that the U.S. government gradually came to this perspective. Blair, 
participating in a review of interrogation methods used by the CIA on high-value 
individuals suspected of terrorism during these years (between 2002 and 2006), wrote a 
memo summarizing his conclusions: "The bottom line is these techniques have hurt our 
image around the world," and "the damage they have done to our interests far outweighed 
whatever benefit they gave us and they are not essential to our national security."
44
 
While the torture and illegal detainment issues were not immediately related to 
the civilian casualties issue, the attempts to carve out legitimate space—through legal 
counsel, that is—for unrestrained state action in the international realm, while denying 
both criminal and legal combatant status to prisoners, triggered intense focus on both IHL 
and Human Rights law (IHRL). The public debate about the Geneva Conventions in 
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particular had the effect of encouraging scrutiny of the contradictions and tensions in 
U.S. words versus deeds. John Yoo, the Bush administration’s Chief of Legal Offices 
famously authored the Torture Memos, laying the groundwork for a legal defense against 
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
45
 Yoo claimed that the conflict in 
Afghanistan was exempt from the Geneva Conventions because al Qaeda is a "violent 
political movement" and, as a nonstate actor, cannot be a party to a treaty. Further, the 
Taliban is not a legitimate government since it presides over a failed state and is 
“functionally indistinguishable" from al Qaeda, "to the extent that the Taliban militia was 
more akin to a non-governmental organization that used military force to pursue its 
religious and political ideology than a functioning government."
46
 Moreover, Yoo 
contended that the President was not bound by international law, nor even by domestic 
law in cases of security: "customary international law, whatever its source and content, 
does not bind the President, or restrict the actions of the U.S. military" and is strictly a 
matter of the President's ability to interpret such law.
47
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While IHL is specific to warring parties, any remainders are swept into the 
jurisdiction of IHRL,
48
 which claims the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family” and as such “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.”49  A memo signed by Bush was circulated in 
response to the torture memos in 2002, which demonstrates some rhetorical recognition 
of this fact as well as a desire to reinforce the notion that U.S. values are aligned with 
international human rights. Without acknowledging that detainees have human rights, 
Bush invokes the language of human rights and aligns himself, however imperfectly, with 
the “spirit of the law.”50  
Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations 
in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who 
are not legally entitled to such treatment. Our Nation has been and will 
continue to be a strong supporter of Geneva and its principles. As a matter 
of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees 
humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military 
necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.
51
  
This memo, made public in June 2004, was written as an acceptance of the legal 
positions asserted in the Torture Memos. It was completely declassified and made public 
in June 2004 just as the Torture memos were leaked to the press. Meant to balance the 
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harsh legal position with a reassuring statement of the persistent U.S. commitment to 
international morality (if not law per se), the effects of such a statement are to thrust even 
greater attention and scrutiny on the American reputation and on its identity alone as a 
guarantor of moral behavior.  
The administration continued to cling to its position even in the wake of public 
furor, however, and it was not until the 2006 Supreme Court case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
that it was forced to modify its stance.
52
  Hamdan essentially overturned the 
administration’s official position—ruling that the Geneva Conventions do indeed apply. 
Even in its acceptance of the ruling of the Supreme Court, the administration was sure to 
invoke both the sovereignty and human rights aspects of international law as the moral 
basis for the illegitimacy of non-state actors (and even state actors in the case of the 
Taliban). Dan Bartlett, legal counsel speaking for the Administration, stated:   
We strongly believe that terrorists picked up off the battlefield -- who 
don't represent a nation, revel in killing the innocent, and refuse to wear 
uniforms -- do not qualify for protections under Geneva," [the] White 
House counselor said. "Five members of the Supreme Court disagreed. As 
the president said, we will comply with the ruling.
53
  
The administration was thus legally coerced to alter its stance, and as such lagged 
well behind the military, which had already undertaken what the Washington Post called 
“wrenching internal and public debate since the Abu Ghraib prison scandal came to light 
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in 2004.”54 Importantly, the Torture Memos were only made public in June 2004, shortly 
after Abu Ghraib, which intensified an already feverish legitimacy crisis, affecting the 
image of the U.S. and by extension, that of the U.S. military.  
The torture debate, in drawing attention to the Geneva Conventions and the 
“moral character” of the U.S., highlighted the fragility of the international legal order, 
particularly the laws of war. Bush, in his statement accepting the core of Yoo’s legal 
position on Geneva, had called for “new thinking in the laws of war” where terror is 
concerned.
55
 This was made more salient as a result of the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006. 
Israel, whose tendency had long been to interpret IHL in an expansive manner in order to 
loosen constraints in fighting irregular wars,  helped to contribute to this “new thinking” 
as it sought to undo the damage to its own reputation wrought by global perceptions that 
it had disproportionally harmed civilians when fighting Hezbollah. Embroiled in its own 
legitimacy struggle concerning the use of force, Israeli scholars closely linked to the 
Israeli government and the IDF produced reports that sought to direct "truth-seeking 
audiences," to the correct conclusions and to provide direction on the issue of how killing 
civilians fits into the larger war on terrorism.
56
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The IDF's air strikes and ground attacks against Hezbollah targets located 
in population centers were carried out in accordance with international 
law, which does not grant immunity to a terrorist organization deliberately 
hiding behind civilians supporting it, using them as human shield.
57
   
Israel’s stance demonstrates the elasticity of the norm in the sense that it can 
enable or constrain—note the framing of the issue at hand as the immunity of the terrorist 
rather than the immunity of the civilian. Placing all blame on Hezbollah also echoes 
Rumsfeld’s rhetorical strategy of holding the Taliban and al Qaeda responsible for all 
civilian casualties.  
Perhaps most importantly as it pertains to this study, three things happen within a 
short time span (in 2006): Public and intellectual debates about the ability of anti-torture 
norms to withstand U.S. attempts to bend them to “military necessity” reach a zenith. 
Second, increasing civilian casualties begin to accompany a resurging Taliban in 
Afghanistan. Third, the civilian immunity norm debate begins to follow in the wake of 
the torture debate: interested parties begin to debate whether to loosen civilian immunity 
to confront the increased scope and urgency of the terrorist threat.  
Helen Kinsella, scholar of international law and normative political theory, is one 
of the few to take notice of the close connection between the third (torture) and fourth 
(civilian immunity) conventions.
58
 She argues that the Bush administration’s willingness 
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to violate prohibitions on torture was seen through the lens of the Civilization versus 
Barbarism discourse, which enables (or expands the space for) non-compliance with 
international law. In keeping with historical precedent, since the identity of terrorists has 
been constructed as barbaric, they are seen as outside of the laws that govern civilization. 
On the other hand, the concept of the “civilian” is essential to the very idea of 
“civilization,” and Kinsella argues that Bush’s policy was very careful to strengthen and 
abide by the norms protecting civilians in order to reinforce the exemption of terrorists 
from the protections of international law. On Kinsella’s account, the variance in 
compliance between the third and fourth Geneva Conventions is thus explained by the 
need to reinforce the notion of terrorists as manifesting a wholly illegitimate identity in 
order to neutralize any justice-oriented political claims that might otherwise merit 
consideration.
59
  
While I accept Kinsella’s argument in its basic formulation, she does not account 
for variance in attitudes and policies toward civilian casualties over time. Since, as was 
documented in the Iraq chapter, an important part of Al Qaeda’s (and later the Taliban’s) 
strategic narrative is based on the U.S. treatment of Muslim civilians, my argument is that 
the reputational damage incurred as a result of the torture issue created more pressure for 
the U.S. to strengthen its position vis a vis civilians, in order to counter the opposing 
narrative in the war of ideas.  
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The U.S. image of illegality that was central to its disadvantage in the war of 
ideas in Afghanistan derived from both its international reputation (damaged by the Iraq 
War and the torture issue),
60
 as well as its local interactions with Afghans, which would 
be felt locally but viewed and interpreted by distant audiences through various media. As 
military scholar Robert Cassidy points out, the mere fact of occupying a foreign, 
culturally distant land provides opportunities for the enemy to attack the legitimacy of the 
mission, irrespective of the legitimacy of the initial invasion. Insurgents and terrorists 
rely on the constant stream of media images that highlight their own deeds and the deeds 
of the occupier: 
The recurring images of Western soldiers and combat vehicles 
maneuvering through the streets of Muslim villages represent an illegal 
occupation of the Ummah by infidels to radicalized audiences in Muslim 
countries. Likewise, repeated images of uniformed Western troops and 
Muslim casualties animate opposition, if not hatred, for such endeavors.
61
 
 Making the decision to protect civilians, in addition to calming the insurgency, 
provides a legitimacy bridge by helping to repair the damage done from all sources to 
both the U.S. image in a broad sense as well as the U.S. military’s professionalism more 
specifically, as I will argue below.   
Driven more by concerns about counterinsurgency in Iraq than in Afghanistan, 
attempts to reform military culture in the direction of respect for civilian immunity and 
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human rights took place within the military in the interim period of the Afghanistan 
conflict (2005-2007). While the C.O.I.N. manual was meant to shift military culture 
toward a new kinder, gentler, American way of war, in reality, the thinking behind the 
C.O.I.N. handbook was driven by the urgency of Iraq’s particular situation. Military 
leadership had been increasingly convinced of the necessity to win hearts and minds by 
shifting the emphasis from winning the war of ideas as a secondary matter to a primary 
goal—one that would take precedence over and even, at times, supplant traditional ideas 
of “winning.” As I argued in the previous chapter, the sustained interaction between high 
level military personnel with the human rights community evidenced the shift toward a 
human rights-centered civilian immunity norm. Moreover, this normative orientation was 
central to what Petraeus called the “surge of ideas” whereby winning demanded paying 
attention to competing perspectives in order to get the “big ideas right.”62 The big ideas 
increasingly focused on the international normative context as constraining the strategic 
options.  The idea that the military could revert to punitive population-centered strategies, 
which was considered legitimate not so long ago, was no longer the case. John Nagl 
acknowledges that civilian protection is not the only strategic option insofar as it does not 
flow directly out of the material conditions of counterinsurgency: 
The history of counterinsurgency campaigns tells us that the way to 
succeed -- there are two options. You can either conduct the Roman 
method, where you kill everybody, sow the fields with salt and prevent 
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anybody from living there again. That defeats the insurgency, but it's 
illegal and immoral and absolutely not a solution we can think about.
63
 
Rather, he states, population protection “is the only way to succeed in the modern 
era, in a CNN era.”64 Nagl, a key figure in the writing of C.O.I.N.—and along with 
Petraeus one of its most visible public champions—thus sees the international normative 
context regarding the treatment of civilians as directly constraining the range of possible 
strategies to those which are moral and consistent with U.S. identity.  As in Iraq, early 
interagency early efforts at counterinsurgency in Afghanistan attempted 
counterinsurgency goals such as training the Afghan army (ANA) development, and 
diplomacy, but without resources or a coherent campaign plan, this was done alongside 
“punitive displays of lethal force.”65  As Colonel Robert Cassidy writes, “perception 
creates reality and that perception stems from consistency in deed and message.”66 The 
population must perceive the host nation’s government and its partners as legitimate. 
Information operations must understand the strategic nature of perceptions, since this is 
true not only for the U.S. and coalition forces, but for the insurgents and terrorists as well. 
Asserting certain criteria for legitimacy through the war of ideas also draws attention to 
inconsistencies in deed, which is exploited by the opposition.
67
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Habitualizing: Changing Attitudes Through Identity 
The backdrop to this study, which has been the subject of much recent attention 
for military scholars and journalists, is that the military also struggled to reform its own 
culture to align with the new doctrine.
68
 Though insights gained in Iraq would not be 
applied directly to the Afghanistan conflict until later, how force was used increasingly 
came to be seen as directly relevant to the maintenance of an effective military. The 
willingness of the military to eventually embrace instead of resist the demands of the 
human rights community was therefore motivated at least partly by what Sarah Sewall 
calls its desire to protect its own professionalism.
69
    In order to support what the new 
military leadership saw as the diminished utility of force and, as a result, its own 
transformed role in the implementation of foreign policy, it would need to learn some of 
the discarded lessons of Vietnam.
70
 The military would also need to bring the lessons of 
Vietnam into the present by taking stock of the changes in the post-Vietnam normative 
context.  
                                                          
68
 See, for example, David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and Their Epic Struggle 
for the Future of the United States Army (Three Rivers Press, New York: 2009); Fred Kaplan, The 
Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (Simon and Schuster, New 
York: 2013). 
69
 An interview with Charlie Rose: Sarah Sewall, December 23, 2007, 
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8848; “Introduction,” in U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Manual, University of Chicago edition, 2007. 
70
 Both Petraeus and Nagl wrote PhD dissertations on the lessons of Vietnam. See John A. Nagl, Learning 
to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005; David H. Petraeus, The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of 
military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam era. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1987. 
219 
 
 
The evidence suggests that it gradually became accepted among many in the high 
levels of the military, particularly among those whose work pertained to international 
law, that the strengthened civilian immunity norm had become an increasingly powerful 
symbol of international morality. According to Charles Dunlap, who looks at 
international law from a military perspective,  
The practical impact of law on the war on terror is also well understood 
today. No observer of the post-9/11 era fails to recognize that the most 
serious setbacks for the American military involve not an adversary’s 
battlefield successes, but rather alleged violations of the law by the U.S.’s 
own forces...for members of the American military profession who came 
of age in the era between Vietnam and September 11, the significance of 
legal legitimacy at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels had 
become virtually axiomatic.
71
      
What is less evident in this characterization is that the demands of moral 
legitimacy can transcend even that of legal legitimacy, defined by compliance with 
LOAC. This shift toward legal legitimacy may have begun post-Vietnam, but military 
culture lagged behind the normative environment in terms of recognizing the significance 
of the moral and ethical dimensions of civilian immunity. Further, Dunlap expresses 
typical assumptions within military culture that see civilian casualties as relevant 
primarily because of the democratic character of the domestic public. This focus on the 
domestic public to the exclusion of foreign publics that was seen early on missed the 
point of what David Kilcullen, top counterinsurgency advisor to David Petraeus, termed a 
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“global insurgency.”72 The excessive focus on domestic public opinion also reinforces the 
primacy of force protection since domestic publics tend to be more casualty sensitive 
toward their own soldiers than toward foreign civilians.
73
 Take, for example, the 
“immaculate war” of Kosovo, so named because of zero troop casualties. Such a war only 
appeared immaculate from fifteen thousand feet in the air, but it was instrumental in 
ushering in a new optimism about war fighting based on perceptions that war would be 
freed from its vulnerability to losing domestic public support as a result of troop 
casualties.
74
 This is exactly the sort of thinking that distinguishes pre-C.O.I.N. from post-
C.O.I.N.; that is, perceptions of domestic audiences matter, but the civilians of foreign 
publics were not of great concern. Once top-level officials began to recognize the current 
human-rights centered international normative environment as a defining and permanent 
feature of the security environment, it became evident that a fundamental cultural shift 
within the military would have to be nurtured.   
Whereas the issue of discrimination between combatants and noncombatants had 
previously been viewed through the prism of collateral damage modeling, targeting 
procedures, and the development and acquisition of precision weaponry, it became 
increasingly evident that the issue of civilian deaths was not merely technological nor 
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even doctrinal; the basic attitudes of soldiers on the ground lagged behind. In the 
confusion of two wars with vague, shifting objectives, attitudes toward civilians had 
deteriorated, and consistent with interviews performed for this study, the priority of force 
protection had been thoroughly internalized. What became evident was that 
implementing a civilian-centered, human rights-based strategy was dependent on 
transforming military culture all the way down.  
Appeals to civilian immunity as part of the core values and identity of the military 
began in earnest in 2006, after General David Petraeus was shocked to hear the results of 
an internal study that showed hostile attitudes toward civilians and indicators of high 
levels of acceptance for violations and abuse of civilians among enlisted members of the 
military. In response, Petraeus set into motion the later steps in the process of human 
rights diffusion known as habitualization and institutionalization.
75
 Attempting to 
convince the troops that fighting effectively is contingent on “living our values,” 
including respecting civilian immunity and rejecting torture, he writes: 
Our values and the laws governing warfare teach us to respect human 
dignity, maintain our integrity, and do what is right. Adherence to our 
values distinguishes us from our enemy. This fight depends on securing 
the population, which must understand that we - not our enemies - occupy 
the moral high ground. This strategy has shown results in recent months. 
Al Qaeda's indiscriminate attacks, for example, have finally started to turn 
a substantial proportion of the Iraqi population against it. In view of this, I 
was concerned by the results of a recently released survey conducted last 
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fall in Iraq that revealed an apparent unwillingness on the part of some US 
personnel to report illegal actions taken by fellow members of their units. 
The study also indicated that a small percentage of those surveyed may 
have mistreated noncombatants. This survey should spur reflection on our 
conduct in combat."
76
 
 Note especially that the hallmark of terrorism—“indiscriminate attacks”—is 
emphasized in order to differentiate the virtuous U.S. soldier from what Bush had earlier 
called outlaws and enemies of civilization.  
This effort to appeal to a soldierly ethic consistent with American values was not 
limited to Petraeus as a personality, but rather points to a concerted move that cut across 
the branches of the armed services. James Mattis, Petraeus’s counterpart in the Marines 
and co-leader of the combined forces effort that led to the C.O.I.N. manual, gave the 
annual Stutt Lecture on Ethics in 2006, around the same time as Petraeus’s “Open 
Letter.” The lecture was notable for its intended reach; while the Stutt lectures were 
generally attended by the small numbers of soldiers taking ethics courses, the emphasis 
on ethical decisions in combat was held to be so important at that time that the entire 
brigade was required to attend. Speaking on the importance of morality and values as 
integral to military identity, Mattis was introduced as the embodiment of the just war 
values the military wanted the rank and file to internalize:   
He [Mattis] has inspired his men and women, in the midst of intense 
combat, to engage the brain before the weapon and, above all else, to 
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demonstrate chivalry, decency, and soldierly compassion for both friend 
and foe.
77
  
As Mattis spoke in his straightforward style, he urged the audience to plan ahead 
for moral dilemmas and to never cross the line between killing innocents and combatants 
in order to maintain their own and their country’s honor. Specifically relating being a 
moral soldier to the interests of the U.S., Mattis cites de Toqueville: “America is a good 
country, and if America ever ceases to be good, she will cease to be great.”78 Noting the 
examples of Abu Ghraib and its deleterious effects on efforts in Fallujah, as well as the 
French Algerian experience, he tells the soldiers that a lack of moral behavior has 
negative reputational effects that are strategically damaging and thus an affront against 
one’s peers and one’s country:  
There is no one harsher about what those soldiers did in Abu Ghraib than 
your fellow sailors, Marines, and soldiers on the ground in Iraq right now.  
No one. There was no call for it. It was a bunch of punks is all it was, but a 
lack of moral fortitude cost our country greatly. If you read what happened 
to the French army in Algeria, the 10th Parachute Division breaks the back 
of the terrorists there, but does so in a way that the government falls, and 
France is held up to scorn and ridicule around the world. You must make 
certain that you never do something that brings that sort of scorn or 
ridicule on our own country.
79
 
Mounting Casualties in Afghanistan 
By 2005, as demonstrated in the previous chapter on Iraq, attention within the 
U.S. military had begun to intensively focus on the problem of civilian casualties as 
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anathema to the war of ideas and thus the war on the ground in Iraq. It was also at this 
time that civilian casualties in Afghanistan were starting to be recognized as an 
“operational issue” by ISAF.80  By 2006, the Taliban had definitively re-emerged with a 
new strategy: 
By 2006 there were clear signs that the Taliban were becoming an integral 
part of a wider supranational jihadist movement, to a much greater extent 
than the “older Taliban” ever were. They increasingly appeared to believe 
that the decisive factor in winning the war would not be Western public 
opinion…, but the support of their Muslim brethren...their priority would 
be to mobilize Muslim public opinion worldwide as a source of funding, 
moral support, and volunteer[s].
81
  
At this point, the face of the conflict was international, because of the coalition, 
but also American since U.S. and British troops shouldered much of the burden for 
ongoing combat operations in the ongoing OEF.
82
 While the international presence may 
have diluted responsibility for (and therefore legitimacy problems associated with) 
civilian casualties, the “Americans” remained very much the face of the war to ordinary 
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Afghans.
83
 As civilian casualties increased, the Afghani population gradually became 
seen as increasingly strategically important, particularly since Karzai, President of 
Afghanistan, made first private, and then public statements condemning the killing of 
civilians.
84
  
As it became apparent that the insurgency was emerging in full force, more 
careful attention was paid to estimating the effects of fighting on civilians. Initial reports 
highlighting civilian deaths came not from the U.S., however, but from international 
concerns about the deteriorating security environment and its effects on the stabilizing 
mission of ISAF. The Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board, “made up of the Afghan 
government, its key foreign backers and the UN” reported that in 2006, nearly four 
thousand people were killed in the fighting, with about one thousand thought to be 
civilians. Results of the report were publicized by the BBC, which noted that both 
corruption of the Afghan government and civilian casualties were “alienating” Afghans 
and “hampering those fighting the insurgency.”85 Nevertheless, international support 
persisted, and pursuing kinetic operations to defeat the insurgency was seen as legitimate 
by many at this point. The Japanese ambassador Kenzo Oshima, part of the Security 
Council delegation,    
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told reporters in Kabul that the most important challenge was the fight 
against the Taleban  insurgency, and that opium production, which was 
fuelling the violence, was also a major problem. But he added that the 
international community would continue to support Afghanistan in its 
efforts towards peace and reconstruction.
86
 
Even in the face of civilian casualties, then, and with the growing recognition of 
an insurgency, the conflict in Afghanistan produced nowhere near the intense 
international pressure as did the war in Iraq. This was not clearly an issue of American  
legitimacy; corruption in the Afghan government meant that finger-pointing by Karzai 
about civilian casualties was tainted by his own efforts to deflect from more fundamental 
issues of governance and legitimacy that he faced.
87
 The leadership of the ISAF, though it 
had been led by NATO since 2003, was changing frequently, which made it difficult to 
coordinate a sustained response. Probably most importantly, however, the U.S. was not in 
any position, because of the crisis in Iraq, to consider any large-scale strategic changes. 
The impetus toward C.O.I.N. and population protection in Afghanistan thus severely 
lagged behind material conditions. As one high level military official put it, it was not a 
conscious doctrinal decision to tolerate civilian casualties, but rather a response to a 
limited scope of alternatives. In terms of this study, the credibility and legitimacy issues 
associated with failure in Iraq, which at this point was disintegrating into civil war, 
crowded out that of Afghanistan, and therefore material factors such as a lack of 
resources took precedence in shaping operations.  
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2007-2012: From Iraq to Afghanistan 
By 2007, Iraq was beginning to turn because of the theater-wide adoption of 
C.O.I.N., the surge in troops, and the Anbar Awakening, and at the same time, civilian 
casualties in Afghanistan were becoming higher profile. Three things had occurred by 
November 2007: U.N. figures showed that in 2007, more civilians were killed by pro-
Afghan government forces than by the Taliban; 2) a U.N report showed that civilian 
casualties were the most important factor motivating suicide bombings in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, suicide bombers did not favor targeting civilians, creating an unfavorable 
juxtaposition between terrorism and military behavior. 3) Finally, support for the 
coalition presence was disintegrating within Afghanistan.
88
  Unlike the old Taliban, the 
neo-Taliban had become quite adept at using media to their advantage. Cassidy writes 
that after 2002, the group quickly adapted to the information environment and “now 
recognizes the importance of news media in determining the outcome of an irregular war 
of ideas.” He explains 
Learning from al-Qaeda’s successes with information warfare, the neo-
Taliban now relies on media as a powerful instrument in waging 
psychological warfare. The Taliban’s global media campaign has two 
audiences: their supporters and potential guerrilla recruits, and the 
populations of their enemies. The number of Coalition-induced “civilian 
casualties” has become an important focus of the Taliban’s information 
operations.  In some instances, Taliban spokespersons have called the 
international media in Kabul within minutes of a NATO airstrike, thus 
getting their message on civilian casualties out before the official 
Coalition statement  and shaping the information environment to fit the 
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Taliban narrative…In Afghanistan, the first messages, whether correct or 
incorrect and regardless of the means of transmission—tend to stick and 
create a perception of reality.
89
 
At this time, however, most attention was still directed to Iraq. Early efforts to 
mitigate casualties were piecemeal and not successful.
90
  According to the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the numbers of civilians killed in 2008 was 839, 
nearly three hundred more than in 2007. This was less proportionately than the Taliban, 
who had begun direct intimidation tactics against civilians, including using suicide 
bombings in residential areas.
91
 Though the scales were tipped in the identity contest 
between pro-government forces and the Taliban, it was still a lose-lose since the aim of 
pro-government forces is to not only refrain from casualties but to provide protection 
from insurgents.
92
 Even with the change of leadership to General McKiernan, who 
recognized the problem as a strategic one, the central problem was still seen as the 
necessity to militarily destroy the insurgency.  
The Carr Center Conferences Conclude 
In the meantime, the series of Human Rights conferences led by Sarah Sewall had 
been focused largely on Iraq. As the series came to a conclusion in 2008, the sentiments 
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expressed by military, human rights, and at this point even government participants 
showed a remarkable convergence, especially considering the distance in perspectives 
that marked their beginnings in 2001.  Specifically, the conference saw an emphasis on 
the strategic aspects of following civilian-centered human rights norms, with moral 
behavior and its importance to identity now seen as central rather than collateral to 
military operations. Legitimacy is now specifically seen as the key concept linking the 
moral and strategic aspects of civilian casualties: 
Human rights embody the ideals of justice and fairness which should 
animate and undergird an “American version of COIN” – including when 
America provides support for countries carrying out COIN operations. 
Liberal, democratic countries face specific problems during COIN 
operations as they balance the competing demands of human rights, 
liberty, security, and violence. However, it is in the strategic and moral 
interest of liberal, democratic countries to affirm their adherence to human 
rights and civilian protection when carrying out COIN operations 
otherwise they risk forfeiting moral and political superiority and thus 
legitimacy.
93
 
Importantly, this last conference seeks to “learn lessons” that extend beyond Iraq 
and Afghanistan to carry into future operations. One of the lessons discussed is that the 
use of American force is tied to an ongoing problem of perceptions about its ideology, 
identity, and place in the larger international order. One discussion focused on power 
issues that form the context for C.O.I.N.: 
American irregular warfare and COIN are often viewed as subsidiary to 
the question: is the United States a modern imperial power? American 
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irregular warfare and COIN can be viewed as manifestations of 
Imperialism and thus can garner anti-imperial or at least anti-hegemonic 
responses.
94
 
Recognizing the war of ideas as an enduring feature of the new political 
landscape, some participants noted that “the liberal, democratic worldview must enter 
into the realm of debating opposing ideologies connected to the problem of political 
legitimacy.”95 One participant put it this way:  “there is one golden rule in COIN: does 
the government or the insurgent have greater legitimacy or a ‘credible vision of the 
future’?96 Someone from within the government posed the question as to how ideologies 
are best countered. A panelist responded by saying: “we should embody our ideals in the 
actions of our soldiers on the battlefield by ensuring that they conform to the rule of law 
and human rights.” Another participant noted that COIN should focus on discrediting 
insurgents by demonstrating how they harm civilians which can contribute to 
undermining the appeal of their movement.
97
 
Still others noted the need for thought directed toward non-military strategic 
communication efforts. The danger of concentrating this issue within a military context 
lies in the inherent tensions in using force as an instrument for what are primarily moral 
and ethical problems, which means that though “moral and ethical issues lie at the core of 
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COIN thinking, [they] are often relegated to the sidelines in favor of “harsher force.”98 A 
more comprehensive and far-reaching conception of the war of ideas was discussed 
wherein “the liberal, democratic countries…consolidate and articulate a broadly 
appealing worldview that does not focus solely on the benefits of capitalism.” 99 
C.O.I.N. Goes to Washington: Diffusion of Ideas  
Other developments within the government show the diffusion of the ideas 
developed in dialogue with the military and human rights communities. One example is 
the increasing strategic concern for public opinion viewed through the idea of a strategic 
narrative focused on civilians as the key to winning the global war on terror. The annual 
security threat assessment delivered by the National Intelligence Director to the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence echoes the concerns of the military:  
Are the United States and its allies losing the war of ideas to the virulent 
message of the terrorists? Does the continued existence and operation of a 
separate CIA system of -- for terrorists employing secret interrogation 
techniques undermined our moral standing and the willingness of other 
countries to cooperate with us? Is our continued military presence in Iraq 
generating more terrorists and more Islamic radicals around the world than 
we are capturing or that we are killing?
100
 
Though the statement mentions Iraq, the global political implications rather than 
just theater implications are being emphasized. Furthermore, al Qaeda begins to re-enter 
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the conversation about public opinion and civilian casualties, and connections are made 
between regions and theaters:  
We have seen notable progress in Muslim opinion turning against terrorist 
groups like al-Qa’ida. Over the last year and a half, al-Qa’ida has faced 
significant public criticism from prominent religious leaders and fellow 
extremists primarily regarding the use of brutal and indiscriminate 
tactics—particularly those employed by al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and al-
Qa’ida in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)— that have resulted in 
the deaths of Muslim civilians. Given the increased pressure posed by 
these criticisms, al-Qa’ida leaders increasingly have highlighted enduring 
support for the Taliban and the fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in 
other regions where they portray the West being at war with Islam and al-
Qa’ida as the vanguard of the global terrorist movement.101 
The Obama/McChrsytle Era and Afghanistan’s C.O.I.N.: 2009-2010 
Regardless of the growing recognition of civilian casualties as a core strategic 
problem, it was not until 2009, when Obama’s foreign policy reprioritized Afghanistan 
and General Stanley McChrystal assumed command, that Afghanistan got its own 
population-protection centric C.O.I.N. strategy.  One participant interviewed for this 
study suggested that as more attention was paid to the perspectives and beliefs of 
Afghans themselves, it became evident that Afghan perceptions of the U.S. were shaped 
against the backdrop of the memory of past experiences with a foreign presence, 
especially of the harsh, punitive strategies adopted by the Soviet Union against the 
population, and of the U.S. abandonment after the Soviet withdrawal. A deficit of trust 
and legitimacy thus already existed to some extent in the local population, made worse by 
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the civilian casualties over time. Moreover, the strength of the U.S. and its ability to 
protect the population from the Taliban was seen as key to changing perceptions of the 
Afghans toward the national government and the entire state system they were trying to 
implement. 
As part of the institutionalization of C.O.I.N. principles, in 2009, the Marine 
Corps University and Marine Corps Foundation co-hosted a symposium focused on the 
importance of leadership in counterinsurgency operations. In attempting to apply lessons 
from Iraq to the ongoing challenges of “winning” in Afghanistan, a renewed emphasis on 
the war of ideas as crucial to the war on the ground was articulated in terms of a 
redefinition of “strength” as communication via deeds: 
Convincing these ultimate arbiters—the Afghan people—and defeating 
the Taliban’s strategy requires an effective communications strategy. The 
difficulty of persuading local populations and communicating effective 
messages of strength and resolve in a foreign culture cannot be overstated. 
An effective communications strategy can only be delivered by Afghans 
themselves—and must be underwritten by coalition deeds and acceptable 
behavior, not just hollow rhetoric. Actions inevitably speak louder than 
talking points. The most powerful message is the conduct of the various 
actors on the ground: U.S., Afghan, and Coalition security forces.
102
 
It was against this backdrop, along with the change in administrations from Bush 
to Obama, that General David McKiernan, who had framed he fight in conventional 
terms of destroying the enemy, was replaced with General Stanley McChrystle.
103
 In 
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McChrystle’s recently published memoirs, he tellingly introduces his experience in 
Afghanistan by way of Thomas Hobbes’s Behemoth: “The power of the mighty hath no 
foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people.”104 McChrystle went further than 
had even David Petraeus in Iraq in attributing failure on the battlefield to civilian 
casualties. One of the first things he did when arriving in Afghanistan was to consult with 
Karzai, who immediately told him that civilian casualties were the biggest threat to 
success. While Karzai’s assessment alone may have been regarded with some suspicion, 
and indeed he was considered by Karl Eikenberry to be the main impediment to success 
in Afghanistan,
105
 McChrystle also listened intently to public opinion within Afghanistan, 
which overwhelmingly suggested a lack of trust based on civilian casualties. The 
reasoning within the population was that since the U.S. could avoid casualties with its 
precision weaponry, it must have therefore not valued Afghan lives in comparison to 
American lives.
106
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McChrystle’s earliest response was to publish a “Tactical Directive” meant for 
both American and ISAF personnel, imploring them to “avoid the trap of winning tactical 
victories—but suffering strategic defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive 
damage and thus alienating the people.”107  McChrystle’s reasoning evidenced little 
concern for the effects of casualties extending beyond the local Afghan audience, though 
portions of his Directive were publicly released “to ensure a broader awareness of the 
intent AND SCOPE OF General McChrystle’s guidance to ISAF and USFOR-A forces.” 
What is notable is that he internalizes Petraeus’s new civilian-centric counterinsurgency 
logic and pushes it even further, defining victory
108
 as contingent on the moral 
perceptions of the Afghan people:  
While this is also a legal and a moral issue it is also an overarching 
operational issue—clear eyed recognition that loss of popular support will 
be decisive in this conflict. The Taliban cannot defeat us but we can defeat 
ourselves.
109
  
While McChrystle does not articulate a connection between the moral, legal, and 
operational issues, his statements support my argument that the normative (especially the 
moral) environment provides the crucial social context in which the fight occurs and 
therefore becomes imbued with strategic weight.  
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One interviewee conducted for this study stated that the perspective of some 
within the military is that McChrsytle’s Directive may even have overplayed the case for 
civilian casualties. His particular reading of civilian casualty mitigation was controversial 
because it was too restrictive about the use of force, allowing little room for flexibility 
and judgment, for example requiring special permission for operations involving “air to 
ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds.”110 McChrystle 
wanted his men to understand the idea that civilians were the new center of gravity, and 
so soon after the Directive he released the ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency 
Guidance, which specifically addressed the identity contest between the intervening force 
and the insurgents as dependent on a contrast between those who hurt civilians and those 
who protect civilians:  
If civilians die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot them-we still 
failed to protect them from harm…Think of counterinsurgency as an 
argument to earn the support of the people…We must undermine the 
insurgent argument while offering a more compelling alternative.”111 
In his Initial Commanders’ Assessment, the study resulting from Obama’s 
ordered strategic review, he “redefines the fight” calling for a more highly resourced 
C.O.I.N. strategy. In his bid for more troops and a new direction, 
112
 he specifically 
addresses the war of ideas and its reliance on deeds:  
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Many describe the conflict in Afghanistan as a war of ideas, which I 
believe to be true. However, this is a 'deeds-based' information 
environment where perceptions derive from actions, such as how we 
interact with the population and how quickly things improve. The key to 
changing perceptions lies in changing the underlying truths. We must 
never confuse the situation as it stands with the one we desire, lest we risk 
our credibility.
113
 
McChrystle, it should be noted, is hardly a proponent of nonviolence. Rather, he 
was a Ranger whose most notable accomplishment in Iraq was supervising the killing of 
AQI’s al Zarqawi as well as Saddam Hussein’s sons Uday and Qusay. It is safe to 
assume, then, that McChrystle’s emphasis does not derive from a personal preference; 
rather, he emphasizes that the goal must change to recognize the increased importance of 
the social aspect of military behavior in counterinsurgency, and that military culture in 
Afghanistan must change to accommodate the goal: “Pre-occupied with protection of our 
own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and 
psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect.”114  
Obama’s approved strategy called for a mixture of force, both in rolling back the 
momentum of the Taliban and in going after Al Qaeda, and improving governance, with a 
very short timeline in which to accomplish any gains at all. Creating a sense of legitimacy 
about the behavior of the intervening forces is supposed to work in partnership with 
improved governance and increased training of the Afghanistan Security Forces. 
Legitimacy problems in Afghanistan were not limited to the issue of civilian casualties, 
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however, and so McChrystle’s emphasis on this aspect came to be seen by some as an 
over-emphasis. Even Sarah Sewall agreed.  
Petraeus, head of CentCom at this time, suggested that McChrystal allow an 
independent team to assess the conditions concerning civilian casualties on the ground. 
Sarah Sewall, the human rights scholar who partnered with Petraeus in leading the 
C.O.I.N. revision conference, was to lead the team, and McChrystle accepted her offer, 
hoping to gain insight as to why some of his men did not seem to understand or embrace 
his Counterinsurgency Guidance. While Sewall had long worked for and appreciated the 
measures implemented to protect civilians, she noted the “toxic” atmosphere of fear 
about civilian casualties that had been created by too restrictive guidelines.
 115
  
Attributing the atmosphere to groupthink at the highest levels, she boldly told the General 
that he had forgotten to include force in the equation. Kaplan describes it vividly:  
Sarah Sewall, the Ivy League human –rights scholar and the only woman 
in the room, looked unblinkingly at Stan McChrystal, the peerless 
professional killer, and said, “General, counterinsurgency is a combination 
of offense, defense, and stability operations. Don’t forget the offense. 
McChrystal growled, “Don’t tell me how to run my war.”116 
When McChrystle resigned summarily in 2010 for a media scandal involving an 
article published by Rolling Stone magazine,
117
 Petraeus took over.  Obama had earlier 
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declared Afghanistan as a “necessary war” as opposed to Iraq as a “war of choice.”118 
This necessity was framed in terms of Afghanistan’s dire condition providing a safe 
haven for terrorism. With time running out, Petraeus emphasized attacking al Qaeda and 
the Taliban directly (CT or counterterrorism), while still trying to lessen civilian 
casualties. Civilian casualties figured into the calculus, but the goal became making 
whatever progress was possible, and so Petraeus issued a new tactical directive loosening 
the guidelines.
119
  
2012: Institutionalization Continues post-C.O.I.N. 
It soon became evident that Afghanistan held poor prospects for a successful 
counterinsurgency. This was partially seen as a lack of time commitment, given that 
NATO countries were losing public support for the war effort, but also because the aims 
of the intervening forces to create a stable government that the local tribes could support 
and identify with appeared to be at odds with the power-maintenance goals of Karzai. 
Beyond Karzai himself, corruption pervaded nearly every aspect of rule— in many ways 
it formed the foundation for whatever order did exist. Moreover, the mountainous terrain 
and the fact that Pakistan provided a safe haven, with some elements supporting the 
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Taliban and al Qaeda, meant that it was impossible to fully defeat the insurgents, who 
could always retreat and reappear. 
120
 
As troops were reduced and counterinsurgency goals took a back seat to 
counterterrorism,
121
 the military’s efforts to institutionalize the lessons learned about 
civilian casualties continued. The Afghanistan Handbook of Civilian Casualties was 
published in 2012, and in contrast to McChrystal’s emphasis on only local effects of 
civilian casualties, this handbook takes a longer, broader view of its effects on American 
war-making.  Emphasizing civilian immunity as a core value, it begins by stating that  
The U.S. military has long been committed to upholding the law of armed 
conflict and minimizing collateral damage. This includes the killing or 
wounding of noncombatant civilians — described in this handbook as 
civilian casualties or CIVCAS — as well as damage to facilities, 
equipment, or other property.
122
  
Importantly, the handbook links the need for altered behavior toward civilians to 
the larger normative context, which has become strategic because publics now know 
what happens on the battlefield due to communications technology: 
Due to several factors, the impact of CIVCAS has increased to the point 
that single tactical actions can have strategic consequences and limit 
overall freedom of action. These factors include: the increased 
transparency of war, where tactical actions can be recorded and 
transmitted worldwide in real time; increased expectations for the United 
States’ conduct of war in light of improved precision and overall 
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capabilities; and the enemy exploitation of CIVCAS to undermine U.S. 
legitimacy and objectives.
123
 
Note that the legitimacy problem is seen as directly attributable to the identity 
contest on the ground, and it is connected to American image and the use of force in the 
larger, global sense. 
The military has also worked to institutionalize the lessons learned about civilians 
in a way that looks past Afghanistan to the future of war, regardless of whether it is 
counterinsurgency or not. Working with human rights groups such as the Center for 
Civilian Protection, founded out of the specific experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
various doctrinal materials have integrated “best practices” on civilian protection. The 
organization notes its involvement with the military in developing these plus the first 
handbook on civilian casualty mitigation, which came out in July 2012: 
We were the only NGO on the drafting committee of the US Army’s first 
handbook on the protection of civilians The US Army Civilian Casualty 
Mitigation ATTP (Army Tactics Training Procedures), published in July 
2012.  We are working with the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, the 
US Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and the Joint 
Center for Operational Analysis to insert civilian protection concerns and 
amends throughout all relevant publications.
124
 
The Civilian Casualty Mitigation Handbook seeks to make sense of the issue of 
civilian casualties in terms of broad effects. Much like the Afghanistan handbook, it first 
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appeals to the ethical identity of the soldier and then states that what is legally 
permissible is not always the issue:  
Protection of civilians is at the heart of the profession of arms. Consistent 
with law and ethics, a Soldier must balance the necessity of using force 
with the likely effects of using force. While the use of force may be 
legally justified, not all permissible force is necessary in every case, and 
forces must also consider second-order effects. A U.S. legal investigation 
summarized this point: “Just because we can shoot does not mean that we 
should shoot.”125 
Viewing the normative environment as inherently part of the strategic 
environment, the handbook expresses recognition of the social-political aspects of war: 
Army units conduct unified land operations in complex and populous 
environments. To the extent possible, civilians (including those loyal to 
the enemy) must be protected from the effects of combat. In addition to 
legal and humanitarian reasons, Army units must mitigate CIVCASs 
because they create lasting repercussions that impair post-conflict 
reconstruction and reconciliation. CIVCASs lead to ill will among the 
host-nation population and political pressure that can limit freedom of 
action of military forces. If Army units fail to protect civilians, for 
whatever reason, the legitimacy of U.S. operations is likely to be 
questioned by the host nation and other partners. CIVCAS mitigation is 
critical to ensure that Army units uphold Army values and comply with 
legal authorities while conducting operations… Focused attention on 
CIVCAS mitigation is an important investment to maintain legitimacy and 
ensure eventual success. Failure to prevent CIVCASs will undermine 
national policy objectives as well as the mission of Army units, while 
assisting adversaries.
 126 
 
 
 
                                                          
125
 Department of the Army, ATTP 3-37.31: Civilian Casualty Mitigation Handbook (Washington DC: July 
2012,) 3, online: https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html. 
126
 Ibid., 1-5. 
 
243 
 
 
Conclusion 
The postponed adoption of a variant of C.O.I.N. focused on civilian protection 
(and the waning commitment to the more difficult long term goals of C.O.I.N. soon after 
it was adopted) presents an interesting contrast to Iraq. While the Iraq case study 
represents the early phases of human rights diffusion that occurred early in the 
development of C.O.I.N. doctrine within the military at large, I find evidence that the 
later years of the Afghanistan conflict see a continuation of human rights diffusion in the 
form of habitualization and institutionalization, which was particularly evident in the role 
that human rights groups assumed (as advisors on the ground rather than as partners in 
dialogue).  Appeals to military values and identity were employed to promote the 
processes of habitualization of civilian immunity within the military. I find little support 
for the direct influence of the human rights community in shaping the adoption of 
Afghanistan’s version of C.O.I.N.; however the presence of human rights scholars in the 
later phases of norm diffusion were noted, particularly in the institutionalization of the 
norm through tracking, assessing, and documenting lessons learned. Earlier forms of 
human rights diffusion are present in this conflict as well, but not definitive. The 
instrumental use of CIN was employed early in the Afghanistan conflict, but the 
perception across two administrations was that the legitimacy of the invasion in 
Afghanistan was not in question (even though the later growing civilian casualties did 
present legitimacy problems).  
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Evidence for the conditions under which civilian protection occurs is mixed. As 
the recognition grew that a loss of monopoly of force could not be overcome by 
escalation of force alone, and that attempting to regain control would entail unacceptable 
levels of civilian casualties and increase oppositional recruiting, efforts to shape strategy 
and doctrine in keeping with civilian protection took root. Based on the evidence 
presented about perceptions of some important actors within the military as well as non-
military personnel involved in the C.O.I.N. efforts, I find strong support for the argument 
that material conditions alone do not determine the content nor adoption of innovated 
doctrine. In fact, material conditions were thought to run counter to a successful 
counterinsurgency campaign, particularly the geopolitical complications of a hostile 
population and porous border in neighboring Pakistan. However, material conditions did 
matter insofar as a lack of resources created the conditions for increased civilian 
casualties for many years. Moreover, it was only with the risk of failure in Afghanistan 
that other strategies were considered.  
The evidence presented supports the argument that ideational factors associated 
with civilian casualties were seen as a primary driver in the strategic choice of C.O.I.N.. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence supports the argument that the civilian immunity norm, 
as embedded in the global normative environment, constrained counterinsurgency options 
to those in line with its legal strictures and especially its moral spirit, even beyond what is 
required by law. Finally, I find mixed support for my main thesis that legitimacy based 
on a strategic narrative in the context of the war on terror is a primary factor driving the 
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content and adoption of a population protection strategy in Afghanistan. Evidence of a 
concern for strategic communication is definitely present, but legitimacy in Afghanistan 
was more variable and complex than this study had anticipated—the surplus of 
legitimacy present in the beginning did not carry through the conflict. Legitimacy issues 
that might have concentrated on the U.S. alone were spread amongst many actors in 
Afghanistan—coalition partners and the leadership and power brokers within Afghan 
society, Pakistan, the Taliban itself.  Despite the state of legitimacy concerns at any given 
point in the conflict, the overall thrust of the military was to recognize civilian casualties 
as an enduring issue of legitimacy whenever force is used.
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
As has been shown in the previous chapters, in two theaters of war in the last 
decade, the U.S. military changed its attitudes toward civilian casualties, demonstrating a 
profound and significant movement from pushing the limits of civilian immunity by 
favoring the norm’s sovereignty dimensions toward interpreting the norm through a 
human rights lens, transcending even its legal requirements under IHL.  In each case, the 
campaigns were both considered conventional successes in the invasion phase, when 
toppling the regime was the goal. Each experienced local resistance combined with 
foreign “terrorist” intervention, and both went through a difficult period in which a lack 
of initial planning for post-invasion stability operations contributed to inconsistent and 
ineffective responses to what would grow into full-blown insurgencies. Most importantly, 
all of this took place within the context of globalized communications media that 
produced multiple audiences for the United States, its allies, and its foes. 
Key leaders within each campaign read the signs of impending strategic failure 
long before the actual strategic failure. A core group within the human rights community 
participated in assessing each conflict, although in different ways—as part of shaping the 
initial C.O.I.N. doctrine in Iraq and as part of the assessment of the situation on the 
ground in Afghanistan.
1
  As summarized in Table 2 (below), I have identified a crucial 
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juncture in each case that preceded a shift in doctrine, and in both cases, this juncture was 
defined by an increasing concern for and emphasis on the effects of civilian casualties on 
the ability to prevail according to the foreign policy commitments defined by the civilian 
administration. Whereas civilian casualties were seen as collateral damage in the initial 
phases of each conflict, such casualties became seen as a key issue of legitimacy as each 
war progressed. 
In order to assess the significance of the empirical chapters, I will break down the 
claims and compare each. Since both Iraq and Afghanistan were fought under the 
overarching framework of the Global War on Terror, an overall pattern of becomes 
evident when the cases are shown side by side. In this sense, each case impacts the other, 
and the U.S. military demonstrates an overall organizational shift toward defining human 
rights as a strategic concern rather than as a constraint that entails strategic costs. Further, 
the relationship between the cases is important to consider since they competed for the 
attention and resources of the same institution, and involved many of the same personnel.  
Regulative Effects 
Regulative effects of the CIN were indicated by the movement in attitudes toward 
civilian casualties. When a norm is treated as a variable, the norm itself cannot be 
measured through behavior, so attitudes about behavior were used. The invasion of each 
conflict was used as a baseline, and in both conflicts, sovereignty-based, or enabling 
attitudes were present toward civilian casualties. This was evident in the early rhetoric 
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followed the priorities of the military. Afghanistan was barely mentioned in the conference records, for 
example, while Iraq was the primary focus of the military. It was only when the military shifted toward 
Afghanistan that key human rights advocates were invited to conduct civilian casualty reports.  
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and public statements in response to criticism about civilian casualties. A temporal 
element is also present and is supported by the identification of crucial junctures at which 
civilian casualties were seen to be strategically problematic by at least some in the 
military. These crucial junctures preceded the innovation process as well as the attitudes 
toward civilian casualties. The innovation process likewise was also identified as a key 
marker for each case, since this study is not about the actual increase in resources that 
marks a “surge” or visible strategy change but rather the shift in perception and analysis 
that triggered the process of adopting a civilian-protection focus.  
Table 2 shows that both cases went through a similar process in terms of an 
invasion that was uneventful in terms of civilian casualties (that is, from the perspective 
of the military at the time,). Both experienced a turning point in the war marked by a 
growing concern for civilian casualties (CIVCAS), followed by a concern for a 
legitimacy crisis in terms of damage to the American war-fighting image, and then both 
underwent a process of doctrinal innovation. The differences in time are striking, 
however. In Iraq, the rising civilian casualties, the crucial juncture and the legitimacy 
crisis are compressed and intensified within a short time frame. The innovation process 
begins in earnest within the organization within a very short time after the crisis is 
perceived.  
In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the time frame stretches out over a decade, and 
there is a significant period of almost no attention to civilian casualties in the global 
press, nor any real sense that the war had reached a crisis in any other way during that 
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time (about 2002-2004). The table above shows a lag; the period of growing concern for 
civilian casualties was relatively long ( 3-4 years), and the innovation response was slow.
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of Findings 
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 Overall, civilian casualties appeared to be perceived as a less urgent problem than 
in Iraq. Below I will examine whether the same is true of the constitutive effects.  
Constitutive Effects 
Constitutive effects were supported by analysis of some of the key points of the 
narrative; specifically I looked for whether and how the constraining normative 
environment came to be seen as a key part of the security environment. Since a narrative 
is the way actors literally tell the story of events in a way that creates meaning, these do 
not represent variables because they are not independent. Rather, they rather represent 
overlapping, mutually constitutive relationships.  Indicators included the use of the 
language of CIN, the invocation of identity in relation to interests, and the eventual 
connection between words and deeds in the form of linking the outcome of the war of 
ideas to the outcome of the operational war.  
The use of  CIN language (just war, civilians, rule of law, et cetera) indicates a 
constitutive effect insofar as it is seen as a legitimizing resource by which to locate one’s 
actions and interests in relation to one’s identity within the social order.  This was 
demonstrated to be the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, I argued that the 
constitutive effects of the CIN are such that the legitimizing language creates both a 
positive resource and a potential rhetorical trap. This was also found to be the case in 
both theaters. Specific articulations of the connection between identity and interests were 
made in response to the legitimacy crisis suffered as a result of civilian casualties (as 
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explained above). The rhetorical trap
2
 was created through the appeal to CIN early on by 
the civilian leadership. The threat to reputation or identity pertaining to civilian casualties 
was increasingly seen as problematic over time, and interests were redefined in each case 
to support a definition of “winning” that was consistent with civilian-protection. 
Moreover, the effect of this was not only in language but in action, since the language 
was followed by actual changes in policy, as well as attempts to institutionalize those 
changes in policy and in attitudes within the organization.  
Finally, the interpretive analysis found evidence that the war of ideas was 
increasingly seen as important, not just for ideological advantage and for curbing anti-
Americanism in general, but for how perceptions about American values and identity 
affected support for the opposition. Civilian casualties were seen as the key link between 
the two in Iraq, particularly since targeted audiences for the war of ideas existed at the 
local, regional, and even global levels. Direct material results in Iraq were evident in the 
form of foreign fighters feeding into Iraq to support AQI. In Afghanistan, however, the 
connection between the war of ideas and the war on the ground is not as strong. The 
reason for this is that, although the local population was seen as important to win over—
and reducing civilian casualties were definitive in this regard, a lesser degree or intensity 
of concern was conveyed about the effects of losing the war of ideas for regional 
audiences (the Pakistani audience, for example, who did provide a source of foreign 
fighters).  
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I suggest two possibilities for the exertion of uneven effects: first, strategic 
distinctions were made about audiences in terms of fence-sitters versus irreconcilables. 
Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, especially in the FTA, was already extremely high. 
Identity loyalties may already have been decided and so “hearts and minds” may have 
been calculated to already have been lost. Second, the conflict in Afghanistan was truly 
an international effort, especially as time progressed. This means that responsibility for 
casualties is dispersed, along with damage to image or reputation. This also means that 
the attention of global audiences would likely be diffuse as well; in other words, with so 
many horses in the race, many different possible focal points exist,  or a single diffuse 
focal point, such as N.A.T.O., for example. While foreign audiences focused 
responsibility for the war almost exclusively on the United States in Iraq, domestic 
audience costs within member states would likely figure more highly in Afghanistan. 
3
 
One other possibility will be discussed below. 
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Conditions 
Table 3. Conditions of Strategic Effects  
 Iraq Afghanistan 
Loss of Monopoly on Force High Moderate 
Legitimacy of Invasion Weak High 
Need to Delegitimize Terror High Moderate 
 
The above table summarizes my findings on the three conditions I identified as 
impacting when the CIN becomes seen as part of the strategic environment.  My 
argument was that, based on a social conception of power, state interests change over 
time and that this is evident as sovereignty-based attitudes toward civilian casualties 
move toward a more constraining, human rights-based outlook. I identified three 
conditions under which this occurs: when the normative/discursive framework of 
protecting civilians is seen as essential to delegitimizing the enemy; when the legitimacy 
of the initial invasion is in question, and civilian casualties are seen as damaging to the 
international image by increasing that gap; finally, when regaining a monopoly on force 
is seen as impossible to achieve through material force alone because civilian casualties 
increase support for the insurgency. I argued that, together, these provide the conditions 
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under which aligning with human rights-centered norms eventually comes to be seen as 
the only viable strategy in fighting insurgencies.   
Aspects of the normative environment highlighted in this study derive from the 
observation that terrorism, which has been discursively shaped in recent decades by the 
U.S. and Israel in their attempts to maintain control over the strategic narrative about 
illegitimacy of force as used by opposing non-state actors. Drawing on the normative 
strength of the CIN to rhetorically strengthen anti-terror norms has resulted in global 
publics that increasingly accept the definition of terrorism as “killing civilians.” The first 
condition posited in this study was that CIN would be seen as part of the strategic 
environment when drawing attention to enemy violations of the CIN is seen as crucial to 
delegitimizing terrorism—and thus the ends, means, and identities of  enemy non-state 
actors.  The rhetorical trap is created when a state fails to live up to its own rhetoric—
when words do not match the deeds. The evidence suggests that targeted publics and 
those who identify with them are quick to recognize the contradiction, even hypocrisy of 
applying double standards. While in the past, states have found plenty of room to 
maneuver within the norm through the “collateral damage” claim, the war on terror has 
forced powerful states such as the U.S. to clarify its own moral purpose, and by 
extension, its own claims to the use of just force.  
The strategic use of the norm thus creates pressure to live up to the standards 
previously identified as morally non-negotiable. The evidence presented in this study 
supports the conclusion that this was the case in Iraq because AQI and its foreign fighters 
were creating anti-American and anti-government alliances in the Sunni triangle. For 
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regional and global audiences, the fact that the conflict in Iraq had become characterized 
by an actual war on terrorists needed to be brought to the fore.  It was also necessary to 
delegitimize terrorists based on their identity as killers of civilians in Afghanistan 
because of the alliances between al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban. I list 
this condition as weak or variable in the case of Afghanistan because of the previously 
mentioned reason that delegitimizing terrorism was not as urgent in Afghanistan because, 
relative to the U.S. identity, the Taliban was already widely considered as illegitimate 
because of the group’s proximity to the events of 9/11.  
I find that the recognition of the loss of a monopoly of force coincided with the 
shift toward the recognition of the importance of ideational/ethical factors within the 
normative environment, specifically CIN.  For Afghanistan, however, the shift away from 
conventional force may have been less complete because although avoiding civilian 
casualties was an important focus of doctrinal change, the physical destruction of al 
Qaeda was the original legitimating discourse for the war.   This leads to the next 
condition, the impact of the legitimacy of the war itself.  
First, I argued that the recognition of the loss of a monopoly on force was one of 
those conditions. This refers to a shift in attitude rather than a material loss—as well as 
an acceptance that exerting more force was an insufficient strategy to regain that 
monopoly. This shift was seen within the military as a gradual understanding of the 
evolution of the character of war that renders political solutions more important than 
purely military solutions. This understanding as it applied to the particular conflicts came 
earlier in Iraq than in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the intensity and spread of the violence was 
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seen as creating conditions for political failure, and adding to civilian casualties was seen 
as contributing to the chaos, for example in Fallujah. In Afghanistan, however, late in the 
war (especially after the departure of McChrystle in 2010), counterterrorism was pursued 
alongside counterinsurgency, and that strategy, as directed toward al Qaeda, was 
conventional in its goals (search and destroy). As such it reflected a more sovereignty-
oriented approach by attempting to regain a monopoly on violence, at least as it pertains 
to terrorist foreign fighters. In such cases, no political solution was seen as a possibility, 
and the existence of such groups remained unacceptable, leaving as the only possibility 
conventional defeat through destruction. 
I find that the legitimacy of the initial invasion in each conflict, while initially 
used in this study to provide a baseline level of legitimacy, may weigh more heavily than 
I initially thought.  In Iraq, the legitimacy of the invasion was extremely low, and the 
damage to the image of the U.S. was high and became higher throughout the war as 
conditions worsened. The rhetorical trap was stronger because the humanitarian 
rationalization for the war (liberation from tyranny and democratization) left few options 
for “winning” in a conventional sense, that is by destroying the enemy. The “enemy” was 
an elusive term because many fighters began as civilians and later became fighters. The 
enemy that emerged after the invasion was created out of the occupation that was waged 
for reasons that increasingly were seen as illegitimate, for example, the WMDs that failed 
to materialize. Thus killing civilians was especially egregious given this lack of 
legitimacy for the initial invasion. This left few avenues to repair the credibility and 
restore the moral authority of the U.S. other than to embrace a more ethical stance that 
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helped to define its own identity post-invasion. “Protector of civilians” was strategically a 
better identity because it was consistent with the humanitarian rationalization of the 
invasion, and it provided a communicative bridge between multiple publics—the Iraqi 
public, the Arab/Muslim public, the domestic public, and even the larger global public. 
As one of the strongest of all international norms, the legitimating power of the CIN 
provided a core moral purpose on which all could agree.     
In Afghanistan, the initial invasion did not suffer from the same legitimacy deficit 
as Iraq, and this is found to be correlated with a weaker commitment to innovating 
doctrine toward population protection. The invasion was broadly construed as legitimate 
since the Taliban openly defied demands to turn over al Qaeda after 9/11. Thus the 
justification of the Afghanistan conflict was more persuasively part of the “Global War 
on Terror” in that it involved terrorists and their allies. However, as time went on, and it 
became apparent that the long term foreign policy outcome was in question (bringing the 
war to a successful conclusion by producing a stable, democratic Afghanistan), the 
original legitimacy surplus became less of a factor. As in Iraq, killing civilians worked 
against the desired political outcome. As I stated above, however, when the conflict was 
finally given attention and resources, the original legitimation for the war—destroying al 
Qaeda—was invoked once again.4 In Afghanistan, a sovereignty-orientation was 
reasserted based on that original just cause. Thus, the rhetorical trap set by strengthening 
the association between terrorism and CIN violation produces uneven effects, as 
                                                          
4
 Further research might examine whether or not Obama’s refocusing the war on the destruction of Al 
Qaeda contributed to a widened berth for civilian casualties in the FATA of Pakistan.  
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evidenced by the relative weight and urgency assigned to civilian casualties in both 
conflicts.  While the evidence suggests that protecting civilians is a way to remedy a 
legitimacy gap, the gap is not attributable directly to the contradiction between words and 
deeds; rather, indications are that it is mitigated or aggravated by just cause (the jus ad 
bellum). Thus the initial legitimacy undergirding the purpose of the entire war weighed 
more heavily than was originally anticipated 
Material Factors 
Finally, though this study aimed to background material factors, one of the 
limitations of foregrounding ideational factors is that the material factors are assumed to 
be present but not independent. So while this study did not seek to measure the impact of 
material factors  in such a way, it became apparent from interviews and other sources that 
in Afghanistan, the lack of material resources devoted to the war effort was a major factor 
in tolerating civilian casualties for a much longer time than in Iraq. Air power was 
employed in direct relation to the paucity of ground troops available, and while air power 
is more discriminate than some alternatives in the context of conventional wars, civilian 
casualties are hard to avoid in the context of using air power in insurgencies. Moreover, a 
fully resourced C.O.I.N. strategy in Afghanistan was only considered once there was a 
change in civilian leadership. Even then, the timeline for achieving results would be 
extremely short.  All of these material conditions helped to shape what was possible in 
terms of implementing a civilian-centered strategy.  
Still, if one looks at the situation as two interrelated cases (occurring within a 
single organization), the two wars were competing priorities, and Iraq took the lion’s 
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share of attention and resources. Viewing this through the lens of legitimacy, however, 
Iraq could have been made a bigger priority over time because it was a bigger risk for 
U.S. reputation.  If so, legitimacy would still be the driving factor, with material 
conditions an intervening factor.  
Material factors also formed the background to these cases in the sense that global 
communications technology allows for a more potent counter-narrative to the one being 
offered by powerful states. The U.S. military came to realize that the ability to control the 
narrative was no longer possible and that civilian casualties were a major strategic boon 
to the other side. One former intelligence person interviewed told stories of the Taliban 
rushing to the site of an aerial bombardment, killing civilians and their bodies in the 
wreckage, then using cell phones to spread the images—all before the U.S. military even 
knew what had happened. Strengthening the CIN becomes a sort of damage control and 
prevention in the face of such pressure. Without a strong norm, however, and without 
identity claims resting on the norm, such images would have less import.  
Comprehensive Timeline of Both Cases: Sovereignty versus Human Rights 
The last visual representation below shows an overall timeline of the events 
covered in both cases. I had argued earlier that I expected to see a shift in attitudes over 
time from a sovereignty orientation toward civilian casualties to a more human rights 
orientation toward civilian casualties. The key indicator used was not based on numerical 
outcomes of civilian casualties due to highly problematic data collection issues,
5
 but 
                                                          
5
 See discussion about this. (docs on HR conferences plus email documenting problems. Plus reports of 
what does exist).  
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rather on what arguments were made about behavior toward civilians and whether the 
interpretation of civilian immunity was made in enabling, expansive ways (military 
necessity) or in constraining, minimizing ways (emphasizing precaution and distinction).  
Critical discourse analysis
6
 was employed in order to separate the always problematic 
issue of reading intention into arguments and claims about behavior. This is not as 
problematic in this study as it might otherwise be since the premise of this study is that 
ethical arguments relating to identity claims are used strategically, but that ultimately this 
has a constraining effect. My findings are that each conflict demonstrates the predicted 
shift from a sovereignty interpretation of CIN to a human rights interpretation of CIN.   
As I argued in chapter two, the CIN is one of the constitutive norms of warfare 
and thus of the international order that is produced within the context of warring states, 
their soldiers, and non-state actors, both combatants and civilians. The struggle for power 
between states and non-state actors is material but also social in that each seeks the 
recognition of and cooperation with civilians. The struggle for legitimacy is thus an 
important part of the social relations between states and their non-state challengers, and it 
is thus to be expected that the norms of war will evolve according to the political-social 
context. The shift from sovereignty attitudes toward human rights attitudes is visually 
demonstrated in Table 3.  
 
 
                                                          
6
 Explanation of critical discourse analysis and its hermeneutic aim of discerning social and power 
relations. 
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Further Research and Implications 
The implications derived from this study are that morality and ethics have 
constraining effects even in the realm of political behavior most closely approximating 
anarchy. Power in this case is shown to entail social dimensions articulated by the 
constructivist paradigm but still not adequately accounted for in positivist approaches to 
international relations. This study has attempted to bridge the divide between rationalism 
and constructivism through the examination of one norm in an important set of conflicts.  
One of the more striking observations I made about the orientation of military decision-
makers is that they are often much more attuned to war as a human endeavor and in many 
ways seem to intuitively reject theories of state behavior that abstract too much from this 
basic fact. Therefore, many in the military demonstrated a surprising openness to 
considering the ethical aspects of war—indeed, some of the early fascination I had with 
military perspectives grew out of discussions with military scholars about just war theory.  
Furthermore, one implication that derives from the exploration of ethical aspects 
of power is that intervention itself means intervening into a social and political setting. 
Again, a striking observation made about how doctrinal innovation developed has to do 
with how the military eventually sought help from anthropologists, human rights 
organizations, and other academics in order to better understand and perform as a social 
actor within not only local social settings, but global ones as well. Implications are that 
IR theory about state behavior and interests has much to gain from considering the role 
the military plays not just as an instrument of foreign policy but as an actor in foreign 
policy, especially regarding its role as a strategic communicator. Perhaps the most 
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important policy relevant implication is that reputation, especially among foreign publics, 
matters for democracies when using force, with the result that perceptions of the 
illegitimate use of force profoundly affect the scope and range of military options 
available in cases of intervention and long term occupation.   
The limitations of generalizing from this study are great since it looks at the 
behavior of a single state, in a single time period, within a single overarching political 
context (the GWOT). It may well be that the extraordinary turn taken by U.S. foreign 
policy in the post 9/11 years will not be repeated. Areas of further research suggested by 
this study would entail comparing cases with more variation on the dependent variable, as 
well as cases that are not fought as counterinsurgencies. Furthermore, one might see more 
variation among states that are not superpowers and that do not rely as heavily on their 
moral identity claims in order to maintain their positions within a given international 
order.   
While the generalizability of the two cases I examine may be limited, the basic 
question asked in this study is part of a growing inquiry about the relationship between 
morality and power more generally, and the role of the civilian in defining the limits on 
the use of force more specifically. An interesting comparison might include the relative 
effects of the war on terror on the strategies and doctrines of Israel versus the United 
States since Israel’s own struggles with legitimacy have been caught up in a similar net of 
terrorism, civilian casualties, and public opinion. A just released study on the impact of 
international criticism about civilian casualties in Israel echoes to some extent the 
findings of this study. Yagil Levy commented on Israel’s forced reckoning with its own 
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“hierarchy of death” as a result of international pressure, and its resulting relative 
restraint in its November 2012 operations against Gaza, Operation Pillar of Defense: 
Three years after Operation Cast Lead, Israel could no longer shift the risk to the 
Gazan noncombatants—that is, it could not reduce the soldiers’ exposure to danger by 
using a liberal fire policy that could potentially claim more Gazan civilian casualties. The 
international community has grown more vocal in its opposition to ground operations, 
and Israel more sensitive to a changing post-revolution Egypt. No less important, Israel 
learned to exercise some caution after the UN-commissioned Goldstone Report accused it 
(along with Hamas) of war crimes during Operation Cast Lead.
7
 Such cases call for a 
more thorough testing of all alternative explanations. For example, Downes’ findings that 
states will victimize civilians when they wish to annex land may suggest a relative 
weighting of the competing foreign policy goals of legitimacy versus expansion.   
Finally, the constraints democracies face based on the identification with human 
rights norms may loosen in the case of interstate war. Interstate war provides the basis for 
more permissive sovereignty-based legitimacy claims about how and when force is used. 
What the findings of this study does support is that the use of force takes place within a 
social context, and that norms provide the resources and limitations by which states claim 
the legitimate use of force.     
 
                                                          
7
   Yagil Levy, "Israel’s New Hierarchy of Death,"  Moment(January/February 2013), 
http://www.momentmag.com/opinion-israels-new-hierarchy-of-death/.Accessed 5-4-2013. The author’s 
full academic argument is made in Yagil Levy, Israel's Hierarchy of Death  (New York: New York 
University Press, 2012).   
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